Climate Shocks, Political Institutions, and Nomadic Invasions in Early Modern East Asia

• Date: 01 July 2020
• Published date: 01 July 2020
• Author: Weiwen Yin
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719889665
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Climate Shocks, Political

Institutions, and Nomadic

Invasions in Early Modern

East Asia

Weiwen Yin

1

Abstract

While a large literature argues negative climate shocks can trigger conflicts,

recent findings suggest moderate climatic conditions lead to war. This article

proposes a conditional theory by incorporating political institution as a mod-

erating variable. I argue that, under the impact of negative climate shocks,

centralized societies can mobilize more resources for war, compared to

decentralized societies. Thus, the former is more likely to resort to well-

organized plundering to address the scarcity problem caused by detrimental

climate shocks. Besides, centralized societies have little incentive to plunder

when the climatic conditions are moderate, as they can collect taxes regularly

through centralized institutions. A comparison between the more centralized

Manchurian and the less centralized Mongols on their conflictual behavior serves

as an empirical test. I find that temperature was negatively associated with the

probability of Manchurian invasion after they embraced centralization but had a

positive effect on the likelihood of Mongol invasion.

Keywords

militarized disputes, natural disasters, political economy, resource, extraction

1

Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Weiwen Yin, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, Allen Building, 2010, College

Station, TX 77843, USA.

Email: weiwen.yin@tamu.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(6) 1043-1069

ªThe Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002719889665

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The linkage between climate change and political violence has received increasing

attention from scholars and policy makers. Many pundits share the concern that,

impacted by global climate change, civil and international conflicts may occur more

frequently and more violently in regions that are environmentally fragile. According

to a senior United Nations official, climate change—and the shortages of water and

food that come from it—is becoming increasingly linked to conflict, and “[f]ragile

countries are in danger of becoming stuck in a cycle of conflict and climate disas-

ter.”

1

Scholars from different disciplines have made much effort to rigorously

examine whether climate change causes war. The empirical results about the effects

of climate shocks on the likelihood of conflict initiation, however, are still largely

disparate (Salehyan 2014; Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). While scholars

conventionally believe that bad weather results in more conflicts (Hsiang, Burke,

and Miguel 2013), recent findings suggest that this is not necessarily true (Devlin

and Hendrix 2014; Detges 2014; Landis 2014; Slettebak 2012).

In this article, I propose a conditional theory that identifies the social—more

specifically, institutional—conditions under which negative climate shocks (and the

absence of them) can increase the likelihood of war. It argues that societies suffering

from scarcity caused by climate shocks may not necessarily resort to violence. The

decision to attack or not depends on, under the impact of negative climate shocks

such as extremely cold weather or severe droughts, whether they can mobilize

sufficient resources for war. In other words, negative climate shocks not only affect

the willingness to initiate a conflict but also the feasibility of doing so. Since

institutionalized and centralized societies can effectively mobilize more resources

for war even impacted by bad weather, they are more likely to respond to negative

climate shocks by means of plundering their richer neighbors. Moreover, centralized

institutions can help generate stable income that disincentivizes them from plunder-

ing when the weather is mild. Thus, the likelihood of conflicts initiated by centra-

lized societies is increasing in the severity of negative climate shocks. On the other

hand, since decentralized societies are unable to mobilize resources that are neces-

sary for an effective military action when negative climate shocks occur, they are

less likely to launch an offensive war under bad weather. But they become more

war-prone when climatic conditions become moderate and suitable for military

actions. Simply put, the relationship between climate and violence is moderated

by the internal political institutions of the conflict initiator.

To test my conditional theory, I examine how two nomadic groups in East Asia

responded to negative climate shocks in the early modern period (1368–1840). The

two nomadic groups are the Mongols and Manchurian who shared many similarities.

First, they confronted the same major enemy, the Han Chinese settlers. In addition,

they were both very sensitive to temperature change due to the Mongols’ nomadic

lifestyle and the Manchurian’s reliance on hunting and fishing. The difference in

institutional capacity, however, significantly distinguished the two. The Mongols,

ever since being driven back to the Mongolia Plateau by the Chinese settlers in 1368,

formed a union of independent tribes. Hence, the Mongol society remained largely

1044 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(6)