A Computerized Approach to Detect Collusion in the Sealed-Bid Market

Published date01 September 1977
Date01 September 1977
AuthorJoseph C. Gallo
DOI10.1177/0003603X7702200305
Subject MatterArticle
A
COMPUTERIZED
APPROACH
TO
DETECT
COLLUSION
IN
THE
SEALED.BID
MARKET
by
JOSEPH
C.
GALLO·
Detection of bid collusion in the sealed-bid market has not
generally been the result of any systematic monitoring of
these markets. Instead, detection has been highly dependent
upon such factors as tips from public-minded individuals who
have knowledge of the existence of a conspiracy, large and
obvious price changes in the level of bids due to a temporary
breakdown in the ring, or the sharp-eyed public agency em-
ployee who detects an unusual
pattern
in bids.
This
paper
represents apreliminary attempt to systema-
tize the detection of price fixing in the sealed-bid market.
It
presents a set of computer programs which provide ameans
of continuously monitoring records of bidding in certain types
of sealed-bid markets. These computer programs process
bidding data in such a way as to enable an investigator to
detect various
patterns
of bidding which would be anticipated
if
bidders were conspiring and submitting rigged bids. The
limitations of the
data
restricted the author to developing
computer programs
that
would enable users to examine price
and quantity variables which would be artificially manipu-
lated ifaprice-fixing ring was present.
Acomputerized approach is particularly applicable to the
sealed-bid market
for
anumber of reasons.
First
of all, public
agencies frequently buy standardized and unchanging prod-
ucts over a considerable period of time. The computerized
approach is very well suited to a
market
with such a large
amount of
data
to be monitored. Second, the data, consisting
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Cincinnati.
AUTHOR'S
NOTE:
The author is indebted to the Missouri State
Highway Commission and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads for their
support in this study.
593
594
THE
ANTITRUST
BULLETIN
of successful
and
unsuccessful bids,
are
readily available to
economists, which facilitates the examination of non-competi-
tive bidding patterns. Third, as input to the computerized
approach as well as to the policing mechanism of the price-
fixing ring, the exact records of bids
are
published by the pur-
chasing agency. (See Table 1.)1 Fourth, the theories of col-
lusive oligopoly indicate
that
collusion is more likely to take
place in industries consisting of a small number of non-inno-
TABLE
1
Missouri State Highway
Division of Equipment
Jefferson City, Missouri
Request Number 1
Tabulation of Quotations received on May 31,1956 for Flake-
Type Spec.
"A"
100#
bags in carload lots, Calcium Chloride.
Firm
Pyramid Materials Co. $31.00
St. Louis, Missouri
Stewart
Sand
Material Co.
31.00
Kansas City, 'Missouri
St. Louis, Distributing Co., Inc.
St. Louis, Missouri
Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co.
Kansas City, Missouri
Consolidated Supply Co.
Joplin, Missouri
Abner S. Hood Chemical Co.
Kansas City, Missouri
Barado S. Page, Inc.
St. Louis, Missouri
American Builders Supply Co.
St. Louis, Missouri
31.00
31.00

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