Conservation of Nature and Wildlife
| Author | Winston Anderson |
| Pages | 283-315 |
Page 283
13. Conservation of Nature and Wildlife
Humanity’s sur vival is contingent on con-
serving what anthropocentricism refers
to as “natural resources”—water, soil, air,
forests, plants, wildlife, and the other life forms
that these sustain. Such biodiversity is more threat-
ened now than at any time in the past 65 million
years,1 compelling international law to put in place
treaties (as well as soft law instruments) for their
conservation. ese rules are applicable to all spe-
cies and habitats2—namely, particular habitats or
species located at the global level or restricted to
a particular region3 and all species and habitats
within a particular region.4
Features of Regulation
e Caribbean has a long and distinguished record
of nature conservation. Nascent concerns for envi-
ronmental control may be traced back to the ear-
liest environmental legislation on regional rec ord.
e Tobago Forest Reserve Act was signed into
law by the Governor, Sir Willia m Young, on April
13, 1776, and gives Tobago the dist inction of hav-
ing the oldest legally protected forest of its kind
in t he world.5 Sir William indicated that the law,
“Did a lso in pursuance of your said Instructions
remove to Your Majesty a tract of Wood Land lying
1. W R I ., W R -
127 (1992).
2. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818; and Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
3. See, e.g., Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S.
245, 11 I.L.M. 963.
4. See, e.g., Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and
Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean Region, Jan. 18, 1990, 2180
U.N.T.S. 101.
5. See Environment Tobago, e Origin of the Tobago Forest
Reserve, http://www.scsoft.de/et/et2.nsf/KAP2View/68DD73
3B5A94E00BC1256329007777A1?OpenDocument.
in the interior and most hilly parts of this island
for the purpose of attract ing f requent Showers of
Rain upon which the Fertility of Lands in these
Climates doth entirely depend.” Similar sentiments
were evident in another statute of similar v intage,
the veritable King’s Hill Enclosure Act of 1791 of
St. Vincent and t he Grenadines.6 is act was put
into force to protect “King’s Hill in the parish of St.
George and to preserve t he trees growing thereon
in order to attract clouds and rain.”7 Admittedly
another hundred years was to elapse before the
mantle was again taken up with the enactment of
statutes designed to protect other a spects of ora
and fauna important to colonial sensibilities, and
later still the habitat of t hese species. ese devel-
opments are discussed below.
Regulatory Objectives
A central objective of Caribbean environmental law
continues to be the conservation and rational use of
natural resources. Caribbean legislation treats nat-
ural resources as components of the natural envi-
ronment that are available to people to satisfy their
economic, social, and cultural needs.8 us, not
only is the natura l environment expressly dened
to include natural resources9 but also many of the
constituents specied in the denition are them-
selves, obviously, natural resources. ese resources
6. King’s Hill Enclosure Act, Ch. 239 (St. Vincent). e act com-
menced on April 2, 1791, and remains in force to this day.
7. Proprietors of adjoining land are required to plant and maintain
in good order a hedge or fence of galba between their lands, and
the act made it an oense punishable by ne and imprisonment
for any person to destroy any trees or brush on the hill.
8. Environmental Protection Act, No. 22, § 2(2), cap. 328 (1992)
(Belize) denes natural resources as “those living and non-living
natural components which are available to man in order to satisfy
his economic, social and cultural needs.”
9. For a more complete discussion of this subject, see chapter 1,
above.
Page 284 Principles of Caribbean Environmental Law
include land, water, wet lands, coastal areas, and
the seabed.
Less obvious are the so-called nonliving com-
ponents, such as geologic formations and mineral
deposits, which consist of bauxite, oil, sand, and
gold, for example. Crown v. Murphy10 illustrates
that even when the term “environment” stands
alone, it may include living fauna. Caribbean legis-
lation makes clear that “natural resources” include
both plants, animals, organisms, and other biologi-
cal factors in the environment and t heir habitats.11
Accordingly, the law regulating forestry, sheries,
birds, and other wild animals may properly fall
within the ambit of environmental law. Regulatory
strategies between nonliving resources, which tend
to be nonrenewable, and living resources, which
tend to be renewable, may dier.
Notions of Conservation, Protection, and
Management
Conservation, protection, and management—
frequently featured alternatively, and in rare cir-
cumstances conjointly, in the titles of Caribbean
environmental statutes—are clearly central to the
objective of Ca ribbean environmental law. e
terms are not usually dened, but the deliberate
selection of one term over another by individual
legislatures could support the conclusion that the
notions are not necessarily meant to be synony-
mous with each other. However, a common con-
cern is to regulate human act ion taking something
out of the environment.
In the literature “conservation” implies “pres-
ervation” and has its roots in the early U.S. natu-
ralist movement, which advocated the restriction
of access by huma n beings to environmental
resources, particularly nonrenewable resources.12
Early environmental treaties may a lso be con-
strued in a similar vein.13 Protection bears a similar
nuance, but was intended to objectify the need to
limit the impact of pollution on the environment.
“Management” reects the more recent approach
of attempting to accommodate both preservation
and consumption of environmental assets within
10. Crown v. Murphy, (1990) 64 A.L.J.R. 593 (Australia).
11. Environmental Management Act, No. 3, Ch. 35:05, § 2 (2000)
(Trin. & Tobago), §2; and Environmental Protection Act, No.
11, Cap. 20:05, § 2(m) (1996) (Guy.), §2 (m).
12. See, e.g., A L, A S C A
S H T (1968).
13. See, e.g., S L, I W L (1985),
at 62, citing, for example, the Convention for the Protection of
Birds Useful to Agriculture, Mar. 19, 1902, 102 B.F.S.P. 969.
the context of adequate planning and regulation.
In this way, management is facilitated by planning.
Still, it appears that the va riation in wording
has not indicated any substantial dierences in the
institutional and regulatory approaches adopted by
the statutes. at the concepts might not have been
intended to be mutually antagonistic is evident in
one case where the legislative caption mentions
both conservation and protection.14 Jurisdictions
whose case law carries high persuasive va lue have
dened conservation in terms of management—
the “protection and maintenance of nature while
allowing for its ecologically sustainable use.”15
Ethical Dimensions
Nature conser vation involves a delicate process of
balancing the interests of the plant and animal
components of the natura l environment with the
interest of humans. However, the fact that humans
are the arbiters of that compromise introduces fun-
damental philosophical questions.16 Essentially,
there a re two broad ethical approaches underpin-
ning policy-making in this area.
Integrity of Nature
e rst approach focuses on respecting the integ-
rity of nature by, as far as human ex istence allows,
leaving it alone, even if that means elements of the
natural environment are damaged or destroyed.
A hidden premise is the view that the actions of
nature may have reason that huma n reasoning
knows nothing about. ere are clear linkages here
to nonanthropocentricism: a concern for biocentric
ethics, or respect and reverence for life.17 Related is
the work of A ldo Leopold in propounding a land
ethic to take in the whole biotic community.18
Above all else, this rst approach is a reection
of deep ecology—a philosophy that emphasizes
comprehension of t he true essence of humankind
as integral to, rather than separate from, nature. All
forms of life are interdependent, so in the most fun-
damental sense nature is an extension of humans.
It may be, therefore, inappropriate to u se a crude
14. See, e.g., National Conservation and Environment Protection
Act, No. 5 (1987) (St. Christopher).
15. See D. E. F, A E L (2003), at
11.
16. See generally J. A D. W, E L
E (1999), esp. at ch. 9.
17. See, e.g., A S , C E
(translated by Nash, 1960).
18. See, e.g., L, supra note 12.
Conservation of Nature and Wildlife Page 285
economic cost-benet analysis as the basis for envi-
ronmental intervention.
Occasionally, criminal penalties have been
imposed for broader altr uistic reas ons. In Ford
v. Wiley,19 the court held that the operation of
“dishorn ing” caused extreme pain without ade-
quate and reasonable object. e practice was
unneces sarily abusive of the animal a nd was thus
unjustiable. e respondent w as rightly c on-
victed. Judge Hawkins said the question before
the court was whether the prac tice of “d ishorn-
ing” for purposes stated in t he case was lawful.
He thoug ht the practice wa s illegal and oug ht to
be suppressed.
In constr uing §2 of the act for the more eec-
tual prevention of cruelty to animals, the judge
believed that t he word “cruelty” predominated,
governing the whole sentence, a nd that to bring a
person within the operation of that section, he or
she must be proven to have cruelly committed the
act charged against him or her. To support a con-
viction, t wo th ings must be proven: (a) that pain
or suering has been inicted in fact and (b) that
it was inicted cruelly, that is, without necessity or
without good reason. What amounts to a necessity
or good reason for inicting suering on animals
protected by statute is hardly capable of satisfac-
tory denition. Each case in which the question is
raised must depend on a variety of circumstances,
and as such is a question of fact.
Maintenance of Diversity
e second perspective is largely anthropocentric
and concentrates on “species” and “ecosystems,”
taking the view that the function of humans is
to maintain the health, vitality, and diversity of
nature. is view justies huma n intervention
and reects the human perspective of t he proper
balance of nature, that is, that harmful species
must be eliminated and nature must be positively
improved.
Some examples of such interventions include the
introduction of foreign species into the environ-
ment to support an ecosystem, and the imposition
of conditions on development to recongure land
subject to bauxite mining into grazing pastures.
Reference is made to the components of nature as
“resources,” implying that their availability for use
and manipulation by humans is ameliorated only
19. Ford v. Wiley, (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 203 (Eng.).
by the need to conserve them for future human
needs a nd concerns. In short, this is an extension
of anthropocentrism and justies human domina-
tion into the indenite future.
A basic assumption of the anthropocentric doc-
trine is that humans can manage and even improve
upon nature. However, from the beginning inter-
vention ha s been based on articial human con-
structs. us, “species” are taken to refer to “a
population whose members are able to interbreed
freely under natural conditions, thus providing a
genetic lifeline,” and “ecosystem” means “a collec-
tion of living things and non-living natural features
which appear to be interdependent a nd to some
extent, self-regulating.”20 But it has been pointed
out that t hese concepts do not correspond to any-
thing in the natural world—for, as quantum phys-
ics has revea led, there are no well-dened edges to
the components of nature to support that kind of
mechanical jurisprudence.21
Neverthele ss, it mu st be c onceded t hat the
anthropoc entric projection of human values and
concerns is at the heart of nature and wildlife
conservation. In at least one Caribbea n jurisdic-
tion there remai ns a legislative provision oer-
ing nancial rewards for the presentation of the
tail of the green monkey, an animal considered
a pest to the island’s agricult ure.22 R v. Somerset
County Council, ex par te Fewings23 accepted that
keeping the deer p opulation within manageable
proportions by allowing the traditiona l sport of
deer hunting by hounds fell w ithin the re gulatory
power of the council to ma nage land for the “b en-
et, improvement a nd development” of the area
as a whole.
International Law of Biodiversity
Protection
Nature and wildlife conservation has been pro-
moted in several “soft law” instruments. e vener-
able Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment recognized that “[M]
an has a special responsibility to safeguard and
wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habi-
tat which are now gravely imperiled”, and called for
nature and wildlife conser vation to “receive impor-
20. J. A D. W, E L E
(1999), esp. 246-49.
21. Id.
22. As the position in Barbados has been for several decades.
23. R v. Somerset Cnty. Council, ex parte Fewings, [1995] 3 All
E.R. 20 (Eng.).
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