Congressional Vote Options

• Date: 01 August 2003
• Author: DAVID C. KING,RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER
• Published date: 01 August 2003
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.3162/036298003X200935

387Congressional Vote Options

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXVIII, 3, August 2003 387

DAVID C. KING

RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER

Harvard University

Congressional Vote Options

Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders often secure “hip-pocket

votes” or “if you need me” pledges from rank-and-file legislators. These are essen-

tially options on votes. Leaders exercise sufficient options—pay legislators to convert

to favorable votes—when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release

the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders produces many

small victories, few small losses, and losses that are, on average, larger than victories.

We find precisely these patterns, hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congres-

sional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non-key votes from the

106th Congress (1999–2000).

Introduction

On June 20, 2001, the House of Representatives took up a supple-

mental appropriations bill. President George W. Bush, having signed a

large tax cut package a few days earlier, strongly favored a controversial

provision to spend $30.5 million on mailings that would tell taxpayers a

rebate check was in the offing. David Obey (D-WI) offered an amend-

ment to spend the money on drug-trafficking programs instead. The

official record from that vote shows that President Bush and the House

Republican leadership won, defeating Obey’s proposal 216 to 212 (Parks

2001), but that narrow tally tells only part of the story. Six Republicans

changed their votes from “yes” to “no” as the Republican leadership

extended the time for voting. In those closing minutes, Republican

leaders called in “if you need me” pledges from wavering members

while full-throated Democrats chanted “shame, shame, shame.” If

changing or delaying one’s vote in response to a promise from the

leadership is a real shame, then it is widely shared.

Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-PA), for example, cast the

deciding vote on President Clinton’s 1993 budget-reconciliation bill. As

the last legislator to vote on August 5, 1993, the outcome was hers to

determine, and most observers expected a “no” vote. Margolies-

Mezvinsky voted “yes” instead. Congressional Quarterly tells the

story: “She had pledged during her campaign and even the day before

388 David C. King and Richard J. Zeckhauser

the vote that she would vote against a bill that increased taxes. But

Democratic leaders extracted a private promise from her to support

the deficit-reduction package if her vote proved necessary to pass it”

(CQ Almanac 1993, C39). This was a classic “if you need me” pledge,

which we shall label an “option.” Although it was widely predicted that

the tax package would be handily defeated, President Clinton and House

leaders got matters close enough that calling in the option on Margolies-

Mezvinsky’s vote was worthwhile; the bill triumphed by a single vote.

The literature on presidential leadership is rich (Bond and Fleisher

1990; Covington 1987, 1988; de Marchi and Sullivan 1998; Edwards

1989; Kernell 1993; Moe and Howell 1999; Peterson 1990; Sullivan

1987, 1990a, 1990b; Rivers and Rose 1985). Likewise, insightful scholar-

ship has addressed the role of coalition leaders in Congress (Baron and

Ferejohn 1989; Carrubba and Volden 2000; Cooper and Brady 1981;

Dodd 1983; Fiorina and Shepsle 1989; Groseclose and Snyder 1996;

Sinclair 1995; Snyder 1991). None of these models includes what is at

the heart of the Obey and the Margolies-Mezvinsky stories. Yet the

story is common in legislatures, where the art of politics is deft coalition

building and “if you need me” pledges are critical building blocks.

This paper employs a simple, nonformal model to introduce the

concept of securing options on votes. In brief, leaders build coalitions

that are “close enough” to make it worthwhile to call in pledges from

cross-pressured members. In most legislatures, coalition leaders rarely

buy votes outright at the moment they need them, as consumers buy

apples or candy bars. Rather, legislative leaders purchase “hip-pocket”

votes or “if you need me” pledges, which are options on votes to be

called in if and when needed.

President Clinton saw several “narrow victory” coalitions unravel.

Few were more embarrassing than the defeat he suffered on the 1994

Omnibus Crime Bill.1 On a critical procedural vote, White House Chief

of Staff Leon Panetta boldly predicted victory (“we’re going to kick

some ass” was his delicate phrasing), but the president lost by 15 votes

in the House. A hoped-for win turned out to be a big loss. Why? “Several

members who had been willing to support the leadership if needed

instead voted no when it became clear the [measure] would not pass,”

explain Idelson and Sammon (1994, 52). President Clinton did not get

the vote close enough to make it worthwhile to call in the “if you need

me” pledges (i.e., to exercise the vote options) he had spent the previous

week securing.

When coalition leaders do secure sufficient votes to win, excess

vote options will not be exercised. Washington Democrat Norm Dicks

said as much to John Kasich (R-OH) and Ron Dellums (D-CA) on