Constitutional Courts as Mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil‐Military Relations, and the Rule of Law in Latin America. By Julio Ríos‐Figueroa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

• Date: 01 December 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12302
• Published date: 01 December 2017

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Constitutional Courts as Mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil-Military Relations,

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and the Rule of Law in Latin America. By Julio R

ıos-Figueroa. New York:

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Cambridge University Press, 2016.

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Reviewed by Karina Denari G. Mattos, Law School, Universidade

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Federal do Rio de Janeiro

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Comparative constitutional law is a vibrant field of study, especially

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in Latin America. The confluence of democratization and major

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economic reforms following the demise of authoritarian regimes (in

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the 1980s and early 1990s) generated a nearly consensual belief

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that the 1990s were an era of great hopes regarding civil liberties,

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political stability, and wealth distribution in the region.

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Almost three decades later, it seems that such optimistic predic-

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tion was not entirely fulfilled. Even if a wave of constitutional

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changes inscribed transformative socioeconomic rights in many

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countries’ legal orders (the “new Latin American constitutionalism”

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of Colombia 1991, Venezuela 1999, Ecuador 2008, and Bolivia

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2009), political stability, and economic growth remained somewhat

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fragile.

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The recurrent crises of presidential systems and an unprece-

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dented flood of impeachments swept Latin America in the 1990s: in

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just over a decade, six presidents faced and impeachment process

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and four of them were removed from office (P

erez-Li~

n

an 2007).

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The frequent and widespread mobilization of the impeachment

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mechanism challenged many of the dominant views among political

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scientists, reopening important questions in the literature about

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Latin American democracies, both on structure and functioning.

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The new institutional balance that is perceived in Latin America

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involves the understanding of the role of an important political and

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strategic actor: Constitutional Courts. Performing an increasingly

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active position in several of the most politically sensitive national

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issues, the courts emerge as neutral and reliable instances aimed to

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protect democratic regimes. For this reason, traditional framings

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and the mere reproduction of the common sense about judiciary

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competences are becoming outdated.

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What lessons can be drawn from these experiences? Do these

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phenomena corroborate the narratives that emphasize the insti-

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tutional fragility of Latin American democracies? Despite the

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discussion around its causes, what does political fragmentation

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and constitutional changes imply for practical functioning of

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institutions?

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R

ıos-Figueroa departs from this context to create a bold and

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compelling perspective on the structure, democratic position and

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strategic behavior of Courts. Combining a stimulating narrative and

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