Conscience as a Regulatory Function: An Integrative Theory Put to the Test

• Author: Marion Verkade,Julie Karsten,Frans Koenraadt,Frans Schalkwijk
• Date: 01 March 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/0306624X19881918
• Published date: 01 March 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X19881918

International Journal of

Offender Therapy and

Comparative Criminology

2020, Vol. 64(4) 375 –395

© The Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0306624X19881918

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Article

Conscience as a Regulatory

Function: An Integrative

Theory Put to the Test

Marion Verkade1, Julie Karsten2,

Frans Koenraadt1,3,4, and Frans Schalkwijk5

Abstract

The subject of this study is an integrative theory of the conscience. According to this

theory, conscience is operationalised as a regulatory function of one’s own behaviour

and identity, resulting from an interplay of empathy, self-conscious emotions such

as guilt and shame, and moral reasoning. This study aimed to evaluate conscience in

an adult forensic psychiatric sample by assessing the underlying factors proposed by

Schalkwijk. Offenders (n = 48) appeared to show less affective but not less cognitive

empathy, less identification with others, less personal distress in seeing others’

suffering, less shame and shame-proneness, and lower levels of moral reasoning

than non-offenders (n = 50). In coping with self-conscious emotions, offenders used

the same amount of externalising coping strategies, but fewer internalising coping

strategies.

Keywords

conscience, empathy, guilt, shame, moral reasoning, offenders, delinquency

Introduction

In forensic mental health reports, descriptive diagnoses of conscience functioning are

often formulated in vague terms such as “lacunary conscience functioning” or a

“defective conscience” (Le Sage, 2006; Stapert, 2010). However, in the absence of a

1GGZ Drenthe, Assen, The Netherlands

2University of Groningen, The Netherlands

3Utrecht University, The Netherlands

4Netherlands Institute for Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, Utrecht, The Netherlands

5Private Practice, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Marion Verkade, Forensic Psychiatric Hospital, GGZ Drenthe, P.O. Box 30000, 9400 RA Assen, The

Netherlands.

Email: marion.verkade@ggzdrenthe.nl

881918IJOXXX10.1177/0306624X19881918International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative CriminologyVerkade et al.

research-article2019

376 International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 64(4)

clear definition of conscience, theoretical substantiation of these terms is lacking.

Researchers face similar problems when operationalising conscience and relating con-

science to offending: Some authors refer to shame and guilt (Spruit, Schalkwijk, Van

Vugt, & Stams, 2016), whereas others refer to cognitive moral development (Gibbs,

2010), emotional moral development (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998), or empathic capacity

(Hoffman, 2000; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004). Unambiguous definitions are hard to

come by, and prevailing mono-aspective definitions provide only variable evidence

when tested (Stapert, 2010). This situation hampers theoretically research-based diag-

nostics, assessment of criminogenic needs, and treatment planning. Schalkwijk (2006,

2009, 2015) effectively addressed this problem by proposing a theory which brings

together the existing knowledge on self-conscious emotions, moral knowledge, and

empathy to approach the operationalisation of conscience as a multidimensional

construct.

Schalkwijk (2011, 2018) considers the conscience to be a psychological function

which monitors the balance of self-esteem and identity. As long as self-esteem is in

balance and the sense of identity is not threatened, the conscience remains inactive. In

the case of a disruptive threat, however, it becomes active and starts to regulate the

disruptive factors in order to restore balance. These disruptions, stemming from evalu-

ation of concrete behaviour or internal behaviour such as feelings, thoughts, and fan-

tasies, can pertain to both one’s intrapersonal and one’s social-relational sense of

identity. This psychological function emerges and becomes more refined during the

course of a child’s development, initially manifesting itself in the capacity for empa-

thy, followed by proneness to experience and regulate self-conscious emotions such as

shame, guilt or pride and, lastly, the capacity for moral reasoning (Schalkwijk, 2015).

The advantage of this developmental theory is its integration of the hitherto separate

fields of knowledge on the relation between offending and empathy, self-conscious

emotions and morality; all of these become meaningful in relation to one’s sense of

self-esteem and identity. The resulting integrative theory enables theoretically based

diagnostics and treatment indications and is put to the test in this study.

In a comparative study involving delinquent and nondelinquent adolescents,

Schalkwijk tested his integrative theory of the conscience to see whether the selected

domains of the conscience do, in fact, enable to reveal differences in the developmen-

tal level of the conscience (Schalkwijk, Stams, Stegge, Dekker, & Peen, 2016). Results

indicated that delinquents show lower levels of affective empathic capacity, are less

prone to experience shame and guilt, more prone to experience pride, and more pun-

ishment-oriented than victim-oriented. This outcome paves the way for further explo-

ration of the conceptual framework, to better evaluate the conscience and indicate for

suitable interventions. The present study replicates this study for the first time in a

population of adult patients, to test the validity and broad applicability of Schalkwijk’s

earlier results.

Although not studied in unison, the different domains that make up Schalkwijk’s

concept of conscience have been studied separately and associated with offending.

First, a lack of empathy is associated with offending (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004;

Van Langen, Wissink, Van Vugt, Van der Stouwe, & Stams, 2014) and aggressive