Competing for Attention: Lobbying Time‐Constrained Politicians

• Author: CHRISTOPHER COTTON
• Published date: 01 August 2016
• Date: 01 August 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12202

COMPETING FOR ATTENTION:LOBBYING TIME-CONSTRAINED

POLITICIANS

CHRISTOPHER COTTON

Queen’s University

Abstract

We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource con-

strained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn

about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews

the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contri-

butions. We study how policy outcomes and contributions depend on

policymaker constraints and the design of the “Contest for Attention.”

Among other results, awarding attention to the highest contributors

generally guarantees the first best policy outcome. It can also lead to

the highest possible contributions, suggesting that a policymaker may

not need to sacrifice policy in order to maximize contributions. Our

results also give insight into other settings where agents compete for a

decision maker’s attention.

“About all you get [in exchange for a contribution] is a chance to talk to

them.... If you have a good case you can win them over. But you have to be

able to talk to them.”

—Interest group representative interviewed in Herndon (1982, p. 1000)

“Access to the president should never be for sale.”

—Bob Edgar, president of Common Cause, February 26, 20131

1Common Cause is perhaps the most recognized U.S. organization focused on promoting campaign

finance reform. Edgar issued this statement in response to a New York Times article suggesting that Or-

ganizing for America, a nonprofit organization that developed from the Obama for America campaign

organization following the 2012 presidential elections, was selling access to the president.

Christopher Cotton, Department of Economics, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6,

Canada (cotton@econ.queensu.ca).

This project benefited greatly from conversations with Steve Callander, Steve Coate, Ralph

Boleslavsky, David Kelly,Arnaud Dellis, and seminar participants at Queen’s University, Cornell Univer-

sity, Stanford GSB, University of Alberta, University of Miami, University of Pittsburgh, and University

of Padua, as well as the First Caribbean Game Theory Conference and the 2011 Tournaments, Contests

and Relative Performance Evaluation conference. The author is grateful for financial support provided

through his position as the Jarislowsky-Deutsch Chair in Economic and Financial Policy at Queen’s

University.

Received February 17, 2015; Accepted April 30, 2015.

C2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18 (4), 2016, pp. 642–665.

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Competing for Attention 643

1. Introduction

Popular opinion is that political contributions corrupt policymaking. The majority of

Americans believe that “money buys results in Congress,” and that money biases legisla-

tion away from the needs of average constituents and in favor of deep-pocketed special

interests (Lessig 2011, p. 88). Theoretical models of politics largely support these pop-

ular views, with classic models depicting lobbying as little more than a quid pro quo ex-

change of political contributions for policy (e.g., Tullock 1980; Grossman and Helpman

1994). Insider accounts of policymaking, however, describe overtly corrupt behavior as

the rare exception, with most policymakers trying to do the right thing, while facing

severe constraints on their time and limits to their expertise (e.g., Bauer, Dexter, and

de Sola Pool 1963; Hansen 1991; Schram 1995; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner

and Jones 2015). We present a model of the political process consistent with the insider

accounts of policymaking. Ours is a model of informational lobbying, where political

contributions help special interest groups (IGs) capture the attention of a time con-

strained policymaker, and are not provided in the direct exchange for policy favors. We

show how political contributions lead the policymaker to focus his efforts on the most

beneficial policies. By allocating his limited attention based on political contributions,

the policymaker can guarantee better policy outcomes than in the absence of contribu-

tions.

We develop a model of lobbying that approximates the political process described in

a number of insider accounts, which emphasize how severely constrained policymakers

are in their ability to learn about and implement policy proposals (e.g., Bauer et al.

1963; Hansen 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 2015). In our model, a policymaker faces

a number of policy proposals and must choose which to implement. The proposals

may involve earmark funding for projects within the policymaker’s home district. Due

to budget constraints, the policymaker may not be able to fund all of the projects he

believes are beneficial.2Alternatively, the proposals may involve introducing legislation

reforming policy on alternative issues. Drafting, introducing, and promoting legislation

is time-consuming, preventing the policymaker from introducing legislation in all areas

that may benefit his constituents. Although the proposals may not by nature be mutually

exclusive alternatives,3resource and time constraints necessitate that the policymaker

prioritize proposals and choose only some on which to focus his efforts.

Before choosing which proposals to implement, the policymaker can assess the costs

and benefits of alternative options by meeting with IGs and experts, reading government

reports or independent research, holding legislative hearings, or asking staff or govern-

ment agencies to research the political feasibility and constituent benefits of different

options.4If the policymaker carefully assesses all alternatives, then he can be certain

2Frisch and Kelly (2010, 2011) present evidence that during the 2006 budget cycle the Chairman of the

U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services allowed each rank-

and-file member of the U.S. House to request up to $400,000 in earmark funding from his subcom-

mittee. The allotted amount increased systematically for subcommittee members, principals in at-risk

districts and those in leadership positions. If a legislator requested a larger amount of funding from the

subcommittee, the funding was rejected or cut down to the allotted amount. This process means that

legislators must carefully decide for which earmark proposals to request funding, and the legislators

may rely on political contributions to help narrow down the set of candidates.

3The policymaker could, if budgets permitted, fund many projects, and could, if time permitted, draft,

introduce, and pass legislation reforming many issues.

4See, for example, Baumgartner et al. (2009, p. 7) who observe: “In the case of Congress and adminis-

trative agencies, policymakers must choose to allocate their time among the myriad of different issues

they are called upon to address.”