A Comparative View of Transparency in Antitrust Enforcement.

• Date: 01 January 2024
• Author: Jamillia Ferris, Meghan Rissmiller, Laura C. Onken & Kara King

547

A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF TRANSPARENCY

IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

J F

M R

L C. O

K K*

INTRODUCTION ......................................... 548

I. TRANSPARENCY IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:

PREDICTABILITY, COMPLIANCE, AND EFFICIENCY ...... 549

A. T  A E

T  P  O

 I C .......................... 549

B. E A C C E

B  B  E A ......... 551

II. A VIEW OF TRANSPARENCY IN COMPETITION

ENFORCEMENT GLOBALLY .......................... 552

A. C E   E

C ....................................... 553

B. C E   U K ...... 559

III. U.S. COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AND

LIMITATIONS ON TRANSPARENCY .................... 562

A. C E P  

DOJ  FTC ..................................... 563

B. DOJ  FTC S  P

P  I T .................. 565

C. C  T   DOJ  FTC .... 569

IV. OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY ........ 572

A. G—F  I—D

A S  N P

P ......................................... 573

* Members of the District of Columbia bar. With sincere thanks to Jennifer Mellott, Megan

Yeates, and Eva Roney for their thoughtful contributions.

548 A L J [Vol. 85

B. I U  D C

S  M R ..................... 574

C. A G  T 

E  P ......................... 575

CONCLUSION ........................................... 576

INTRODUCTION

The idea that transparency is crucial for good democratic government

is neither novel nor controversial.1 In the context of antitrust enforcement,

transparency has two related but distinct aspects. Procedural transparency

can refer to agencies outlining clear processes that businesses must follow to

comply with the antitrust laws. This is similar to the notion of due process,

which is enshrined as a tenet of the United States Constitution.2 Substantive

transparency refers to agencies allowing for more predictable outcomes and

efficient compliance by enforcing clear legal standards developed through

established legal principles. Substantive and procedural transparency are

both essential components of effective antitrust enforcement. As former

Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Christine Varney stated, “complaints

about process lead to concern that substantive results are flawed, whereas a

fair, predictable, and transparent process bolsters the legitimacy of the sub-

stantive outcome.”3

In both respects, and regardless of the appropriate level or contours of

antitrust enforcement—which we will not debate here—transparency in

enforcement provides legal certainty for businesses, facilitating antitrust

compliance through predictable processes and results without unnecessarily

chilling legitimate, procompetitive conduct.

In this article, we discuss the state of procedural and substantive transpar-

ency in antitrust enforcement. We focus on the United States, but this analysis

would not be complete without an evaluation of how other agencies approach

1 See, e.g., Saladin Al-Jurf, Good Governance and Transparency: Their Impact on Develop-

ment, 9 T’ L. & C P 193 (1999) (“Governments cannot engage

in good governance—i.e., good management of the country—without promoting ‘transparency.’

This usually means managing government institutions according to clear and accessible rules

(i) that make government officials and agencies accountable to the country’s citizens and (ii) that

provide members of the international community with the predictability and stability they need

to function efficiently and productively.”).

2 See U.S. C. amend. XIV, § 1; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.

306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process... is notice rea-

sonably calculated... to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them

an opportunity to present their objections.”).

3 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks

at the 13th Annual Competition Conference of the International Bar Association: Procedural

Fairness 1 (Sept. 12, 2009), www.justice.gov/media/526141/dl.