Conflicts of Values and Political Forgiveness

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12214
• Published date: 01 May 2014
• Date: 01 May 2014

Paul Nieuwenburg is associate

professor of political philosophy in the

Department of Political Science at Leiden

University and codirector of the Centre of

Political Philosophy. He has held positions

in departments of philosophy, public

administration, and legal philosophy as

well. His research focuses on issues in moral

psychology, public ethics, and constitutional

theory. He is interested in both historical

and systematic aspects of political philoso-

phy and tries to combine these interests

where possible.

E-mail: pnieuwenburg@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

374 Public Administration Review • May | June 2014

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 74, Iss. 3, pp. 374–382. © 2014 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12214.

Paul Nieuwenburg

Leiden University, The Netherlands

Citizens have a right to be governed by of‌f‌i cials with

an acute awareness of the conf‌l icts between the consti-

tutional values of liberal democracy. Such an awareness

is an integral part of a public of‌f‌i cial’s integrity.  at is

why citizens should have a say in deciding whether to

remove from of‌f‌i ce an of‌f‌i cial with such integrity. In this

article, this type of conf‌l ict between constitutional values

is translated into the terms of an individual of‌f‌i cial’s

decision making with the help of moral theory.  is yields

two paradoxes: one focusing on the decision maker and

the other on the object of his or her decisions: the citizen.

 ese paradoxes lead to the following questions: If run-

ning a liberal democratic constitution essentially involves

moral complexity, should we not try to have it run by of‌f‌i -

cials with a sensitivity to that complexity? And if of‌f‌i cials

with that sensitivity are bound to commit moral wrongs

because of complexity, do not we owe them something like

political forgiveness?  e paradoxes are used to formulate

conditions for political forgiveness.

While the integrity of a public of‌f‌i cial is mul-

tifaceted and complex, it certainly includes

the endorsement of values enshrined in

the constitution that, in the words of the late John

Rohr (1986), he or she has to “run.” But what if these

values clash violently in a moral dilemma? Such is

the predicament of the police of‌f‌i cer in the following

real-life case.

On September 27, 2002, Jakob von Metzler, son

of a Frankfurt-based private banker, is kidnapped

by 27-year-old law student Magnus Gäfgen. In a

letter to Jakob’s parents, Gäfgen demands a ransom

of 1 million euros. Two days later, the kidnapper is

identif‌i ed while collecting the money.  e next day,

on September 30, Gäfgen is arrested by the Frankfurt

police. During interrogation, Gäfgen consistently

misinforms his interrogators as to the whereabouts of

Jakob. At one point, Gäfgen tells them to go and take

a look at a cottage near a lake not far from Frankfurt.

In the cottage, police of‌f‌i cers f‌i nd a bed with blood-

stained blankets.  ey surmise that if Jakob is still

alive, he is likely to be in serious danger.

In the early morning hours of October 1, 2002, all

this is reported to the responsible of‌f‌i cer, Wolfgang

Daschner, vice president of the Frankfurt police. After

20 minutes of agonizing deliberation, Daschner orders

Gäfgen’s interrogators to threaten him with what is

in ef‌f ect a (relatively mild) form of torture. When the

latter is confronted with the threat, he at once gives

way. Gäfgen reveals that Jakob is no longer alive. On

October 14, he gives a full confession. More than

half a year later, on July 27, 2003, he is convicted for

abduction and homicide. He is sent to prison for the

rest of his life.

Having issued the order, Daschner informs the

Staatsanwalt, or public prosecutor.  e public pros-

ecutor, who, according to German penal law, has no

discretionary authority to decide whether or not to

prosecute, has no choice but to start an investigation.

Meanwhile, Daschner is demoted as a result of an

internal disciplinary measure. His new task consists

of performing menial administrative chores, awaiting

his case to be examined in court. On February 20,

2004, Daschner is indicted, and in December of that

year, he is convicted.  e sentence is mild: he gets

a conditional f‌i ne (Verwarnung mit Strafvorbehalt)

of 10,800 euros.  e relevant article of the German

penal code (§ 59 Strafgezetzbuch), which is seldom

applied, makes it possible to punish someone formally

without punishing him materially.  e newspapers

aptly comment that Daschner has been convicted

but not punished.  e case again receives a lot of

exposure in the German media in 2011. In August of

that year, Gäfgen successfully seeks compensation for

having been threatened with torture by the authori-

ties: the state has to pay him 3,000 euros (Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung, October 10, 2012). A wave of

public moral indignation washes over Germany.

 e reputable German weekly Die Zeit comments,

“Rechtens, aber nicht richtig” (Legal, but not right)

(Die Zeit, August 4, 2011).

Cases of this kind should make a citizen of any liberal

democracy think—and think hard. Such a case brings

Conf‌l icts of Values and Political Forgiveness