11 September and the clash of civilizations: the role of the Japanese media and public discourse.

• Author: Sakai, Keiko
• Position: Part II. Realities: policy and practice

THE ATTACKS IN NEW YORK AND Washington on 11 September came as a tremendous shock to Japan. The majority of the population felt sympathy with the victims and understood to some extent the U.S. anger, which led to the emergence of a new formulation of "the war against terrorism". This general atmosphere allowed the Japanese government to take further steps toward legitimizing the overseas dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which had been a major public policy issue since the 1991 Gulf War. When war came to be seen as unavoidable, however, the traditional mind-set of Japanese pacifism started to set in, and a rejection of the "clash of the civilizations" thesis began to be expressed in public discourse. However, they did not reject the idea itself, but rejected its adoption to Japan; that is, Japan was seen to be outside of the two-worlds in conflict.

This general feeling of "having little involvement" may be partly due to the relatively small size of the Muslim community in Japan, which numbers only a few thousand people. Very few incidents of harassment or hate crimes against Muslims have been reported. This also indicates, in a way, that the understanding of Muslim society among the Japanese people is very poor. Here, the pacifists' logic runs as follows: we do not understand Islam nor Muslim society very well, and so we cannot pass a judgment before we learn about them. However, we know the U.S. well, and what is important for Japan is to examine our relations in order to not be a loser in this clash between "the U.S. and Islam." (1)

In this essay, I will begin by surveying political developments in Japan after 11 September, focusing especially on the debate on the overseas deployment of the SDF among policy-makers. In Part 2, I will compare the major discourses in the Japanese media regarding 11 September and "the war against terrorism." In the final part, I will look at how previous wars have defined the Japanese mind-set for facing the present situation, and how domestic factors dominated Japan's foreign policy decision-making.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS

The Immediate Reaction of the Government of Japan

The Japanese Government's first reaction was to present an appearance that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was devoting himself fully to this crisis. The aim of this policy was to avoid a repetition of the failure of his predecessor Yoshiro Mori. (2) Koizumi sent a message to U.S. President George W. Bush denouncing the attack as a "mean and outrageous act that cannot be forgiven," and stating that "I feel great anger." He followed by saying, "representing the people of Japan, I offer my heartfelt condolences to the US president and the people of the U.S."

Secondly, the government of Japan decided to tighten security at all important government institutions and U.S. bases. Defense Agency chief General Nakatani placed all SDF units on maximum alert to guard against possible attacks. Here, defects in the SDF legislation were revealed with regard to guarding U.S. military facilities in Japan. Though this was requested by the U.S., the existing SDF law did not allow it. In response, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) called for a legislative change, and the three ruling Parties (3) agreed to it on 18 September. Koizumi soon went much further; on 14 Sept., he mentioned that Japan planned to assist the U.S., though without the use of force, saying; "Japan will contemplate ways to provide as much assistance and co-operation as possible, once the U.S. takes specific steps."

The government policy to loosen restrictions on the activities of the SDF became obvious in Koizumi's announcement of the seven-point plan issued on 19 September 2001. He clearly stated that Japan would: (1) take steps to enable the SDF to provide logistical support to the U.S. military in the event of a retaliatory strike in areas such as medical services, transportation and logistics; (2) take steps to strengthen security measures at important facilities in Japan, including U.S. military bases; (3) dispatch SDF ships to gather information; (4) further strengthen international co-operation over immigration control; (5) provide humanitarian and economic aid to neighboring and involved countries, including the provision of emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India; (6) take steps to help refugees, who might flee areas affected by the potential U.S. military action, possibly as part of humanitarian aid by the SDF; and (7) co-operate with other countries and take "appropriate steps" so that there would be no disorder in the economic systems of Japan or the rest of the world.

The first three points required fundamental changes to the legislative system surrounding the SDF. The third meant the deployment of an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean to lend support to the U.S. retaliation. The Maritime SDF had already been preparing to dispatch ships as soon as possible, without waiting for the amendment of the laws. Finally on 5 October 2001, the government submitted three related bills: a bill for a new law to deal with terrorism, a bill to revise the SDF law, and a bill to revise the Japan Coast Guard law (See Appendix A for details of the contents). All three were approved by the Diet at the end of October. While these developments were taking place in the Diet, Japanese military C-130 transport aircraft were dispatched to lslamahad as early as 9 October 2001, in response to requests by the Office of the UNHCR. (4)

Reactions of the Opposition

Koizumi's seven-point plan and the successive legislative changes concerning the SDF turned out to be a significant watershed in the discussion on Japan's national defense and military policy since WWII. They received little resistance from the opposition parties compared to those during and after the Gulf War. It is true that clear rejection came from the JCP (Japan Communist Party) and SDP (Social Democratic Party), but these two groups had less influence in the Diet than they did in the days following the Gulf War. (5) There were also some within the LDP who voiced different opinions, including Hiromu Nonaka, a senior member of its leadership, but their number was limited.

On the other hand, Yukio Hatoyama, chief of the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan), the largest opposition grouping, expressed cautious support for the idea of creating new legislation, provided that a U.N. resolution be included as a prerequisite for dispatching the SDF, and that the transportation of weapons and ammunition be excluded from the types of support the SDF could offer. The DPJ's policy fluctuated several times in opposing the LDP's basic draft of the new law for the SDF. Initially, its condition for agreeing to it was the adoption of an additional U.N. resolution; then it insisted on revising the bills to ensure that the proposed legislation would be in effect for only one year. Lastly it said it would support the new legislation on condition that the bill be revised to require advance Diet approval for the dispatch of SDF overseas, instead of merely requiring the government to report such dispatches to the Diet. All these requests were rejected in the end, however. Watching its behavior, it seemed that the leadership of the DPJ was essentially in favor of Koizumi's ideas. Hatoyama himself said that "dispatching the SDF to provide support to the U.S. military strikes did not violate Japan's pacifist Constitution." (6) Rather, they tried to use this chance to change the power balance within the ruling coalition, as we will see later.

The Launch of the U.S Attack against Afghanistan

The initiation of the military attack against Afghanistan did not change the political situation in Japan significantly; it stirred strong anti-war feelings among the public, but only the JCP and SDP expressed concern toward the attack. The DPJ again took an ambiguous position, saying that it "understood" the U.S. actions against Afghanistan, but expressed concern about civilian casualties.

Koizumi accelerated his efforts to create a legal framework for dispatching the SDF while the fight in Afghanistan was still in its early stage, but he could not imagine that the situation would change so quickly. Following the revision of the SDF Law at the end of October 2001, the government hastily began to map out a Basic Plan for the SDF. Following deliberation it was decided that two supply ships would be dispatched to foreign territorial waters, as well as four destroyers, six Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) C-130 transport planes and one multiple purpose plane, and 1,500 personnel. Two Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers and a supply ship left for a two-month intelligence-gathering mission in the Indian Ocean, followed by the dispatch of three MSDF ships in the last week of November. Earlier in the month, the government had started pushing for the enactment of a bill to ease the restrictions on SDF activities in U.N. peacekeeping operations under the 1992 law. These changes would allow SDF personnel to use weapons not only to protect themselves but also to protect those "under their control," such as troops from other countries and U.N. and Red Cross officials.

All the efforts, however, came too late to make a "visible contribution" to the "fight against terrorism" in Afghanistan, which was beginning to ease following the collapse of Taliban regime in November 2001. Although a total of six ships were dispatched, the government finally decided not to send an Aegisequipped warship to the Indian Ocean. The revisions to the Peacekeeping Law were accepted in the Diet on 7 December 2001, but they were aimed not toward Afghanistan, but for East Timor. On 20 December 2001, it was announced that Japan would send a research mission to Pakistan to explore the possibility of lending support to mine clearing efforts in war-torn Afghanistan. However, this decision was withdrawn soon...