Conflict and Universal Moral Theory

• Date: 01 October 2007
• DOI: 10.1177/0090591707304587
• Published date: 01 October 2007
• Author: Eva Erman
• Subject Matter: Articles

598

Political Theory

Volume 35 Number 5

October 2007 598-623

© 2007 Sage Publications

10.1177/0090591707304587

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Author’s Note: Special thanks go to James Gordon Finlayson, Jens Bartelson, and Niklas

Möller for constructive comments. I also wish to thank Jeremy Waldron; the political theory

workshop at Columbia University; the Stockholm political theory group, in particular Sofia

Näsström; as well as the participants of the 3rd International Conference on Political Theory

in Roskilde, Denmark (March 1–2, 2006). Finally, I am grateful to the Swedish Research

Council for financing my research project on human rights, deliberation, and conflict resolu-

tion, and to the two anonymous referees of Political Theory.

Conflict and Universal

Moral Theory

From Reasonableness to Reason-Giving

Eva Erman

Stockholm University, Sweden

The solutions to moral problems offered by contemporary moral theories

largely depend on how they understand pluralism. This article compares two

different kinds of universal moral theories, liberal impartiality theory and

discourse ethics. It defends the twofold thesis that (1) a dialogical theory

such as discourse ethics is better equipped to give an account of pluralism

than impartiality theory due to a more correct understanding of the nature of

conflict, but that (2) discourse ethics cannot, contrary to what Jürgen

Habermas claims, embrace the notion of impartiality connected to agent-

neutrality. The article argues that pluralism reflects conflicts among values

not only between but also within people and that discourse ethics can include

both these dimensions since it recognizes the constitutive connection

between deliberation and (moral) conflict. Thus, unlike impartiality theory, it

can elucidate the transformative aspects of pluralism.

Keywords: impartiality theory; moral conflict; discourse ethics; Habermas;

deliberation

Introduction

The solutions to moral problems offered by contemporary moral theories

largely depend on how they understand pluralism. This article com-

pares two different kinds of universal moral theories, liberal impartiality

theory and discourse ethics. It is claimed that impartiality theory in general

Erman / Conflict and Universal Moral Theory 599

has difficulty in giving a satisfactory account of pluralism, since the “fact of

pluralism” is rigidly interpreted as a static rather than dynamic state of

affairs. The twofold thesis I defend is that (1) a dialogical theory such as dis-

course ethics is better equipped to give an account of pluralism than impar-

tiality theory due to a more correct understanding of the nature of conflict,

but that (2) discourse ethics cannot, contrary to what Jürgen Habermas

claims, embrace a notion of impartiality connected to agent-neutrality. It

is argued that, by understanding conflict as a dialogical phenomenon,

discourse ethics can elucidate the transformative aspects of pluralism.

The structure of the argument is as follows: in their effort to theorize

about moral norms, impartialists such as Brian Barry, Thomas Nagel, and

Charles Larmore connect the notion of impartiality to neutrality and rea-

sonableness through a hypothetical procedure (I). By doing so they presup-

pose two things: firstly, that certain conflicting notions of the good are

already in place, towards which we must be impartial. A hypothetical pro-

cedure assumes that a standard is already at our disposal, in this case pro-

viding independent criteria for recognizing whether impartiality towards

conflicting conceptions of the good has been achieved by the impartial pro-

cedure.1However, I argue that impartiality means to be im-partial towards

something and that conflicts are not simply there; they emerge in interac-

tion, in the meeting between (at least) two subjects. Secondly, impartialists

presume that conflicts are to be understood in interpersonal terms and that

pluralism consists of conflicting unitary comprehensive doctrines. But is

this depiction of modern pluralist societies appropriate? I don’t think so. In

modern societies very few people have unified comprehensive doctrines.

Pluralism reflects conflicts among values not only between people but also

within them. The reason why a dialogical theory can offer a more accurate

understanding of the nature of conflict is because it can include these

dimensions. It takes the step from reasonableness to reason-giving and

thereby recognizes that deliberation is constitutive of moral conflict.

Deliberation is an exercise of autonomous agency, of self-determination, as

well as a cognitive exercise, of self-interpretation. It involves both an inter-

personal and an intrapersonal dimension, which means that conflicts occur

not only between persons but also within them. Moreover, the two dimen-

sions are interdependent since in our deliberation and conflicts with others

we search coherence among our own conflicting values, which has an

impact on how we view others as well as our differences. The article thus

argues that conflict is of cognitive value and that a dialogical understand-

ing of conflict can give a more satisfactory account of the dynamic aspects

of pluralism (II).2