Competing Constraints: State Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions and Legislation on Wages and Hours

• Published date: 01 June 2005
• Date: 01 June 2005
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290505800211
• Subject Matter: Articles

Competing Constraints:
State Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions
and Legislation on Wages and Hours
VALERIE HOEKSTRA, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
This article examines state supreme court implementation of Supreme Court precedent when deciding cases
challenging state legislation. While previous research provides a wealth of insight into how state contextual
and institutional features constrain state court decisionmaking and how lower courts respond to Supreme
Court precedent, very little research explicitly examines state court decisionmaking when both constraints are
present. By integrating the findings of previous research, I develop and test hypotheses about the effect of these
different actors on state court decisionmaking. The results show that state courts are indeed constrained by
both state and federal actors. The results also suggest that there may be instances where policies are so salient
to both state actors and to the U.S. Supreme Court that the influence of the state court’s own policy prefer-
ences may be minimal. The findings provide important evidence about the importance of competing con-
straints on state supreme court decisionmaking.
For decades, scholars have been interested in study- and its ability to review and reject state court decisions, and
ing the implementation of U.S. Supreme Court deci-
constraints from state actors who may rewrite legislation
sions by judges on lower courts.1 Most research con-
and, often, remove a judge from office. The one project that
cludes that the possibility of review by the Supreme Court
attempts to capture both levels of constraint looks at state
effectively constrains lower court decisionmaking. This
court decisions on abortion following Roe v. Wade (Brace,
research typically examines decisionmaking on the United
Hall, and Langer 2000). Their research finds that state court
States Courts of Appeals. Along side this sizable literature
decisionmaking is affected by the state-level environment,
has grown an equally large and impressive body of work
but only to the extent that the judges’ fates are tied to that
examining the state-level institutional and contextual con-
environment. However, they also find that U.S. Supreme
straints on state supreme court judges.2 This work finds
Court precedent has no effect on state court decisionmaking
that state institutional and contextual features affect deci-
(Brace, Hall, Langer 2000). From this single study, can we
sionmaking on the state high courts in interesting and
conclude that Supreme Court precedent is meaningless to
often complex ways.
the decisionmaking among state court judges? Or, is it pos-
Surprisingly, little research attempts to combine these
sible that constraints from the Supreme Court as well as
two lines of work to examine decisionmaking on state
from within the state weigh upon the decisionmaking of
supreme courts when both constraints are present—con-
state court judges? If so, which weighs more heavily? These
straints from the U.S. Supreme Court in the way of precedent
are the questions addressed in this work.
Recent research provides us with considerable leverage on
these questions. First, it is generally accepted that judges are
1
political actors with policy preferences that they would prefer
For example, see Baum (1976, 1978); Benesh and Reddick (2002);
to see enacted into law (Brace, Hall, Langer 2000; Epstein and
Canon and Johnson (1999); Giles and Walker (1975); Gruhl (1980);
Songer and Sheehan (1994); Songer, Segal, Cameron (1994); Tarr
Knight 1998; Langer 2002, Segal and Spaeth 2002). Justices
(1977).
on the United States Supreme Court have wide latitude to act
2 For example, see Brace and Hall (1990, 1997); Brace and Langer (2001),
upon their sincere preferences due to the insularity and inde-
Hall (1987, 1992, 1995); Hall and Brace (1992); Hays and Glick (1997),
pendence they enjoy. Judges on lower courts have consider-
Langer (2002), Songer and Tabrizi (1999).
ably less freedom to act upon their sincere preferences. First,
NOTE: This article was presented as a paper at the 2003 annual meeting
most state court judges do not serve for life. Thus, the insti-
of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. I would like
tutional rules for the selection and retention of judges limits,
to thank Chris Bonneau, Bradley Canon, Laura Langer, Michael
to varying degrees, the institutional independence of state
Nickelsburg and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful com-
supreme court judges from other state political actors (Brace
ments during preparation of this manuscript and Lee Epstein,
Olga Shvetsova, and Jack Knight for generously sharing data. I
and Hall 1995, 1997; Brace, Hall, and Langer 2000; Canon
would also like to thank Tobias Gibson, Scott Hendrikson, Andrea
and Johnson 1999; Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova 2002;
Russo, Johnna Shackelford, and Karen Shafer for assistance with
Langer 2002). Moreover, the decisions of both state and fed-
data collection.
eral judges are subject to review by the Supreme Court, and
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 2 (June2005) pp. 317-328
judges do not like to see their decisions overturned (Baum
317

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318
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
1976, 1978; Benesh and Reddick 2002; Canon and Johnson
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINIMUM WAGE AND
1999; Songer, Segal and Cameron 1994).
MAXIMUM HOURS LEGISLATION IN THE STATES
Very little research attempts to incorporate these different
constraints into a single study of state supreme court deci-
Although a thorough overview of state legislation and
sionmaking (but see Brace, Hall, and Langer 2000). Instead,
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on maximum hours and min-
scholars either focus on the intra-state questions (state
imum wage legislation is beyond the scope of this article, I
courts and the state political context), or on the intra-judi-
include a very brief discussion in order to clarify the kinds
cial questions (lower courts and Supreme Court). Moreover,
of issues involved in these cases and the changing nature of
virtually every empirical study of judicial decisionmaking
Supreme Court precedent.
looks to recent years with very little attempt to understand
During the early part of the twentieth century, a vari-
whether our theories about judicial behavior are based on
ety of forces, such as industrialization, urbanization, and
analysis of modern courts. To examine decisionmaking
the progressive movement converged to increase state and
under both constraints and during a different time period, I
federal legislation aimed at regulating the conditions of
examine state supreme court decisions on the constitution-
American workers (Brandeis 1935, Baer 1978, Epstein
ality of state minimum wage and maximum hours legisla-
1985). Many states enacted legislation to improve work-
tion in the early part of the twentieth century (1900-1940).
ing conditions–particularly for women, children, and
As with capital punishment and abortion politics over the
men engaged in inherently dangerous occupations (e.g.,
last few decades, maximum hours and minimum wage leg-
mining). Much of the early legislation sought to protect
islation during this time were highly salient and issues for
workers by limiting the hours of certain classes of work-
which different institutions of government, at all levels,
ers, often to ten hours a day. States typically singled out
were involved. The United States Supreme Court often
groups–either those engaged in the most dangerous pro-
handed down decisions striking state and federal legislation
fessions such as mining and smelting, or those who were
coming from both state and federal courts. At other times,
thought to need the most protection from the
the Court was more supportive of such legislation and
state–women and children (Baer 1978; Brandeis 1935;
upheld different hours and wage regulations.
Epstein and Walker 2000). States justified the legislation
Since the issue in these cases involves actors from all
as falling within their police powers.
levels of government, it provides a rich opportunity to
The second wave of reforms included minimum wage
examine the relative constraints placed on state court judges
legislation. Like the earlier hours regulations, states justified
as they decide on the constitutionality of state legislation. It
wage legislation as falling under their police powers. For the
also presents the opportunity to examine the dynamic rela-
wage legislation, states moved beyond the simple safety jus-
tionship between state courts and the United States
tification and argued that the state also had a responsibility
Supreme Court. During this time period, which spans close
to make sure that workers, usually women, were paid a
to forty nears, Supreme Court precedent on the states’
wage sufficient for maintaining a healthy and moral lifestyle.
authority to regulate in the area of hours and wages was in
Although the Supreme Court was initially reluctant to
a great deal of flux. Thus, we can examine whether and how
accept minimum wage legislation as falling under the states’
state courts responded to these shifts in precedent.
police powers, they ultimately recognized the connection
The questions addressed in this study are important for
and gave the states latitude to enact such regulations.
many reasons. First and foremost, while research at the
During this time period, many states enacted legislation
state level provides insights into the importance of con-
despite strong and/or...