Combating the threat of nuclear diversion.

• Author: Deutch, John M.

How serious a threat is the potential acquisition of nuclear materials or even nuclear weapons by states hostile to the U.S. or by terrorists intent on staging incidents harmful to American interests? The chilling reality is that nuclear materials and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history - due primarily to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the region's worsening economic conditions. This situation is exacerbated by the increasing diffusion of modern technology through the growth of the world market, making it harder to detect illicit diversions of materials and technologies relevant to a nuclear weapons program.

Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union are not the only potential sources of nuclear weapons or materials. The reported theft of approximately 130 barrels of enriched uranium waste from a storage facility in South Africa demonstrates that this problem can begin in any state where there are nuclear materials, reactors, or fuel cycle facilities.

A few countries whose interests are inimical to the U.S. are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons - Iraq and Iran being two of the greatest concerns. Should one of these nations, or a terrorist group, get their hands on one or more nuclear weapons, it could threaten or attack deployed American forces or allies, or possibly the U.S. itself.

Years ago, there were two impediments to would-be proliferators: the technical know-how for building a bomb and the acquisition of the fissile material - the highly enriched uranium or plutonium atoms that split apart in a chain reaction and create the energy of an atomic bomb. Today, just the latter applies. While it is by no means easy to make a nuclear weapon, knowledge of weapons design is sufficiently widespread that trying to maintain a shroud of secrecy no longer offers adequate protection.

The security of fissile material in the former Soviet Union thus has become even more critical at the same time it has become more difficult. Many of the institutional mechanisms that once curtailed the spread of nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge no longer exist or are present only in a weakend capacity, and effective new methods of control have yet to be implemented fully for a large portion of the world's nuclear-related materials, technology, and information.

During the Cold War, the security of Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile material was based on a highly centralized, regimented military system operating within a strong political authority. Nuclear weapons security ultimately depended on a responsible, competent, well-disciplined military establishment at the command and operations level. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the opening of Russian society, and economic difficulties have subjected the security system to stresses and risks it was not designed to withstand. All these changes have worked together to raise both Russian and U.S. concerns about the security of Russian weapons.

The military is facing a crisis situation in housing pay, food, manning levels, and social services, all of which have resulted in plummeting morale and lapses in discipline. Although nuclear weapons handlers traditionally were among the best-treated and loyal in the Russian military, they now are suffering hardships similar to those of the rest of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the new openness in Russia has reduced the effective distance between personnel who have access to nuclear know-how or weapons and those who may hope to profit from the theft of a nuclear weapon.

The Russian nuclear weapons production complex, and particularly the nuclear material production facilities, face an uncertain future. With the dramatic reduction in nuclear forces that is to occur over the next 10 years, many of the nuclear weapons production facilities will be dismantled or converted to civilian uses.

The once highly regarded personnel employed by these facilities have fewer perks and in some cases their living standards are below that of common factory workers. Some are seeking employement outside the nuclear field, in the commercial sector, where salaries are higher. Some potentially could lose their jobs if work can not be...