Comment

• Author: Carl R. Gwin
• Published date: 01 March 1997
• Date: 01 March 1997
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X9704200109
• Subject Matter: Symposium: Economics of Antitrust Enforcement

The Antitrust Bulletin/Spring 1997

Comment

BY CARL R. GWIN*

115

In

Antitrust

Decision Making

and

the Supreme Court: Perspec-

tives from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, William Kovacic asks a

very interesting question: How do Supreme Court justices make

decisions in antitrust disputes? This question is of interest to orga-

nizational behavior theorists who seek to understand how individ-

uals make decisions within complex organizations. This question

is also

of

interest

to business practitioners who, as

usual,

are

driven by profit motives. Game theory has value in examining

such motives. The plaintiff (accuser) will choose to pursue a law-

suit

if

the

expected

benefits

of

litigation

exceed

the

expected

costs.

Expected

benefits

are

based

upon

the

plaintiff's

prior

beliefs as to his chances of winning alawsuit. The plaintiff's prior

beliefs

about success clearly hinge upon any bias

observed

in

court decisions. Therefore, understanding how the court decisions

are made will help the plaintiff become more informed about his

chances for success and his expectations should be more accurate.

*Associate Instructor, Department of Business Economics &Public

Policy, School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: The author prepared this article

for

asymposium on

The

Economics

of

Antitrust

Enforcement

for

the 71st

Annual

WEA

International Conference, July 1, 1996,

for

a session jointly sponsored by

WEA International and The Antitrust Bulletin.

©1997 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.