Commentary: Shaping Incentives Toward Effective Collaboration: Lessons for Conservation Practice

• Date: 01 March 2014
• Published date: 01 March 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12201

Shaping Incentives Toward Effective Collaboration: Lessons for Conservation Practice 231

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 74, Iss. 2, pp. 231–232. © 2014 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12201.

Commentary

Francisco G. Delf‌i n, Jr., is former

assistant professor at the University of

the Philippines National College of Public

Administration and Governance. He served

as assistant secretary and undersecretary

in the Philippine Department of Energy

in charge of upstream energy projects.

Currently, as vice president of PetroEnergy

Resources Corporation, which is engaged

in conventional and renewable energy

development, he is familiar with land-use

conf‌l icts pitting energy and environmental

goals against one another. He holds a

doctorate in public administration from the

University of Southern California.

E-mail: fgdelf‌i n@petroenergy.com.ph

Francisco G. Delf‌i n, Jr.

PetroEnergy Resources Corporation, Philippines

Many newly democratizing and develop-

ing states are the focus of expectations

for strengthened participation in envi-

ronmental governance. A key challenge, then, for

policy practitioners, public of‌f‌i cials, and private

advocates alike is how to achieve ef‌f ective envi-

ronmental outcomes while reducing transaction

costs in an enlarged and democratic policy-making

arena. Ching-Ping Tang and Shui-Yan Tang’s study,

“Managing Incentive Dynamics for Collaborative

Governance in Land and Ecological Conservation,”

cautions us that the oft-repeated advice from the

public administration literature to dangle incentives

and align the interests of dif‌f erent actors to foster

collaboration is not only incomplete but also, in

certain cases, may backf‌i re.

 e Twin Lake land conservation case in northern

Taiwan documented by the authors is emblematic of

current and future land-use conf‌l icts in many parts

of the developing world.  e existence of unique

landscapes with scenic, ecological, recreational, and

agricultural values is threatened by conf‌l icting uses

and interests. In the Twin Lake study, the authors

report how various actors responded to land conser-

vation ef‌f orts given the incentives embedded in the

evolving approach to ecological preservation, from

regulation through voluntary transaction and eventual

collaboration.  is study makes a unique contribu-

tion in viewing the resulting incentive problems and

dynamics in light of f‌i ndings from behavioral or cog-

nitive economics. Few scholarly investigations apply

the frame of behavioral economics to land conserva-

tion governance, especially in a non-U.S. setting. But

its far bigger contribution may lie in conservation

practice, where its prescriptions for managing incen-

tive dynamics can be tested. Phrased dif‌f erently, if

land conservation practitioners are keen to ensure that

macro-level collaboration leads to ef‌f ective conserva-

tion outcomes, then Tang and Tang’s micro-level

insights on incentive dynamics may help practitioners

reach that desired end.

Shaping Incentives Toward Ef‌f ective Collaboration: Lessons

for Conservation Practice