Coercion and Provocation

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720957078
• Published date: 01 February 2021
• Date: 01 February 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Coercion

and Provocation

Allan Dafoe

1,2

, Sophia Hatz

3

,

and Baobao Zhang

1,4

Abstract

Threats and force, by increasing expected costs, should reduce the target’s resolve.

However, they often seem to increase resolve. We label this phenomenon provo-

cation. We review instances of apparent provocation in interstate relations and offer

a theory based on the logic of reputation and honor. We also consider alternative

explanations: confounding or mis-imputation of resolve; revelation of information,

character, or capabilities; or generalized sunk cost reasoning. Using survey experi-

ments, we systematically evaluate whether provocation exists and what may account

for it. We employ design-based causal inference techniques—a hypothetical natural

experiment, a placebo treatment, and ruling out mediators—to evaluate our key

hypotheses. We find strong evidence of provocation and suggestive evidence that it

arises from considerations of honor, vengeance, and reputation. Our experimental

design minimizes the risk that this result arises from our alternative explanations.

Keywords

interstate conflict, international security, use of force, militarized interstate disputes

Overview

A fundamental assumption in our understanding of conflict is that threats and force

function as a means of coercion. The logic is simple: the use of threatened or actual

1

Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

2

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

3

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

4

Department of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Baobao Zhang, Cornell University, 214 White Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA.

Email: baobaozhangresearch@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(2-3) 372-402

ªThe Author(s) 2020

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sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002720957078

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harm increases a target’s actual and expected costs of resistance, reducing the

target’s resolve, or determination to resist. And yet, contrary to this straightforward

logic, threats and violence often seem to result in provocation; they appear to

increase the resolve of a target, in some cases leading to greater resistance and

retaliation. The September 11 at tacks were arguably an attempt by al- Qaeda to

persuade the US to reduce its military presence in Saudi Arabia and support for

Israel. And yet, far from coercing the American public against involvement in the

Middle East, the attacks of 9/11 provoked the US into invading two countries in the

region, as well as maintaining its previous commitments. Historians and scholars

have documented many such examples throughout history and across cultures, in

interstate and intrastate conflicts (Carlisle 2007; Kagan 1995; Kalyvas 2006; O’Neill

1999). In many tense areas of the world—such as the South and East China Seas, the

Balkans, Korea, and India/Pakistan—analysts express concern that even a minor

“provocation,” such as the collision of military planes or an exchange of fire across

borders, could spiral out of control into a war.

Given our assumptions about the coercive power of actual and threatened harm,

how can we explain its apparently ubiquitous provocation effect? This paper

addresses the puzzle of coercion and provocation. The phenomenon that threats and

violence can provoke resistance and retaliation is recognized (Lichbach 1987;

Myerson 2007), and theories describe why actors might use threats and violence

to provoke (Carter 2016; Kydd and Walter 2006; De Mesquita and Dickson 2007;

Rocco and Ballo 2008). Nevertheless, we lack an explanation for provocation as a

reaction in a target. Studying the phenomenon of provocation is also complicated by

observational challenges: increased resolve is unobservable, inferring resolve from

actions is problematic, and historical counterfactuals are elusive. In this paper, we

offer a theory for how and why provocation occurs based on a review of historical

examples, inductive theory-building, and scenario-based survey experiments. We

employ principles of design-based causal inference in the design and analysis of our

experiments in order to evaluate the processes by which a minor “provocation” (the

aggressive maneuvering of military planes) translates into public support for

escalation.

We first review salient historical examples of apparent provocation: cases where

the application of harm in a coercive setting—such as a threat, aggressive maneu-

vering, or an attack—appeared to substantially increase the target’s resolve or desire

for retaliation. From this review we identify an explanation for provocation that we

focus on in this paper: concern for reputation and honor (E

1

). E

1

emerges from the

observation that threats, aggression, and violence are often perceived as tests of

resolve and matters of national honor. Perceived in this way, coercive acts often

put reputation (for resolve) and honor at stake. By resisting coercion, targets signal

to others that they will not allow themselves to be coerced and that coercion is not

effective against them. This reputational logic could emerge from many different

processes. It could emerge from rational calculation of the value of a deterrent

reputation (Sartori 2002; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015, §10); from cultures that

Dafoe et al. 373