Compulsory technology adoption and adaptation in education: A looming student privacy problem

• Published date: 01 January 2023
• Author: Kristen L. Walker,Kiya Bodendorf,Tina Kiesler,Georgie Mattos,Mark Rostom,Amr Elkordy
• Date: 01 January 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/joca.12506

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Compulsory technology adoption and

adaptation in education: A looming

student privacy problem

Kristen L. Walker

1

|Kiya Bodendorf

2

|Tina Kiesler

1

|

Georgie de Mattos

3

|Mark Rostom

1

|Amr Elkordy

4

1

Nazarian College of Business and

Economics, California State University,

Northridge, Northridge, California, USA

2

Michael D. Eisner College of Education,

California State University, Northridge,

Northridge, California, USA

3

College of Social and Behavioral

Sciences, California State University,

Northridge, Northridge, California, USA

4

College of Engineering and Computer

Science, California State University,

Northridge, Northridge, California, USA

Correspondence

Kristen L. Walker, Nazarian College of

Business and Economics, California State

University, Northridge, 18111 Nordhoff

Street, Northridge CA 91330, USA.

Email: kristen.walker@csun.edu

Funding information

National Science Foundation; Secure and

Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC),

Grant/Award Number: 1936837

Abstract

Educational settings worldwide have a significant

impactontheearlyuseofdigital devices and online

media by children. Therefore, schools' educational

technology (EdTech) adoption decisions may lead to

long-term repercussions for students and society. The

authors explore how schools make technology deci-

sionsonbehalfoftheirstudents,focusingonthe

ways that privacy and data security are considered in

technology adoption decisions and use. Adaptation-

level theory helps to illustrate the growing depen-

dence on technology in compulsory educational set-

tings, the convenience of adopting digital tools, and

the risks to children that result as they use and adapt

to technology. Analysis of in-depth interviews and

text analysis of public state reports indicate that con-

fusion between information technology and EdTech

consequentially leads to a “privacy-security chasm.”

Findings highlight privacy-security challenges in

K-12 school districts and the growing need to under-

stand student privacy protection as part of children's

digital well-being.

Received: 16 April 2021Revised: 21 November 2022Accepted: 23 November 2022

DOI: 10.1111/joca.12506

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits

use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or

adaptations are made.

© 2022 The Authors. Journal of Consumer Affairs published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of American Council on Consumer

Interests.

J Consum Aff. 2023;57:445–478. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/joca 445

KEYWORDS

K-12 education, technology adoption, student privacy, privacy-

security chasm

1|INTRODUCTION

Privacy and cybersecurity issues are at the forefront of societal concerns (Burt, 2019). Yet even

with awareness of these issues, the convenience of technology use at home, in the workplace,

and for educational purposes often undermines privacy. Educational settings significantly

impact children's early use of digital devices and online media. Educators know that the “broad

availability of computers will change the way teachers interact with students, and it will change

how kids learn”(Stone, 2021, p. 4). In most countries, school-aged children are not given a

choice in whether to attend school—they must attend as part of a social contract. This makes

school a compulsory setting for using technology (e.g. learning management systems, email,

online material, etc.). Ultimately, school is a context for increased and diverse forms of student

data collection and data integration by technology companies that provide digital educational

services (Williamson, 2017). We explore how school officials (administrators, teachers, and so

forth) make technology decisions on behalf of their students and we recognize that these deci-

sions have implications for students and parents with technology use at home.

Educational interactions have become increasingly dependent on technology at home and

in school settings, typified with remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. As such,

details about students are regularly assembled in databases which are used for building profiles

that are bought and sold by vendors and other parties. These profiles act as long-term records of

childhood behaviors, which are shared with parties often unknown to children and their care-

givers. In the long term, this puts students at risk when completing educational activities inand

outside of school (Andrews et al., 2020; Kennedy et al., 2019; Lupton & Williamson, 2017;

Walker et al., 2016).

Breaches of student data, whether intentional or not, are additional sources of concern. As

of 2022, at least 30 K-12 public school systems in the U.S. were victims of cyberattacks. Sadly,

experts note that it is not a matter of whether K-12 school systems will face data breaches, but

when (Sequeira, 2022). In 2022, the Los Angeles Unified School District experienced the biggest

education data breach ever reported. At least 3 years of information about students and their

classes was leaked on the dark web (Healey, 2022). This is particularly troubling since a

U.S. Government Accountability Office audit of cybersecurity

1

incidents in 287 school districts

across the country indicates “recent K-12 data breaches show that students are vulnerable to

harm”and that between “July 2016 and May 2020,

2

thousands of K-12 students were affected

by 99 reported data breaches”(Nowicki, 2020, p. 10). Notably, the number of breaches is likely

understated due to insufficient information, delays in reporting, or undetected incidents. Since

many educational platforms and services are offered by for-profit companies, and K-12 students

are increasingly using educational technology (EdTech), we believe the technology decisions

K-12 school districts make create an important and unexplored societal well-being issue.

The continuing challenge is that “individuals are willing to trade privacy for convenience or

bargain the release of personal information in exchange for relatively small rewards”with few

protective actions (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005, p. 2), potentially resulting in negative out-

comes. This surrender to the convenience of technology (Walker, 2016) appears to supersede

446 WALKER ET AL.

even government warnings, such as public service announcements from the Federal Bureau of

Investigation about the risks education technologies pose to K-12 students:

The US school systems' rapid growth of education technologies (EdTech) and wide-

spread collection of student data could have privacy and safety implications if com-

promised or exploited (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018).

Technological innovations enable classroom instructional solutions for schools and educators,

but often without regard to student data privacy. This leaves organizations, consumers, families,

students, and government agencies vulnerable to data breaches, violations of privacy regula-

tions, identity theft, and data sharing with third parties. Children are particularly vulnerable as

an early source of data when they interact online and are surveilled by record-keeping practices

at school (Lupton & Williamson, 2017). This vulnerability continues as children utilize technol-

ogy integrated by the Internet of things (IoT) (Alsaadi & Tubaishat, 2015).

There is a critical need to understand the growing dependence on technology in compulsory

educational settings, the convenience of adopting digital tools, and the risks to children as they

adapt to technology while learning. A vivid example of this problem is highlighted in a cease

and desist letter written to Google's chief executive officer Sundar Pichai, in which the State of

New Mexico Attorney General, Hector Balderas, states:

Violations [of theChildren's OnlinePrivacy Protection Act] stem from what appear to

be active, ongoing, and illegal data collection by Google's G-Suite for Education prod-

ucts, services, and Google-issued Chromebooks…My investigation has revealed that Goo-

gle tracks childrenacross the internet, across devices, intheir homes, and well outside

the educational sphere, all without obtaining verifiable parental consent…to benefit

Google's own commercial interests (State ofNew Mexico v Google LLC, 2020,p.2).

The State of New Mexico charges that Google was allegedly collecting information about “physical

locations, websites [children] visit[ed], every search term use[d] in Google's search engines and the

results they click[ed] on, the videos they watch[ed] on YouTube, their personal contacts lists, voice

recordings, saved passwords, and other behavioral information”(State of New Mexico v Google

LLC, 2020, p. 2). In 2017, the Electronic Frontier Foundation reported that one-third of students in

theU.S.wereusingdevicesprovidedbyschoolsandnoted,“In short, technology providers are spy-

ing on students—and school districts, which often provide inadequate privacy policies or no privacy

policy at all, are unwittingly helping them do it”(Alim et al., 2017,p.5).

We focus on how privacy and data security are considered in technology adoption and use

decisions in K-12 compulsory settings, and how using this technology may enable access to stu-

dent information, thereby exacerbating risk. In the following sections, we overview extant liter-

ature around technology adoption decisions made by K-12 school districts and apply Helson's

(1964) Adaptation-level theory to frame our exploration and understand the privacy risks that

EdTech use may pose for children.

2|LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholarly research on technology decision-making and privacy issues for children in educa-

tional settings is scant in general and scarce in consumer research. Student privacy challenges

WALKER ET AL.447