Civil–Military Relations and Human Rights

• Published date: 01 July 2022
• Author: Amanda Murdie,Sam R. Bell,Ghashia Kiyani,K. Chad Clay
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211006835
• Date: 01 July 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211006835

Armed Forces & Society

2022, Vol. 48(3) 701 –722

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211006835

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Article

Original Manuscript

Civil–Military Relations

and Human Rights

Sam R. Bell

1

, K. Chad Clay

2

,

Ghashia Kiyani

1

and Amanda Murdie

2

Abstract

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–

agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on

mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights

practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between

civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We

test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated

data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of

control increase the variance in human right practices.

Keywords

civil–military relations, repression, human rights, political science

In a security crackdown starting in 2017, the Myanmar military killed tens of

thousands of Rohingyas (a Muslim minority group), often burning complete vil-

lages. The civilian government had little ability to stop the military and protect the

Rohingyas from ethnic cleansing (Croissant, 2018; Myoe, 2017; Selth, 2018; Simp-

son & Farrelly, 2020; Stokke & Aung, 2019). As the violence continued, Aung San

Suu Kyi, the de facto civilian leader of Myanmar and a long time human rights

advocate, came under harsh criticism for her failure to stop the military abuses and

1

Department of Political Science, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USA

2

Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Sam R. Bell, Department of Political Science, Kansas State University, 101D Calvin Hall, Manhattan, KS

66506, USA.

Email: sbell3@ksu.edu

702 Armed Forces & Society 48(3)

her assumed abandonment of the human rights ideals that won her the Nobel Peace

Prize in 1991.

Around the same time in Southern Tunisia, military officers refused their pre-

sident’s direct order to use violence to stop protestors of an oil production plant

(Grewal, 2019).

1

The president justified the use of the military as a way to protect

natural resources (Amara, 2017). Instead of following orders, the military allowed

protestors to shut down the plant (Meddeb, 2015). Some soldiers even celebrated

alongside the protestors (Grewal, 2019).

Both the actions of the Myanmar and Tunisia militaries appear to be in opposition

to the civilian leaders within the two countries. According to classic civil–military

relations literature, military actions taken in opposition to civilian orders are typi-

cally referred to as civil–military conflict; military subordination to civilian govern-

ment wishes may be driven by a lack of civilian control (Feaver, 1999, 2003).

2

Yet,

even though a lack of civilian control may explain both the actions of the Myanmar

and Tunisia militaries, the human rights outcomes of these cases were diametrically

opposed. In Myanmar, a lack of civilian control led to further repression. In Tunisia,

civil–military conflict thwarted abuses.

3

Civil–military relations have been understudied in the growing cross-national

human rights scholarship. This lacuna is somewhat surprising given the core

“problematique” of civil–military relations: “the very institution created to protect

the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity” (Feaver, 1999,

p. 214). As the above examples show, the military may be both a threat to and a

shield for human rights within a country. Military actors are frequently responsible

for carrying out human rights abuses (Conrad et al., 2013). Agents may abuse

without regime directives or may choose to protect human rights in the face of

regime directives to repress.

This article develops a theoretical argument for how civil–military relations

affects human rights abuses within a country. We argue that a lack of civilian control

of the military may lead simultaneously to situations of heightened human rights

abuses, like in Myanmar, and situations that are less abusive, like in Tunisia. A lack

of civilian control increases variation in human rights abuses within a country

without systematically affecting patterns of overall abuse. We adopt a principal–

agent theoretical framework to connect variation in military structure to government

violations of physical integrity rights. This approach is not uncommon in existing

research seeking to understand when government agents are more likely to engage in

repression (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward et al., 2014; Englehart, 2009; Mitchell,

2004) but is unique in our expectation that certain agency slack may simultaneously

lead to increases or decreases in repression. In particular, we expect that weak

control of the military by civilians creates an opportunity for the military to carry

out human rights abuses. However, weak control alone does not determine whether

the military acts on that opportunity.

We test a hypothesis drawn out from our theory with a comprehensive measure of

civilian control (Kenwick, 2020) and an updated measure of civil–military conflict

2Armed Forces & Society XX(X)