Collaborations among Competitors: Texaco Inc. v. Dagher

• Author: Christine Piette Durrance
• DOI: 10.1177/0003603X0805300104
• Published date: 01 March 2008
• Date: 01 March 2008
• Subject Matter: Symposium: The Economics of the Roberts Court

..

THE

ANTITRUST

BULLETIN:

Vol.

53, No. l/Spring 2008

35

C

ollaborations

amongcompetitors:

Texaco Inc. v.

Dagher

BY

CHRISTINE

PIETTE

DURRANCE*

I. INTRODUCTION

Agreements

among

ostensible competitors

have

been

judged

harshly

under

antitrust

law, especially in cases

where

such

agreements

accom-

plish

collusive pricing or reductions in

output.'

But

not

all

agreements

among

firms necessarily lead to anticompetitive outcomes.'

One

ques-

tion

that

has

received little attention in the

antitrust

case

history

is

the

treatment

of firm agreements

within

the

framework

of joint ventures.

Texaco Inc. v. Dagher'

provides

some

guidance

as to

the

treatment

of

lawfully formed joint

ventures

and

collaboration

among

competitors,

particularly

with

respect

to

pricing

decisions.

In Dagher,

gasoline

University of

North

Carolina at

Chapel

Hill.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Iwould to thank

Roger

Blair

and other

seminar

participants at the

Southern

Economic

Association

meetings.

Any

errors

aremy own.

United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273

Ll.S.

392 (1929); United States v.

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

For example, in the case of joint

ventures,

some

agreements

among

ostensible competitors result in cost savings

and

are beneficial to consumers. In

other cases,

when

agreements

among

firms do not necessarily involve elevated

prices or reduced output, the effect of collaboration can be procompetitive.

Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006).

©2008 by

Federal

LegalPublications,

[lie.