International Enforcement in Non-International Armed Conflict: Searching for Synergy among Legal Regimes in the Case of Libya

AuthorJohn Cerone
PositionProfessor ofLaw and Director, Center for International Law & Policy, New England Law, Boston
Pages369-395
XVII
International Enforcement in Non-
International Armed Conflict: Searching for
Synergy among Legal Regimes in the
Case of Libya
John Cerone*
In mid-February 201 1, in the wake of popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt,
members of the Libyan public began protesting against the decades-old regime
of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. The situation rapidly escalated as the govern-
ment sought to forcibly suppress the demonstrations. By earfy March the situation
had deteriorated into an armed conflict.
Anumber of international organizations responded to the crisis in Libya as it
evolved. They utilized avariety of different tools, ranging from official statements
and press communiques to the adoption of sanctions and other legal measures. On
March 19, 2011, acoalition of States initiated abombing campaign in Libya. The
United Nations Security Council authorized this enforcement action in response
to reports of serious violations of international human rights law and the interna-
tional law of armed conflict committed in Libya by persons acting on behalf of the
Gaddafi regime.
*Professor ofLaw and Director, Center for International Law &Policy, New England Law |Boston.
International Enforcement in NIAC: The Case ofLibya
This article provides an overview of applicable rules of international law
through different phases of the situation in Libya and sketches out various modes of
enforcement action employed by international organizations to respond to the crisis,
analyzing several of the controversial legal issues that arise in that context. The article
concludes with an analysis of the unresolved legal issues implicated by the evolving
situation in Libya and by the international community's responses to it.
Applicable Law
Non-intervention
One of the foundational principles of the international legal order, and acorollary
to the equally fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of States, the principle
of non-intervention requires all States to refrain from interfering in the internal af-
fairs of other States, or, in the words of the UN Charter, in "matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of other States. 1While the scope of this
principle was traditionally understood to preclude international regulation of the
way in which aState treated its own people, that understanding has evolved consid-
erably since, at the latest, the advent of the UN Charter system.
In light of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter and the practice of
Charter bodies, it is now generally accepted that serious human rights abuses, even
if committed purely within aState (i.e., not involving aliens, foreign territory or
any other material interests ofother States), are no longer regarded as internal mat-
ters shielded by the principle of non-intervention. Most States are also parties to
specific human rights treaties, further internationalizing the issue of how they treat
their own people and correspondingly diminishing the scope of the principle of non-
intervention. Nonetheless, mere political wrangling, even if it involves the failure to
meet international expectations of good governance, remains apurely internal mat-
ter so long as it does not entail violations of international legal obligations.
The Use of Force//«s ad Bellum
Another fundamental rule of international law is the prohibition on the use of
force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that "[a]11 Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." The two established exceptions to this
prohibition are valid exercises of the right of self-defense and enforcement action
taken in accordance with UN Security Council authorization.2These international
rules on the use of force apply only between States. Thus, the prohibition on the use
of force does not apply internally to aState. 3
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