Congressional Processes and Public Approval of New Laws

• Date: 01 December 2019
• Published date: 01 December 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918819860
• Author: James M. Curry
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918819860

Political Research Quarterly

2019, Vol. 72(4) 878 –893

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918819860

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Article

Voters generally care about ends, not means; they judge

government by results and are generally ignorant of or

indifferent about the methods by which the results are

achieved.

—Samuel Popkin (1994, 99).

I don’t think procedural stuff really resonates with most

Americans. It may add generally to their cynicism, but it is

accomplishment—or lack of it—that matters much more.

—Tom Daschle, former Senate majority leader.1

Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as

we know how they are made.

—John Godfrey Saxe.2

Does how Congress makes a law influence approval of

that law? Since the 1970s, Congress has increasingly

employed unorthodox legislative processes to pass leg-

islation. Once characterized as a decentralized and

norm-driven institution that typically adhered to “reg-

ular order” legislative procedures, the contemporary

Congress frequently bypasses traditional processes

when considering legislation, and today’s congressio-

nal leaders are willing to use all procedural tools at

their disposal to achieve legislative goals (Hanson

2014; Sinclair 2016; Smith 2014).

The public expresses a general preference for civil and

bipartisan policy making, and there is ample empirical

evidence that legislative and public politicking can dam-

age approval of and faith in Congress as an institution

(Harbridge and Malhotra 2011; Jones 2013; Mutz 2015;

Ramirez 2009). But does procedural wrangling influence

public approval of the laws being wrangled, too? This

question has been little studied3 but may have important

implications, as citizen skepticism of government pro-

cesses can reduce public compliance with the law (Marien

and Hooghe 2011; Tyler 2006), participation in political

processes (Cox 2003; Grönlund and Setälä 2007; cf.

Hetherington 1999), and faith in political leaders

(Hetherington 1998).

Information about the use of unorthodox tactics may

reduce approval for new laws in large part because most

citizens have “process preferences” that engender skepti-

cism of legislative politicking (Hibbing and Theiss-

Morse 2002), and a sense of “procedural justice” which

leads them to view some governmental processes as

inherently more, or less, fair (Tyler 1994, 2006).

Moreover, information about the use of unorthodox pro-

cesses may exacerbate partisan motivated reasoning

(Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013) among citi-

zens deciding whether to approve or disapprove of a

policy. Reading that Congress bypassed traditional steps

of the legislative process is likely to further reduce

approval for the policy enacted among those already

819860PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918819860Political Research QuarterlyCurry

research-article2018

1The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA

Corresponding Author:

James M. Curry, Department of Political Science, The University of

Utah, Carolyn and Kem Gardner Commons, Suite 3345, 260 South

Central Campus Dr., Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA.

Email: james.curry@utah.edu

Congressional Processes and

Public Approval of New Laws

James M. Curry1

Abstract

Does how Congress makes a law affect public approval of that law? This question has been little studied, but the rising

use of unorthodox processes in Congress raises concerns about the perceived legitimacy of congressional action

among the public. Utilizing two unique survey experiments, I present evidence that when people are aware of the

use of unorthodox legislative processes they express lower levels of approval for new laws. This effect is especially

pronounced among partisans already inclined to be in opposition to the law, further solidifying their opposition.

These findings have important implications for a Congress that in recent years has increasingly turned to unorthodox

legislative processes to pass legislation.

Keywords

Congress, unorthodox lawmaking, public approval

Curry 879

inclined to be opposed based on policy preferences or

partisan-leanings.

This article assesses the impact of public awareness of

the use of certain unorthodox processes on approval of

new laws. Specifically, it analyzes how procedural hard-

ball tactics—tactics with which congressional leaders

strain the rules and bypass traditional legislative pro-

cesses to win legislative battles—affect levels of public

support for the policies enacted. To do this, I draw on two

survey experiments, the first embedded in a module of

the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

(CCES), and the second fielded using Amazon’s

Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in 2016. Both experiments

asked respondents to read descriptions of hypothetical

new policies passed by Congress, modeled on the lan-

guage used in newspaper accounts of congressional

action. Respondents in control groups just read about the

law, while those in the experimental groups also read

about processes used to enact the law. The results show

that reading about the use of hardball processes reduces

approval for the laws, with the sharpest effects among

partisans who might already disapprove. In the conclu-

sions, I discuss the implications of these findings for a

contemporary era in which Congress is frequently relying

on unorthodox tactics to make laws.

Congressional Unorthodoxy

Once characterized as a legislature governed by institu-

tional norms and an adherence to traditional, regular

order legislative processes, the contemporary Congress

frequently bypasses traditional processes, and its mem-

bers are more willing to employ all of the procedural

tools at their disposal to achieve legislative goals. Barbara

Sinclair (2016, 5) termed this new approach unorthodox

lawmaking, as “the legislative process on major legisla-

tion is now regularly characterized by a variety of what

were once unorthodox practices and procedures.”

What does unorthodox lawmaking look like? It includes

bypassing the traditional committee stages of the legisla-

tive process ahead of floor consideration (Bendix 2016a),

with fewer bills subject to committee hearings and testi-

mony (Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones 2016). It also

includes closed-down consideration of legislation on the

House and Senate floors, with strict limits on debate and

amendment (Bach and Smith 1988; Finocchiaro and Rohde

2008; Wallner 2013). Likewise, it includes secretive and

behind-the-scenes decision making (Curry 2015), with

party leaders assuming more responsibility for cutting

deals and constructing legislative proposals (Aldrich and

Rohde 2000; Hanson 2014; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 2016).

Most major lawmaking efforts of the last several years

have relied on unorthodox processes. Most major legisla-

tive drives of the 115th Congress (2017–2018) relied on

unorthodox tactics. Both the Republicans’ Affordable

Care Act (ACA) repeal and tax reform efforts used spe-

cial “budget reconciliation” rules that allow Congress to

sidestep filibusters and limit debate (Reynolds 2017).

The ACA repeal also featured highly secretive processes

in which rank-and-file legislators were kept in the dark

about deals made behind the scenes.4 Several omnibus

spending packages reflected negotiations conducted at

the leadership table, with committee processes bypassed

almost entirely.5 These highly unorthodox legislative pro-

cesses have received considerable attention in the media

and among political observers.6

Although this approach helps Congress pass legisla-

tion (Curry 2015; Sinclair 2016), many scholars and

observers view unorthodox lawmaking processes as anti-

deliberative, resulting in dysfunction (Lewallen,

Theriault, and Jones 2016; Mann and Ornstein 2006,

2012), the development of poor-quality laws (Bendix

2016b; Drutman 2016; Lewallen 2016), and an erosion of

Congress’s public esteem (Ramirez 2009). Do such atti-

tudes affect how the broader public responds to congres-

sional action?

Why Process Might Affect Approval

of New Policies

Most scholarship finds people approve or disapprove of a

new policy based on its congruence with their policy

preferences (Burden 1997; Coughlin 1992; Downs 1957;

Enelow and Hinich 1984; Page and Shapiro 2010;

Wlezien 1995), its relationship to their partisan attach-

ments (Bartels 2002; Henderson and Hillygus 2011;

Layman and Carsey 2002; Miller and Shanks 1996;

Shanks and Miller 1991), and their perceptions of the

policy’s effects or consequences (Fiorina 1981; Gomez

and Wilson 2001; Healy and Malhotra 2013; Kinder and

Kiewiet 1979; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Tufte

1975). However, there are reasons to suspect processes

may influence approval of new policies, as well.

Specifically, because citizens: (1) have “process prefer-

ences,” (2) have a sense of procedural justice, and (3)

often evaluate political events on the basis of partisan

motivated reasoning.

First, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001, 2002) find

that people’s attitudes about their government and its

actions reflect more than policy preferences, but process

preferences as well. These preferences capture citizen’s

attitudes about how they believe government should and

should not work. The individuals in Hibbing and Theiss-

Morse’s focus groups saw political conflict as driven by

the influence of special interests, evidence of a discon-

nect between lawmakers and ordinary Americans, and a

consequence of corruption in Washington. In their view,

abstruse legislative processes should be unnecessary and