The Communist Party and the law: an outline of formal and less formal linkages between the ruling party and other legal institutions in the People's Republic of China.

• Author: Delmestro, Manuel E.
• Position: Symposium: Constitutional Review in the People's Republic of China

Manuel E. Delmestro (1)

"When the state feels threatened, the rule of law can be suspended. Anywhere." (2)

"Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies."--Groucho Marx (3)

1. INTRODUCTION (4)

   The Communist Party of China (CPC or the Party) is the absolute power center in Chinese politics. Deng Xiaoping made the Four Cardinal Principles paramount in Chinese politics: upholding the socialist path; the people's democratic dictatorship; the leadership of the CPC; and the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. (5) Thus the Party stands aloof, assumes general oversight and coordinates all sides of the executive agencies, the National People's Congress (NPC), the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and other mass organizations. If the latter is the flesh, and the armed forces the bones, of the Chinese political body, the Party is undoubtedly its brain, main nerves and tendons. The Party leads and controls all other political (and not only political) organizations and institutions in the People's Republic of China (PRC), allowing observers to use the once perhaps more fashionable term, "Party-State," to capture China's political reality.

   The Party has relinquished ideology as the sole or main source of legitimacy, (6) and for almost three decades has been enjoying support through the "performance oriented" means (7) of what appears to be a "benevolent one party rule." The Chinese political system could thus also be seen as one of "good governance with Chinese characteristics." The regime delivers steady economic performance and is consistent in terms of "consumer-satisfaction"; the people, in return, refrain from getting too angry about its peculiarities. (8)

   This article does not directly address the rule of law in China or the eternal debate on its development and developmental patterns, but rather it addresses some peculiar aspects of it. The first part shall provide a brief account of how the Chinese Constitution and main statutory norms of public law formally "treat" the CPC. The second part outlines how the Party practically exerts its influence and authority over the Chinese political system, i.e., the actual functioning of the Party-State machine in the PRC.

2. THE PARTY AND THE LAWS (9)

   This section will attempt to address two questions that I asked myself when writing this article. First, to what extent is the CPC present in the Constitution and ordinary statutory laws in China? Second, what, according to these norms, is the legal nature of the CPC?

   1. The Legal Status of the CPC Vis a Vis the Constitution and Main Statutory Laws

      1. The Role of the CPC and the Socialist System in Constitutional Documents

         In 1949, the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) mentioned the CPC in its Preamble ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi gongtong gangling). Additionally, the Organic Law of the CPPCC discussed the revolutionary impetus and the dictatorship of the proletariat, among other things ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi zuzhifa). The Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the PRC also discussed the CPC ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongyang renmin zhengfu zuzhifa).

         In 1954, the PRC's first proper Constitution ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa) mentioned the CPC twice in the Preamble and granted a high profile to the National President in Articles 40, 42, and 43, resembling the 1936 Soviet Constitution. (10)

         In 1975, the Cultural Revolution Constitution, which was a short, thirty article, "more sincere" document, epitomized the then quasi-collapse of the political-legal system, extensively mentioning the expression "under the leadership of the Communist Party of China" ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] zai Zhongguo gongchandang lingdao xia) in the Preamble, General Principles, and in Articles 2, 15, 16, 17 and 26.

         Article 2 mentions the CPC when discussing leadership ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhongguo gongchandang shi quan Zhongguo renmin de lingdao hexin. Gongren jieji jingguo ziji de xianfengdui Zhongguo gongchandang shixian dui guojia de lingdao. Makesizhuyi, lieningzhuyi, Mao Zedong sixiang shi woguo zhidao sixiang de lilun jichu).

         Article 15 mentions the CPC when discussing the Armed Forces ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhongguo gongchandang lingdao de gongnong zidi bing, shi gezu renmin de wuzhuang liliang. Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui zhuxi tongshuai quanguo wuzhuang liliang).

         Article 16 mentions the CPC when discussing the NPC ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Qua nguo renmin daibiao dahui shi zai Zhongguo gongchandang lingdao xia de zuigao guojia quanli jiguan. Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui huiyi meinian juxing yi ci. Zai biyao deshihou, keyi tiqian huozhe yanqi).

         Article 17 mentions the CPC when discussing the State Council (SC) ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Quanquo renmin daibiao dahui de zhiquan shi: xiugai xianfa, zhiding falv, genju Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui de tiyi renmian guowuyuan zongli he guowuyuan de zucheng renyuan, pizhun guomin jingji jihua, guojia de yusuan he jiesuan, yiji quanguo renmin daibiao dahui renwei yingdang you ta xingshi de qita zhiquan).

         And finally, Article 26 mentions the CPC when discussing people's duties ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Gongmin de jiben quanli he yiwu shi, yonghu Zhongguo gongchandang de lingdao, yonghu shehuizhuyi zhidu, fucong Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa he falv).

         In 1978, a Transitional Constitution was enacted. This short-lived document (amended in 1979 and 1980) maintained previous provisions about the Party's leading role, with some adjustments in phrasing and style.

         Article 19 discusses the military ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wuzhuang liliang you Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui zhuxi tongshuai. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun shi Zhongguo gongchandang de gongnong zidi bing, shi wuchan jieji zhuanzheng de zhushi).

         Article 21 discusses the State Council in two different sections ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] genju Zhong guo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui de tiyi, jueding guowuyuan zongli de renxuan, and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]; genju guowuyuan zongli de tiyi, jueding guowuyuan qita zucheng renyuan de renxuan).

         This Constitution made a weak, but real, attempt at a formal strengthening of the role of the Premier of the State Council vis-a-vis the obtrusive leadership of the CPC Central Committee.

         In the 1982 Constitution and following amendments (in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004), the CPC is mentioned five times, but only in the Preamble, while the rest of the text offers only sporadic references to the "Socialism ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] shehuizhuyi) [Socialist System ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] shehuizhuyi tizhi)] with Chinese characteristics." (11) Efforts to strengthen the role of the law and to restrain, at least formally, the Party's omnipotence, are reflected in the eighth paragraph of the Preamble and, more clearly after the 1999 amendments, in Article 5.

         The Preamble, paragraph eight, discusses the Constitution and law [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Ben xianfa yi falv de xingshi queren le Zhongguo gezu renmin fendou de chengguo, guiding le guojia de genben zhidu he genben renwu, shi guojia de genbenfa, juyou zuigao de falv xiaoli. Quanguo gezu renmin, yiqie guojia jiguan he wuzhuang liliang, ge zhengdang he ge shehui tuanti, ge qiye shiye zuzhi, dou bixu yi xianfa wei genben de huodong zhunze, bingqie fuyou weihu xianfa zunyan, baozheng xianfa shishi de zhize).

         Article 5 also discusses the Constitution and law ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shixing yifa zhiguo, jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia. Guojia weihu shehuizhuyi fazhi de tongyi he zunyan. Yiqie falv, xingzheng fagui he difangxing fagui dou bu dei tong xianfa dichu. Yiqie guojia jiguan he wuzhuang liliang, ge zhengdang he shehui tuanti, ge qiye shiye zuzhi dou bixu zunshou xianfa he falv. Yiqie weifan xianfa he falv de xingwei bixu yuyi zhuijiu. Renhe zuzhi huozhe geren dou bu dei you chaoyue xianfa he falv de tequan).

         Both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR) Basic Laws ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Jibenfa), approved in 1990 and 1993 and enacted in 1997 and 1999 respectively, are peculiar examples of "sub-constitutions." Their main role, apart from establishing a basic legal framework for these two new entities, is "suspending" the Socialist System provisions that are in force in the rest of mainland China.

         Provisions "suspending" part of the Chinese Constitution can mainly be found in the second paragraph of the Preamble (12) ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Weile weihu guojia de tongyi he lingtu wanzheng, baochi Xianggang de fanrong he wending, bing kaolv dao Xianggang de lishi he xianshi qingkuang, guojia jueding, zai dui Xianggang huifu xingshi zhuquan shi, genju Zhongghua renmin gongheguo xianfa di sanshiyi tiao de guiding, sheli Xianggang tebie xingzheng qv, bing anzhao "yige guojia, liang zhong zhidu" de fangzhen, bu zai Xianggang shixing shehui zhuyi de zhidu he zhengce. Guojia dui Xianggang de jiben fangzhen zhengce, yi you Zhongguo zhengfu zai Zhong Ying lianhe shengming zhong yuyi chanming), and in Articles 2, 5, and 8.

         There is no need in the text to further explain that the CPC does not enjoy the right to direct ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] lingdao) or lead ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] zhidao) (13) state organs and affairs in Hong Kong and Macao. This is because the CPC's role is implied in the Socialist System and the dropping of the latter apparently entails the removal of the former.

      2. The Role of the CPC and the Socialist System in Other...