Congress' Right to Remain Silent in Dickerson v. United States - or - How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Miranda v. Arizona

• Publication year: 2022

34 Creighton L. Rev. 801. CONGRESS' RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT IN DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES - OR - HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE MIRANDA v. ARIZONA

Creighton Law Review

Vol. 34

Andrew W. Muller - '02

INTRODUCTION

Any watcher of television police programs will recognize the following as familiar:

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before you answer any questions.(fn1)

In Miranda v. Arizona,(fn2) the United States Supreme Court concluded that authorities must utilize procedural safeguards in order to protect the self-incrimination rights of those persons taken into custody.(fn3) The warnings the Court in Miranda articulated were a required prerequisite in order to overcome the pressures inherent in the atmosphere of interrogations.(fn4) The warnings were also a prerequisite for the admissibility of any statement made by the defendant.(fn5) In Dickerson v. United States,(fn6) the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda was a constitutional decision and could not be overturned by an act of Congress.(fn7) The question presented in Dickerson concerned whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501(fn8) governed the admission of confessions or whether Miranda governed such admissions.(fn9) Such a question turned on whether the Miranda exclusionary rule was a constitutional requirement or whether Congress could modify such a rule.(fn10)

This Note will first review the facts and the holdings throughout the procedural history of Dickerson.(fn11) Next, this Note will cite and review background cases in the area of the admissibility of statements made by criminals and other related areas.(fn12) This Note will then explore why, under the "last resort rule," the Court was required to rule on the constitutionality of section 3501.(fn13) This Note will demonstrate that the general rule regarding Congress' ability to draft rules of evidence and procedure is the proper rule to govern adjudication of the 3501 issue.(fn14) This Note will argue the requirement of warnings in Miranda is a prophylactic measure and that the Supreme Court in Dickerson incorrectly concluded that Miranda's warning requirement was constitutionally mandated and therefore immune from Congressional modification.(fn15) Finally, this Note will argue that the Court ignored a possible means of upholding Miranda without distorting post-Miranda cases.(fn16)

FACTS AND HOLDING

In January 1997, a string of robberies occurred at banks in Maryland and Virginia.(fn17) The robbery in question occurred on January 24, 1997.(fn18) On that day, an individual with a black leather bag and a silver semi-automatic handgun exited the First Virginia Bank in Old Town, Alexandria, Virginia, with eight hundred seventy six dollars in cash stolen from the bank.(fn19) According to an eyewitness account, the robber ran down the street and jumped into a white Oldsmobile Ciera.(fn20)

The license plate numbers corresponded with those of an Oldsmobile Ciera registered in the name of Charles T. Dickerson, a resident of Takoma Park.(fn21) On January 27, 1997, a police detective from Alexandria and ten Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents went to Dickerson's residence.(fn22) FBI Special Agent Christopher Lawlor knocked on Dickerson's door.(fn23) Upon Dickerson's answer, Special Agent Lawlor informed Dickerson of an investigation regarding a bank robbery.(fn24) Special Agent Lawlor conversed briefly with Dickerson and asked if Dickerson would accompany the agents to the FBI Field Office located in Washington, D.C. ("D.C. Field Office"), to which Dickerson agreed.(fn25)

Before leaving, Dickerson went to his bedroom to retrieve his coat.(fn26) When Dickerson went to get his coat, Special Agent Lawlor noticed a substantial amount of cash lying on the bed.(fn27) Dickerson explained that he won the cash gambling in Atlantic City.(fn28) Dickerson denied the agents' request to search the apartment and then accompanied them to the D.C. Field Office.(fn29) After Dickerson and the accompanying agents departed, several other agents stayed around outside Dickerson's apartment.(fn30)

At the D.C. Field Office, Special Agent Lawlor and Detective Thomas Durkin, a member of the Alexandria Police Department, questioned Dickerson regarding the robberies.(fn31) Dickerson denied he played any role in the robbery, but he did admit to his presence in Old Town during the January 24 robbery.(fn32) Dickerson explained that he had met an old acquaintance near the First Virginia Bank who needed a ride to Suitland, Maryland.(fn33) Dickerson explained that he had agreed to give the acquaintance a ride.(fn34)

Special Agent Lawlor excused himself and called Judge James E. Kenkel, a United States Magistrate Judge.(fn35) Special Agent Lawlor requested a search warrant to search Dickerson's apartment, describing the Old Town robbery to Judge Kenkel.(fn36) Special Agent Lawlor also made note of the fact that Dickerson had more than five hundred fifty dollars in cash before going to the D.C. Field office, gave his landlord one thousand three hundred and fifty dollars for past rent that very day, and confessed he was near the bank when the robbery occurred.(fn37) Special Agent Lawlor requested the telephonic warrant because he had not officially placed Dickerson under arrest.(fn38) Furthermore, according to Special Agent Lawlor, a high possibility existed that Dickerson might destroy evidence of the robbery if Dickerson were allowed to return to his apartment.(fn39)

Judge Kenkel believed probable cause existed as to whether Dickerson's apartment contained evidence concerning the bank robbery.(fn40) Special Agent Lawlor identified items to be seized as evidence of a bank robbery.(fn41) Special Agent Lawlor wrote that Judge Kenkel issued the warrant at 8:50 p.m.(fn42) After receiving the warrant, Special Agent Lawlor authorized Agent Lawrence Wenko, who had remained near Dickerson's apartment, to proceed with the search of Dickerson's apartment.(fn43)

Special Agent Lawlor returned to the interview room and informed Dickerson that agents were preparing to search Dickerson's apartment.(fn44) Dickerson admitted to driving the getaway car in the string of bank robberies and named Jimmy Rochester as the person who actually robbed the banks.(fn45) Dickerson's account of the events of the Old Town robbery was consistent with previous eyewitness statements.(fn46) When Dickerson finished his statement, the agents placed him under arrest.(fn47)

Police apprehended and arrested Rochester.(fn48) Rochester confessed to the robberies of various banks in Georgia, Virginia (among these, the First Virginia Bank robbery), and Maryland.(fn49) He further stated that Dickerson drove the getaway car for the bank robberies in Maryland and Virginia.(fn50)

A grand jury indicted Dickerson for conspiring to rob a bank.(fn51) The indictments were based on Dickerson's and Rochester's confessions, as well as the evidence obtained from searching Dickerson's apartment and his car.(fn52) The grand jury also indicted Dickerson for use of a "firearm during and in relation to a crime."(fn53)

Dickerson moved to suppress the statements and related evidence.(fn54) Dickerson moved to suppress (1) his statements made while at the D.C. Field Office, (2) the evidence produced as a direct result of his comments, (3) the evidence obtained from his apartment, and (4) the evidence obtained from his car.(fn55) The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held a hearing on May 30, 1997, to consider Dickerson's motion to suppress and the government's opposition thereto.(fn56)

At the hearing, Special Agent Lawlor testified Dickerson received and waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona(fn57) before he confessed.(fn58) Special Agent Lawlor further testified Dickerson received and waived his Miranda rights shortly after Special Agent Lawlor received the search warrant.(fn59) According to Dickerson, he admitted to being involved in the robberies before officers read his Miranda rights.(fn60)

The district court granted part of Dickerson's motion to suppress.(fn61) The court stated that Dickerson's confession had been taken in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment.(fn62) Additionally, the court stated police conducted a search of Dickerson's home in vio-lation of his Fourth Amendment rights.(fn63) The district court called Special Agent Lawlor's testimony into question based on documentary evidence.(fn64) The court found Dickerson's testimony that he received his Miranda warnings post-confession more credible.(fn65) The court, therefore, granted part of Dickerson's motion to suppress.(fn66) The court suppressed only the statement the agents obtained in violation of Dickerson's Miranda rights.(fn67) The court allowed other evidence obtained as a result of the violation such as statements indicating Dickerson was the driver of the getaway car.(fn68) The court also suppressed part of the physical evidence obtained from searching Dickerson's apartment, but allowed physical evidence produced from a search of his car.(fn69)

In July 1997, the government requested the district court reconsider its decision to suppress Dickerson's confession...