Clientelism by Committee: The Effect of Legislator–Constituent Relationships on Legislative Organization

• Author: Michael Touchton,Julie VanDusky-Allen
• Published date: 01 September 2020
• Date: 01 September 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919851872
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919851872

Political Research Quarterly

2020, Vol. 73(3) 667 –679

© 2019 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912919851872

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Article

Introduction

Dozens of countries transitioned away from authoritarian

government in democracy’s third wave. In many cases,

regime changes inaugurated reforms designed to increase

representation, political rights, civil liberties, and

accountability. Yet, good governance has failed to materi-

alize in many new democracies (Bardhan and Mookherjee

2006; Foweraker and Krznaric 2002; Hagopian and

Mainwaring 2005; Heller, Kyriacou, and Roca-Sagalés

2016; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Jensen and Wantchekon

2004; Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Mainwaring,

Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006). Many argue that clien-

telism is to blame for these new democracies’ failure to

deliver on democratic promises. Clientelism occurs when

politicians exchange private goods for citizens’ votes

(Desposato 2007; Hicken 2011; Keefer 2007; Keefer and

Vlaicu 2008; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-

Shapiro 2012, 2014). Recent research has shown how

politicians who engage in clientelistic practices adapt

their clientelistic strategies to democratic institutional

contexts (Desposato 2007; Fox 1994; Helmke and

Levitsky 2006; Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson

2007; Mustapic 2002; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013;

Taylor 1996; Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 2014). In this article,

we examine how they have adapted their strategies within

the legislative arena with respect to the number of legisla-

tive committees.

Legislative committee system structures vary cross-

nationally, but most committee systems are designed to

give legislators some influence over the allocation of

government resources. In some cases, committees are

designed to give certain individuals or parties control

over a very specific resource stream that they can redis-

tribute to voters (Kasfir and Twebaze 2009; Lewis 2009;

Lyne 2008, 193). In other cases, committees give mem-

bers some control over the development of public goods

in a particular policy area (André, Depauw, and Martin

2016; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kim and Loewenberg

2005; S. Martin 2014; Young and Heitshusen 2003). Even

committees in the British House of Commons, which

have been traditionally viewed as weak, have some influ-

ence over the content of bills during the policy-making

process (Thompson 2016).

851872PRQXXX10.1177/1065912919851872Political Research QuarterlyVanDusky-Allen and Touchton

research-article2019

1Boise State University, ID, USA

2University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Michael Touchton, Department of Political Science, University of

Miami, 1300 Campo Sano, Coral Gables, FL 33146, USA.

Email: miketouchton@miami.edu

Clientelism by Committee: The

Effect of Legislator–Constituent

Relationships on Legislative

Organization

Julie VanDusky-Allen1 and Michael Touchton2

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze how legislator–voter relationships influence legislative organization. We argue that legislators

who engage in clientelistic practices to gain votes will create much larger committee systems, with more committees,

than legislators who engage in more programmatic practices. We test these arguments using an original dataset on

the number of committees in the lower chambers of seventy-seven democracies throughout the world. Our analysis

demonstrates that the number of committees is higher in legislatures with clientelistic practices than in legislatures

with programmatic practices. The results provide a new understanding of how legislator–voter relationships influence

legislative organization and lay the groundwork for a series of studies that examine how the clientelism-programmatic

spectrum influences legislative organization.

Keywords

clientelism, committees, legislative, parties, legislator–constituent relations