Cognitive Dissonance on the U.S. Supreme Court

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912909352776
• Author: Paul M. Collins
• Published date: 01 June 2011
• Date: 01 June 2011
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly

64(2) 362 –376

© 2011 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912909352776

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Cognitive Dissonance on the

U.S. Supreme Court

Paul M. Collins Jr.1

Abstract

This research examines the applicability of cognitive dissonance theory to explain a judge’s decision to author or join

a separate opinion. The author proposes that, when a judge casts a counterattitudinal vote, that judge will endeavor

to reduce the aversive consequences of being viewed as an inconsistent decision maker by justifying his or her

attitudinally incongruent vote choice to the public in a separate opinion. The author tests this possibility by examining

U.S. Supreme Court justices’ decisions to author or join concurring and dissenting opinions during the 1946 to 2001

terms. The empirical results provide qualified suppor t for the use of separate opinions as dissonance reduction

mechanisms, suggesting that dissonance theor y both is applicable to the actions of elite decision makers and enjoys

validity outside of a laboratory setting.

Keywords

judicial decision making, political psychology, dissenting opinions, concurring opinions

The application of psychological theories to legal deci-

sion making has a long history in the social scientific study

of judicial politics and behavior. This vein of research saw

its genesis in the legal realist movement of the early

twentieth century. In response to formalistic and mechan-

ical views of how judges rendered their decisions, the

legal realists turned to theories and methodologies devel-

oped in the social sciences, and social psychology in

particular, to explain legal decision making (e.g., Burtt

1931; Frank 1930/1963; Schubert 1965). In large part, the

incorporation of psychological concepts has proved a

success. For example, cognitive and motivational com-

ponents inform the attitudinal model of judicial decision

making (e.g., Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Spaeth

2002). Likewise, the concept of motivated reasoning has

been profitably applied to explain legal decision making

(Braman and Nelson 2007), and social cognition and

motivational theories more generally have been shown to

offer substantial leverage over the determinants of judi-

cial behavior in a variety of contexts (e.g., Aliotta 1988;

Rowland and Carp 1996). Despite the explanatory power

proffered by psychological theories, in more recent years

there has been somewhat limited attention devoted to the

psychology of judicial choice as scholars have focused a

great deal of research on strategic (e.g., Brenner and

Whitmeyer 2009; Epstein and Knight 1998; Hammond,

Bonneau, and Sheehan 2005; Helmke 2002; Hettinger,

Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Maltzman, Spriggs, and

Wahlbeck 2000; Murphy 1964; Rohde 1972), as opposed

to (nonstrategic) psychological, characterizations of judi-

cial decision making (but see, e.g., Baum 1997, 2006;

Braman 2006; Simon 1998; Wrightsman 1999, 2006). The

purpose of this research is to add to our understanding of

the psychology of judging by exploring the application of

cognitive dissonance theory to explain authorship of sepa-

rate opinions on the U.S. Supreme Court.

At its core, cognitive dissonance describes the state of

psychological discomfort that arises when an individual

behaves in a manner that is inconsistent with that individual’s

beliefs or prior actions (Festinger 1957). More specifically,

cognitive dissonance occurs when, for example, an indi-

vidual holds an opinion “X” but then states that he or she

believes “not X” (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959, 203).

When the individual behaves in such an inconsistent

manner, dissonance is said to ensue. To alleviate this dis-

sonance, the individual will employ dissonance reduction

mechanisms in an attempt to reduce the psychological dis-

comfort that resulted from the discrepant behavior (e.g.,

Festinger 1957; Stone et al. 1997). Since the publication

1University of North Texas, Denton

Corresponding Author:

Paul M. Collins Jr., University of North Texas, Department of Political

Science, 125 Wooten Hall, 1155 Union Circle #305340, Denton, TX

76203-5017

Email: pmcollins@unt.edu