Coalition Building in Direct Democracy Campaigns

• Published date: 01 March 2005
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X04272429
• Date: 01 March 2005
• Author: Mathew Manweller
• Subject Matter: Articles

10.1177/1532673X04272429AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH / MARCH 2005Manweller / COALITION BUILDING IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY

COALITION BUILDING IN

DIRECT DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGNS

MATHEW MANWELLER

Central Washington University

Commonto many social movement studies is the argument that ideological heterogeneity causes

organizationaldilemmas. Yet, few scholars consider,let alone test, the impact of ideological het-

erogeneity on direct democracycampaigns (DDCs). Drawing from the extant social movements

literature,I arguethat DDCs functionlike short-term socialmovements. Based on in-depth inter-

views of initiative activists, and in some cases participant-observation opportunities, I conclude

that ideological heterogeneity is also a contributing cause of DDC failure. Ideological heteroge-

neity within DDCs either results in factionalism that wastes time and resources, or the devel-

opment of homogeneous groups that pursue policies unacceptable to the median voter. I also

conclude that ideological heterogeneity is more destructive to DDCs than social movements.

Whereas social movementscan adapt over time, DDCs must achieve a singular electoral victory,

within a specific electoral cycle, in order to succeed. Therefore, time constraintsmake faction-

alism more problematic for DDCs.

Keywords: direct democracy; social movements; initiative process; ideological heterogene-

ity; state and local government

Most scholars agree that the modern era of direct democracy began

in 1978 when Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann successfully passed Cali-

fornia’s Proposition 13. Their tax rollback initiative sparked a series

of copycat initiatives across the West and catalyzed other activists to

realize the initiative process’s potential effectiveness. The frequency

of initiatives qualifying for the ballot (butnot necessarily passing) has

grown steadily since the late 1970s,1especially in western states such

as Oregon, Colorado, California, and Washington.

Direct democracy refers to the initiative, referendum, and recall

processes present in most states’constitutions.2The process offers cit-

izens the ability to propose and pass statutes and constitutional

amendments (initiatives), reject legislation passed or suggested by the

AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH, Vol. 33 No. 2, March 2005 246-282

DOI: 10.1177/1532673X04272429

© 2005 Sage Publications

246

legislature (referenda), and recall elected officials(recall). Unlike leg-

islation developed in state legislatures, the content of initiatives is

completely controlled by the sponsors of the measure. Other than

judicial review, there are no checks and balances such as a guberna-

torial veto or a committee chairperson’spigeonhole. In addition, once

supporters collect a single signature, the content of the measure

cannot be amended (unless supporters agree to start the signature-

collection process anew). In the past few decades, direct democracy

campaigns (DDCs) have been used to influence state-level policy

related to animal rights, drug use and punishment, education, the

death penalty, abortion, taxes, campaign finance reform, term limits,

and gun control (Waters, 2003).

A considerable body of research has examined the policy impact of

successful DDCs. Matsusaka (1995) records that states with direct

democracy have lower tax rates and lower spending levels. There is

conflicting evidence on direct democracy’s impact on public policy.

Gerber (1996, 1999) argues that direct democracy states adopt poli-

cies closer to the median voter on issues such as abortion, the death

penalty,and gay rights. However, Lascher,Hagen, and Rochlin (1996)

counter that governments in direct democracy states are no more re-

sponsive to public opinion than purely representative states. Eule

(1990) and Donovan and Bowler(1998) suggest direct democracy can

be dangerous to minorities. Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins, and Kiewiet

(2001) argue that the policy impact of initiatives depends on whether

there is a principal agency dilemma involved. However, despite the

considerable research on the impact of initiatives, very little research

has examined why some DDCs succeed whereas others fail. Given

that DDCs can have a significant impact on public policy, variables

that affect success or failure are important to understand.

It is essential to clarify early what is meant by “initiative failure.”

DDCs have three stages: ballot access, electoral campaign, and legal

defense. DDCs can fail at all three stages. (a) Initiatives may fail to

make the ballot. The leadership of a movement may fail to agree on

ballot language, or they may fail to acquire the required signatures. (b)

Initiatives may make the ballot but then fail to garner a majority vote.

(c) Initiatives may make the ballot, win an electoral majority, butthen

suffer invalidation by judicial review.

Manweller / COALITION BUILDING IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY 247

Although there is almost no literature examining how often DDCs

fail to qualify an initiative for the ballot, there has been some research

examining DDCs’success rates. Waters (2003) explains that approxi-

mately 48% of initiatives pass whereas 52% lose at the ballot box.3

Miller (1999, 2001) highlights that 54% of successful initiatives are

challenged in court and about 55% of those challenges result in a par-

tial or complete judicial invalidation.4But very little research has ex-

amined why DDCs fail. Broder (2000) suggests that money has a sig-

nificant impact on whether a DDC is successful. However, not all

spending is created equal. A majority of studies suggest that campaign

money has a greater ability to defeat an initiative than to ensure its pas-

sage. That is, money spent opposing initiatives is more effective than

money spent supporting them (Garrett & Gerber, 2001; Lowenstein,

1982; Zisk, 1987). Bowler and Donovan (1998) show that voters fac-

ing significant information costs about initiatives will adopt a risk-

averse approach and simply vote “no.” Karp (1998) argues that elite

opposition to initiatives increases their likelihood of failure. McCuan,

Bowler, Donovan,and Fernandez (1998) suggest the absence of cam-

paign professionals within a DDC increases the likelihood of failure.

The same four scholars also suggest that the type of coalition (broad

vs. diffuse) a DDC mobilizes will affect the likelihood of success.

They argue that initiatives pursuing benefits for special interests or

narrow constituencies fail at a higher rate than initiatives pursuing

benefits for broad coalitions (majoritarian politics). However, it is

important to note that most research examines the dynamics of exter-

nal influences. This article suggests that we need to examine the inter-

nal dynamics of initiative coalitions to add to our existing knowledge

of why so many DDCs fail.

IDEOLOGICAL HETEROGENEITY IN

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The existing social movement literature offers some insight into

how this research might proceed. Scholars examining social move-

ments have long studied the internal dynamics of organizations and

movements, and they offer a considerable body of knowledge on why

some movements fail. Common to most of these studies is the argu-

248 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH / MARCH 2005