Colorado Court of Appeals, 1121 COBJ, Vol. 50, No. 10 Pg. 78
| Position | Vol. 50, 10 [Page 78] |
Summaries of Published Opinions
September 2, 2021
2021 COA 18. No. 18CA1487. People v. Pel-legrin.
Revenge Porn—Stalking—Harassment— Private Intimate Parts—Sixth Amendment— Lesser included Offense—Domestic Violence.
The victim dated defendant. After she ended the relationship, defendant threatened to post private, intimate photos of her online and to send them to her 12-year-old brother. Subsequendy, the victim's Facebook profile was altered to include nude photos of her, and a Craigslist ad posted in her name solicited sex and included her name and phone number, photos showing her face, and directions to her home, and it directed readers to her Facebook page.
Defendant was charged with multiple counts, and a jury returned a verdict. The court polled the jury, and Juror 8 denied that it was her verdict. The court sent the jury back to the jury deliberation room. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. The next day, the jury deliberated for two hours and returned a verdict convicting defendant of stalking, posting a private image for harassment (Craigslist), and harassment. A second polling confirmed a unanimous verdict. The court sentenced defendant to three years of supervised probation and 90 days in jail. It also made a domestic violence finding and ordered defendant to participate in a domestic violence evaluation and to comply with its recommendations.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting a mistrial after polling revealed that the verdicts were not unanimous. Here, the trial court's instruction to continue deliberations was not coercive, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding, based on her response to the poll and her demeanor, that Juror 8 was unlikely to be bullied into a guilty verdict. Accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its discretion by declining to declare a mistrial.
Defendant also contended that the stalking statute is unconstitutional on its face because die statute is overbroad. However, die Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a substantially similar stalking statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad, so the stalking statute is facially constitutional.
Defendant further argued that the photos posted in the Craigslist ads insufficiently established the element of "private intimate parts" required for his conviction of posting a private image for harassment. He maintained that the photo showing the side of the victim's exposed breast is not a photo depicting the "breast of a female" under the CRS § 18-7-107(l)(a) definition of "private intimate parts" because the entire breast was not displayed. However, an image posted for harassment need only display a portion of the female breast. Further, defendant failed to show that the statute is vague and overbroad if "breast of a female" is interpreted to include less than die entire breast.
Defendant also argued that harassment is a lesser included offense of stalking under CRS § 18-1-408(5)(c), so die convictions must merge. However, stalking and harassment differ in die degree of injury or risk of injury, the degree of culpability, and in the class of victims to which they apply. Accordingly, harassment is not a lesser included offense of stalking under CRS § 18-1-408(5)(c).
Defendant further contended that he had a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury, not the trial court, determine whether the crime for which he was convicted included an act of domestic violence. However, a domestic violence finding under CRS § 18-6- 8Ol(l)(a) does not impose a penalty. Therefore, it was not error for the court to decide this issue.
The judgment was affirmed.
2021 COA 119. No. 20CA0919. CadleRock Joint Venture LP v. Esperanza Architecture & Consulting, Inc. Negotiable Instruments— Uniform Commercial Code—Line of Credit.
West Start Bank issued defendants a $500,000 "revolving line of credit" (the Credit Agreement). The parties later modified the Credit Agreement and increased the line of credit to $750,000. Defendants subsequendy defaulted.
CadleRock loint Venture LP (CadleRock) asserted it was the successor in interest to the defaulted line of credit but admitted that the original Credit Agreement had been lost. As relevant here, CadleRock sued defendants for debt due, breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Credit Agreement was a negotiable instrument governed by Colorado Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) article 3. The district court granted die motion to dismiss as to all claims except breach of contract.
On appeal, CadleRock argued that the district court erred in concluding that the Credit Agreement was governed by the UCC because it is not a negotiable instrument. CRS § 4-3-104(a) defines a negotiable instrument as requiring a promise to pay a "fixed amount." Here, while the Credit Agreement specifies an upper limit to the total amount advanced, it allowed defendants to draw less or more than the limit over the course of the loan by repaying and re-borrowing. Accordingly, the amount defendants promised to pay could fluctuate significantly over the course of the loan, and without knowing the total advanced, die amount defendants promised to pay cannot be determined from the Credit Agreement. Therefore, die Credit Agreement does not reflect a promise to pay a fixed amount and is thus not a negotiable instrument. Because UCC article 3 only governs negotiable instruments, CadleRock is not barred from enforcing the past due and unpaid installments claim, and die district court erred. Further, because UCC article 3 doesn't govern enforcement of the Credit Agreement, CadleRock is not...
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