Civil–Military Relations and Civil War Recurrence: Security Forces in Postwar Politics

• Author: Louis-Alexandre Berg
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002720903356
• Published date: 01 August 2020
• Date: 01 August 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Civil–Military

Relations and Civil War

Recurrence: Security

Forces in Postwar Politics

Louis-Alexandre Berg

1

Abstract

Does restructuring security forces reduce the risk of civil war recurrence? Prior

research has examined effects of military integration in alleviating commitment

problems, but the evidence has been inconclusive. Other aspects of civil–military

relations have received less attention. This article examines the effects of civil–

military relations in the context of postwar struggles to consolidate authority. It

outlines three pathways through which security forces contribute to renewed civil

war: by excluding rival factions and facilitating insurgent mobilization, by exploiting

control over resources to challenge the regime, or by escalating incipient insurgency

through repression. Analysis of original, cross-national data on postwar civil–military

relations shows that reducing the potential for exclusion and exploitation through

diverse officer appointments and robust civilian oversight lowers the risk of civil war.

These findings emphasize the distributive effects of restructuring security forces and

highlight the value of examining political contests around state institutions to

understand why civil wars restart.

Keywords

civil wars, civil–mili tary relations, intern al armed conflict, intern ational security,

conflict recurrence, conflict resolution

1

Department of Political Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Louis-Alexandre Berg, Department of Political Science, Georgia State University, 38 Peachtree Center

Avenue, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA.

Email: lberg@gsu.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1307-1334

ªThe Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002720903356

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Governing the armed forces poses one of the thorniest challenges in transitions from

civil war to peace. To reduce the risk of violence by politicized or abusive armed

forces, postwar governments often adopt new structures, rules, and procedures that

alter their relationships to civilian authority and the public. United Nations’ peace-

keepers and bilateral donors routinely attempt to promote “effective, inclusive, and

accountable security institutions” (United Nations 2008). Yet it is not clear whether

these efforts are worth the cost. In several countries, security forces have contributed

to renewed civil war despite having been restructured. Civil war in Libya restarted in

2014 when a faction defected from the military—after rebel militias had been

integrated under new command structures. In South Sudan, civil war began when

factions within the newly structured army split. In Iraq, exclusion from restructured

security forces contributed to the insurgency after 2003. For countries that have

remained at peace after restructuring their armed forces, it is not clear whether or

how the armed forces contributed to these outcomes.

Prior research on security forces and civil war recurrence has focused on disar-

mament and rebel integration into the military. Scholars have argued that disarma-

ment and integration facilitate postwar peace by serving as credible signals of

parties’ commitment to lay down their weapons (Licklider 1995; Walter 2002;

Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Toft 2009). Restructuring security forces may also

improve their capacity to deter renewed insurgency (Collier and Sambanis 2002;

Walter 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). Yet evidence regarding the effects of

military capacity and integration on post–civil war peace remains inconclusive

(Krebs and Licklider 2016; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). Moreover, the research

has not examined the effects of changes to laws, procedures, and institutional struc-

tures that affect civil–military relations and that take much longer to put into place

(Ball 2010; Jackson 2011; Brzoska 2003). Such longer-term, institutional changes

may help to explain civil war recurrence. Of civil wars that ended and restarted

between 1960 and 2012, roughly two-thirds did so at least three years after the

previous war ended, and the average time to civil war recurrence was 4.5 years.

1

By this time, parties have shifted their attention from whether to commit to a peace-

ful settlement to the day-to-day politics of postwar state consolidation—negotiations

and competition over budgets, appointments, po licies, and laws that affect their

access to resources and authority. Security forces are often central to these processes.

This article examines the effects of security forces on civil war recurrence

through an exploration of their role in postwar politics. Studies by Walter (2015)

and Hegre and Nyga

˚rd (2015) highlight the effects of state institutions on civil war

recurrence in shaping the distribution of power among factions, the potential for

renewed grievances, and the way grievances are resolved. Research on postwar state

formation has examined how institutions reflect political contestation and bargain-

ing among elites as they consolidate their authority (B arma 2017; Huang 2016;

Wantchekon 2004). Yet the literature has devoted little attention to how specific

state institutions, other than elections or power-sharing, affect the potential for

renewed civil war (Matanock 2 017). Studies of civil–militar y relations in weak

1308 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(7-8)