Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq

• Author: Major Daniel J. Sennott
• Pages: 07

112 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 189

COBRA II: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ1

REVIEWED BY MAJOR DANIEL J. SENNOTT2

A journey through the war's hidden history demonstrates why American and allied forces are still at risk in a war the president declared all but won on May 1, 2003.3

1. Introduction

   Through primary-source documents and contemporaneous interviews, Michael Gordon and General (GEN) (Retired) Bernard Trainor provide a thought-provoking look into one of the most contentious and defining events of our time: the war in Iraq. The authors' main thesis, notably that "[t]here is a direct link between the way the Iraq war was planned and the bitter insurgency the American-led coalition subsequently confronted,"4 is developed through a detailed look at the "foreign policy strategy, generalship, and fighting" of this polarizing conflict.5 But the authors go beyond the oft-repeated mantras of the war's many critics, providing an interesting study of the background to the conflict, the personalities behind the plan, and even a lesson in Army values.

   As fascinating as it is, however, Cobra II does possess a significant flaw. Although the authors promise from the outset a "contemporary history of the entire conflict with all of its complexity,"6 by the epilogue, the reader is left wondering if history, like revenge, is a dish best served cold.7 The authors have endeavored to write a definitive history of the

   war before it has ended, an account so close in time to the actual events that the authors are unable to draw on much of the newly-emerging information available on the conflict.8 In addition, the authors' version of history is decidedly one-sided and limited. This is due in large part to their sources: Soldiers who were interviewed immediately after their return from the war, while their prejudices were still on the surface. Finally, the book is tainted by the authors' own biases. Gordon, who was an embedded reporter with the 3rd Infantry Division during the war, tends to favor certain units and Soldiers over others.

   This review provides an overview of the book, then analyzes some of the lessons that can be drawn from the stories recited in it, and finally identifies some of the flaws contained in the book. While Cobra II provides a previously unpublished glimpse into the preparation for the war in Iraq, as this review will point out, it is not a definitive history. What the authors do provide, however, is an edgy snapshot of the conflict through the eyes of those who fought it.

2. Transformation: The "Official Ideology"

   The authors use the negotiations and debates surrounding the plan to liberate Iraq, code-named Cobra II, as a showcase for the various characters involved in that plan. Namely, the authors describe GEN Tommy Franks, commander of the U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM), as the aggressive but anti-intellectual general who oversaw the war. Lieutenant General (LTG) David McKiernan, the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander during the war, is the "taciturn and unflappable"9 officer who was responsible for coordinating the highly successful push to Baghdad. These two officers are pitted against an enemy force controlled by Saddam Hussein, a paranoid

   dictator who was out of touch with the reality of his inevitable defeat.10

   And finally, looming over the entire cast of characters is then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. He is portrayed as an authoritarian who is determined to transform the cumbersome "legacy"11 military created during the Cold War into a "leaner, more lethal force."12 Eager to prove that the transformation was viable, Secretary Rumsfeld used the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as the test bed for what became his "official ideology."13

   The authors take issue with Secretary Rumsfeld's ideology of "transformation," arguing that the seeds of the insurgency were sown in the initial days of the war when U.S. forces, operating with limited resources, bypassed several key cities on their way to Baghdad. In their effort to conduct the war "on the cheap," the administration jettisoned the Powell doctrine of "overwhelming force" in favor of a smaller "transformation" force with a goal of flexibility and maneuverability.14

   But, in their effort to make the Army more flexible, the Department of Defense (DOD) actually eliminated many of the resources that allow a force to quickly react to an ever-changing enemy. This shortfall in resources, combined with intelligence failures at all levels,15 made for significant challenges. Although conventional wisdom and U.S. intelligence suggested that forces would meet with minimal resistance in Southern Iraq, the Marines and Army experienced protracted battles in the southern cities of Samawah and Nasiriyah.16 This intelligence failure

   soon led to a leadership failure, as the DOD was unable to adapt to the changing battlefield. For instance, after Baghdad fell earlier than anticipated, many believed that an additional U.S. Army division "would have assisted greatly with the initial occupation."17 Instead, the United States had insufficient troops to provide security and basic services, thus exposing a "chink in the victor's armor" that could be exploited by insurgents.18 Had Secretary Rumsfeld adhered to the Powell doctrine, the authors argue, the insurgents may never have been able to gain a foothold.

3. Application to Current Issues

   Aside from the evident application to the ongoing battle in Iraq, Cobra II highlights other contemporary issues that continue to be a source of debate among the military. The authors tackle a recurring problem in time of...