Conscientious Objection and the State

• Author: Adi Livny
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17743988
• Published date: 01 October 2018
• Date: 01 October 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Conscientious Objection

and the State:

Contextualizing the

Israeli Case

Adi Livny

1

Abstract

The abundant writingon conscientious objection (CO) had kept onesignificant actor

rather neglected—the state.Relatively unexploredis the question of how democracies

shape their policies toward CO. This article wishes to address this gap, focusing in

particular on states that maintain conscription, and examiningwhat accounts for their

different responses to CO. Based on the Israeli case study, while drawing on com-

parative insights from The Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland during the

Cold War, I argue that states’ treatment of CO depends primarily on the military’s

status and the type of roles assigned to conscription. States in which these roles are

mainlyfunctional, and themilitary does not enjoy,accordingly, a highsymbolic status will

be more inclined to formally recognize CO than states in which the military fulfills

civilian–social roles and enjoys a high symbolic status. Lack of recognition, however,

does not necessarily imply harshness; states of the latter sort might nonetheless

accommodateCO through unofficial means.Thus, when discussing the policytowards

CO a distinction isought to be made between accommodation and recognition.

Keywords

civil–military relations, defense policy, democracy, law, militarism, political science,

recruitment/retention

Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has maintained a policy of conscription for

men and women alike. Conscription, along with the ongoing occupation of the West

1

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

Corresponding Author:

Adi Livny, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel.

Email: adi.livny@mail.huji.ac.il

Armed Forces & Society

2018, Vol. 44(4) 666-687

ªThe Author(s) 2017

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X17743988

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Bank (and the Gaza Strip until 2005) and the conflicts arising from the constant

encounter between soldiers and civilians, has all made the question of conscientious

objection (CO) to military service of central interest, especially since the eruption of

the Al-Aqsa Intifada in the early 2000s.

CO is not only a subject of public controversy but has also received much scholarly

attention. The phenomenon has engaged political philosophers who focus on its nor-

mative aspects, argue over its definition, and consider its legitimacy under various

circumstances (Asheri-Shahaf, 2016; Sagi & Shapira, 2002); historical–sociological

accounts, on the other hand, deal with the objectors themselves, as groups or individ-

uals, accounting for their experiences and for the social and political significance of

objection (Epstein, 1999, 2006; Helman, 1999; Linn, 1986, 2012; Weiss, 2014).

Yet this abundant writing has neglected one significant actor—the state. Rela-

tively unexplored is the question of how democracies shape their policies toward

CO, on how they vary from one another in their treatment of CO and what accounts

for their different responses. I wish to address this gap, focusing in particular on

democracies that maintain conscription, for which the challenge of CO is of long-

term importance, unlimited to a specific war or campaign, and thus part of their

general recruitment policies.

These questions will be addressed through a careful examination of the Israeli

policy toward CO, while also drawing on comparative insights from two diametri-

cally opposed historical case studies: Switzerland and The Federal Republic of

Germany (FRG) —which within the West-European context of the Cold War—were

the least and most tolerant states toward COs, respectively.

Based on these three cases, I argue that states’ treatment of CO depends primarily

on the military’s status in society and the type of roles assigned to conscription.

States in which these roles are mainly functional, and the military does not enjoy,

accordingly, a high symbolic status will be more inclined to formally recognize CO

than states in which the military fulfils civilian–social roles and enjoys symbolic

status. Lack of recognition, however, does not necessarily imply harshness; states of

the latter sort might nonetheless accommodate CO through unofficial means.

CO and the State

Moskos and Chambers’ (1993) collected volume offered the most comprehensive

scholarly account of states’ policies toward CO. While most authors deal with

individual case studies, Noone’s chapter offers a thorough survey of states’ legal

practices toward CO. He furthe r argued that variations betwee n states could be

attributed to their diverging security circumstances. While Switzerland was an

exception, since its security situation cannot explain its harsh treatment of CO

(pp. 194–195), the cases of Israel, Cuba, and South Africa were cited as indicative

of this rule of thumb.

An alternate explanation attributes differences between states’ policies to polit-

ical culture, which refers to the “impact of society’s history and the underlying social

Livny 667