Codes of conduct and practical recommendations as tools for self‐regulation and soft regulation in EU public affairs

• Date: 01 November 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1850
• Published date: 01 November 2018

ACADEMIC PAPER

Codes of conduct and practical recommendations as tools for

self‐regulation and soft regulation in EU public affairs

Maria Cristina Antonucci

1

|Nicola Scocchi

2

1

CNR, National Research Council of Italy, ITB,

Rome Unit, Rome, Italy

2

FTI Brussels, Belgium

Correspondence

Maria Cristina Antonucci, Social Sciences

Researcher, CNR, National Research Council

of Italy, ITB, Rome Unit, Via dei Taurini 19,

Rome 00185, Italy.

Email: mcristina.antonucci@gmail.com;

mariacristina.antonucci@cnr.it

During the 2000s–2010s, EU Commission and Parliament and European interest

groups advanced a specific model of regulation. It combines, on one side, lobbyists

self‐regulation—the codes of conduct for EU lobbying professionals' associations,

such as SEAP and EPACA—with institutional nonbinding or “soft”regulation on the

other side—the EU Transparency Register framework for registered interest groups,

its code of conduct, the related system of checks, alerts, and complaints about inter-

est groups misconduct put forward by the EU Joint Transparency Register Secretariat,

the list of Dos and Don'ts by the EU Ombudsman. This paper examines the peculiar

lobbying self‐regulation and soft regulation tools and practices, as implemented within

the EU model: SEAP and EPACA codes of conduct, EU Transparency Register, EU

Interest Groups Code of Conduct, Commissioners and MPs codes of conduct, the pro-

cedures of the EU Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, and the Ombudsman list of

Dos and Don'ts, underlining their growing impact on interest groups registration to

the EU Transparency Register. This EU innovative regulatory model‐based on a pecu-

liar mix of self‐regulation and institutional, incentive‐based, soft regulation‐stands as a

concrete alternative to the traditional North American top‐down binding regulatory

pattern. The EU model is based on a participatory, cooperative, and pragmatic dia-

logue between European policy makers and interest groups. Clarifying the concept,

the nature, and the functions of this model, while underlining its peculiarity is the

purpose of this paper.

1|EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The regulation of lobbying activities through binding models consti-

tutes the main tool to regulate the relations between interest groups

and decision‐makers in the United States and Canada. Yet binding reg-

ulatory frameworks are not universally widespread and co‐occur with

other nonbinding models, based on self‐regulation and on selective

incentives mechanisms. When it comes to these nonbinding models,

professional standards, such as ethical codes and codes of conduct,

play an important role in framing correct relations between decision

makers and interests groups.

In order to evaluate the role of nonbinding regulatory models,

this article analyzes the main features of the codes of conducts

developed by public affairs professionals' associations active in the

European Union's (EU) system, the European Public Affairs

Consultancies' Association (EPACA), and the Society of European

Affairs Professionals (SEAP) and analyzes their interaction with the

EU Transparency Register (TR) and its code of conduct. The latter

can be defined as a nonbinding, incentives‐based register: interest

groups seeking to influence the EU policy making process can regis-

ter voluntarily in exchange of several incentives (different forms of

access to the European Institutions). In this framework, the codes

of conduct developed by the associations representing public affairs

professionals played a special role. Professional associations, already

equipped with codes of ethics, implemented codes of conduct in

order to meet the institutional demands of self‐regulation posed by

the TR.

The paper describes the process of self‐regulation of EU interest

groups, by two mechanisms: bottom‐up self‐regulation and top‐down

incentive‐based regulation.

Received: 15 May 2018 Accepted: 26 June 2018

DOI: 10.1002/pa.1850

J Public Affairs. 2018;18:e1850.

https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1850

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1of7