Civil–Military Relations and Russia’s Post-Soviet Military Culture: A Belief System Analysis

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211062932
• Published date: 01 April 2023
• Date: 01 April 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211062932

Armed Forces & Society

2023, Vol. 49(2) 252 –274

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211062932

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Article

1134644AFSXXX10.1177/0095327X211062932Armed Forces & SocietyShamiev

research-article2020

Civil–Military Relations and

Russia’s Post-Soviet Military

Culture: A Belief System

Analysis

Kirill Shamiev

1,2



Abstract

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on

Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall

of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having

relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before

minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the

advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military

memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the

military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’self-serving bias,

critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium”in Russian civil–military

relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though

necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.

Keywords

Military culture, Russia, civil–military relations, military effectiveness, defense policy

1

Center for Comparative Governance Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics,

Saint Petersburg, Russia

2

Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations, Central European University,

Vienna, Austria

Corresponding Author:

Kirill Shamiev, Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations, Central

European University, Quellenstraße 51, 1100 Vienna, Austria.

Email: shamiev_kirill@phd.ceu.edu

Shamiev 253

Introduction

Why did the Russian military struggle to make itself more effective as a f‌ighting force

despite enjoying relative autonomy in the period before the reforms of minister

Serdyukov (2007–2012)? Barany (1999,2008) argues that Russia experienced an

“institutional decay”that deinstitutionalized exist mechanism of civilian control and

prevented the Kremlin from building a powerful military. Huntington’s (1957) pro-

fessional military approach suggests military professionals are best apt to know how to

make themselves capable, while civilian authorities can assess the progress and demand

that the military adheres to civilian goals. While the Russian military did not receive

proper civilian guidance, it is unclear why the military elites did not make the troops

more capable, although they had to f‌ight in a war, publicly acknowledged hundreds of

non-combat casualties, and general reluctance of young Russians to serve. However,

after the military did receive a strong civilian minister, the positive changes were

introduced without building a solid institutionalized system of civilian control. The

deinstitutionalized civilian control theoretically makes the role of informal beliefs

particularly salient. This paper thereby traces the role of military culture in civil–

military relations to provide an ideational explanation for Russia’s policymaking in the

military sector.

This article proposes an argument which I call the “imperfect equilibrium”ex-

planation of Russian civil–military relations. Under an imperfect equilibrium, military

autonomy from civilian leadership stimulates the military’s sense of cultural exclu-

siveness. Absent capable civilian restraint, this exclusive military culture becomes

detrimental to military effectiveness, preventing reforms from within (i.e., military-

led). Externally imposed, civilian-led reforms clash with the culture, however, and can

result in an imperfect equilibrium wherein civilian attempts to reform the military

appear to improve the situation but, actually, they “muddle through”the sticky military

culture that results in imperfect but mutually accepted reform results.

I characterize Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations in these terms. In the

1990s, a deep cultural divide between the Russian military and the civilian government

forced the military to prioritize preserving the Soviet military legacy and carrying out

the civilian order to wage war in Chechnya over its institutional development. Although

Vladimir Putin’s coming to power narrowed this divide, the Russian military still

resisted independent institutional oversight and scrutiny due to its historical claims of

an “exclusive role”(“osobaya rol”) in the socialization of Russian citizens and survival

of the Russian state. This problem produced devastating consequences in the

2008 Georgia war, which triggered abrupt, civilian-driven changes in the military.

However, the most symbolic changes have since been backpedaled, producing an

imperfect equilibrium of civil–military relations in Russia.

My argument helps f‌ill several gaps in the literature on Russian military effec-

tiveness and military culture. Barany (2008) and Marshall (2014) argue post-Soviet

Russian military reforms halted because of a weak presidency and strong resistance

from military generals. Yet, it is unclear why the military resisted changes that could

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