Clinton and the military.

• Author: Bresler, Robert J.
• Position: Column

No one can understand the senior leadership of the American military without a close appreciation of the Vietnam legacy. Most of them were junior officers in Southeast Asia and have spent a good part of their careers since then contemplating the lessons of that tragic war. Consequently, they have developed a far better understanding of the complex nature of civilian-military relations and the role of force in foreign policy than did the generation of military leaders that preceded them. This generation of military leaders expects their civilian superiors to provide them with clear and realizable political objectives before they commit to the use of force. This does not come about by the president barking orders and the military sharply saluting. It requires a sustained and intelligent dialogue between the president and his senior military advisers. Such a dialogue can not take place intermittently or be perceived as an interruption of more important business before the president.

Thus, when the military is asked to commit the force, they will and should subject their civilian superiors to some sharp questioning. Although the military is too deeply steeped in the principle of civilian control to be openly insubordinate, their level of enthusiasm will be measured in part by the clear thinking of the commander-in-chief and, it needs to be said, by his moral stature.

It is here that Pres. Clinton may have difficulties dealing with the military, perhaps throughout his years in office. In the 1960s, he no doubt shared the agony with other young men as to whether they could serve in a war they did not support. However, the record shows that he did not pay any price for his opposition - no risk of jail or loss of educational or professional advancement - and that he dissembled about his actual draft status during the 1992 campaign. Add to that the stories of Troopergate and Whitewater, and there is a picture of a president whose credibility and stature are diminished. Clinton is perhaps as aware of that as anybody, and it must influence his behavior in dealing with the military.

In his first year and a half in office, the results of Clinton's selfconsciousness concerning military issues have been a lack of sustained attention and an avoidance of responsibility. Policy in Bosnia, Haiti, North Korea, and Somalia has drifted from crisis to crisis without direction or resolution. From outward appearances, the President takes actions with the wish that...