Christensen v. Harris County: When Rejecting Chevron Deference, the Supreme Court Correctly Clarified an Unclear Issue

• Publication year: 2022
• Citation: Vol. 34

34 Creighton L. Rev. 753. CHRISTENSEN V. HARRIS COUNTY: WHEN REJECTING CHEVRON DEFERENCE, THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY CLARIFIED AN UNCLEAR ISSUE

Creighton Law Review

Vol. 34

Jeana L. Goosmann - '02

INTRODUCTION

Congress delegates power to agencies under broad-spectrum directives.(fn1) Agencies utilize this power to pass rules.(fn2) Agencies pass two types of rules: interpretations that do not carry the force of law, and legislative rules that carry the force of law.(fn3) Originally, the United States Supreme Court held that courts should grant deference to administrative rules because of the agency's expertise and experience.(fn4) In 1984, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,(fn5) the Supreme Court veered away from granting deference based on administrative experience and instead linked deference to the clarity of the statute.(fn6) After Chevron, the question of the deference to be afforded agency interpretations not promulgated pursuant to the formal methods of rulemaking remained.(fn7)

Recently, in Christensen v. Harris County,(fn8) the Supreme Court answered this Chevron question.(fn9) In Christensen, Harris County, Texas, imposed a policy on its employees forcing them to take accrued compensatory time.(fn10) The United States Department of Labor ("DOL") issued an opinion letter stating that a public employer could direct employees to take accrued compensatory time only if a prior agreement provided for such.(fn11) The Christensen Court determined that the DOL opinion letter and similar agency interpretations lacked the force of law and did not warrant Chevron deference.(fn12) Instead, the Court applied the form of deference applied in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,(fn13) which was a lesser form of deference than Chevron deference.(fn14) The Court determined that Harris County's policy was not prohibited.(fn15)

This Note will first examine the facts and holding of Christensen. (fn16) Then this Note will detail the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),(fn17) the statute agencies must follow.(fn18) Next, this Note will review the fundamental types of deference courts grant to agency decisions by examining the United States Supreme Court opinions in Skidmore and Chevron.(fn19) This Note will also discuss the application of deference afforded to agency opinions since the time the Court decided Chevron by examining the Supreme Court cases in which the Court granted deference to agency interpretations. (fn20) Next, this Note will analyze Christensen's holding.(fn21) Specifically, this Note will criticize the Court for failing to acknowledge the APA.(fn22) This Note will then commend the Supreme Court for clarifying confusion as to the standard of deference for different types of administrative rules.(fn23) The Court was correct because it provided guidance for future decisions and is supported by case precedent.(fn24) Finally, this Note will agree with the Court's refusal to apply Chevron deference to agency interpretations, and will agree with the Court's application of the lesser degree of deference established in Skidmore.(fn25)

FACTS AND HOLDING

In Christensen v. Harris County,(fn26) one hundred twenty-seven county deputy sheriffs ("employees"), employed by Harris County, Texas, sued Harris County and its sheriff, Tommy B. Thomas (collectively, "Harris County").(fn27) The employees sued Harris County for re-quiring them to take compensatory time off at Harris County's convenience.(fn28) Harris County and the employees had executed an agreement to accept compensatory time as overtime in lieu of cash compensation.(fn29)

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"),(fn30) government employers may compensate employees for overtime work with compensatory time if there is an agreement between the employee and the government which entitles the government to grant compensatory time off as a way to compensate for overtime work.(fn31) When the employee requests to use the compensatory time, the government employer must honor the request within a reasonable time period, so long as it will not excessively disrupt the employer's operations.(fn32) A cap isset by the FLSA on the amount of compensatory time off hours an employee may accrue, and the government employer may substitute cash payment for accrued compensatory time.(fn33)

Harris County became troubled that accumulated compensatory time would exceed monetary resources when employees reached the FLSA limit on accrued compensatory time or when employees left their jobs with significant amounts of accrued time.(fn34) Therefore, Harris County wrote to the United States Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division to discover whether the Sheriff could schedule employees to take compensatory time.(fn35) In an opinion letter, the Department of Labor ("DOL") replied with their position.(fn36) The DOL stated that a public employer could schedule its nonexempt employees to take their accrued compensatory time if the agreement explicitly provided such a clause and if the employees voluntarily and knowingly agreed to the provision.(fn37) The DOL determined that the statute and the regulations did not permit an employer to mandate that an employee take accrued compensatory time.(fn38) However, the accrued compensatory time may be cashed out to achieve the same objective.(fn39)

Following receipt of the letter, Harris County put into practice a policy limiting the number of accrued compensatory hours.(fn40) County supervisors forced the employees to use compensatory time when they accumulated a certain amount of hours.(fn41) Once the employee's accrued compensatory hours approached the limit, the employee's supervisor notified the employee of the limit and asked the employee to reduce the accrued compensatory time.(fn42) If the employee refused, the supervisor ordered the employee to take the compensatory time.(fn43)

After Harris County supervisors forced employees to take their accrued time, the employees filed an action against Harris County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.(fn44) The employees alleged violations of the FLSA.(fn45) The parties stipulated to a set of facts.(fn46) The stipulated facts led the district court to order a motion for summary judgment.(fn47) In the district court's opinion on summary judgment, the district court concluded that the Harris County policy violated the FLSA.(fn48) The district court stated that governments were able to substitute compensatory time for overtime pay if the time credits were near equivalents and the compensatory time was consumable on the employee's own terms.(fn49) The district court noted that employees have a statutory right to use compensatory time when they request it unless the use of that time would disrupt operations.(fn50) The court noted that the employees in this case did not attempt to exercise this right.(fn51) The district court determined that by limiting the accrual of compensatory time, the County policy forced employees to take time off instead of receiving cash compensation for overtime.(fn52)

The district court noted that if scheduling compensatory time became inconvenient, the government was always free to either compensate employees with cash or hire additional employees.(fn53) The district court stated that compensatory time was much less open to management adjustment because the compensatory time was in exchange for mandatory cash compensation.(fn54) The district court concluded that the government must avoid management problems with compensatory time without infringing on statutorily-protected employee rights.(fn55)

Harris County appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employees to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that Congress intended for government employers to control accrued compensatory time.(fn56) Harris County reasoned that Congress must have planned for government control because Congress considered circumstances in which governments may elect to reduce accumulated compensatory time by making cash payments.(fn57) The employees contended that Congress granted them the right to decide when to use accrued compensatory time because the undue disruption restriction was the only limitation on the use of compensatory time.(fn58) Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, writing for the majority, determined that, on its face, the FLSA was facially inappli-cable to the dispute and did not cover the Harris County policy.(fn59) Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that it was impossible to figure out what Congress would have legislated if it had confronted the issue.(fn60)

Next, the Fifth Circuit looked to case precedent before fashioning their solution to the conflict.(fn61) The Fifth Circuit reasoned that an employee's ability to choose when to use their compensatory time did not relate to an employer's ability to require employees to reduce compensatory time levels.(fn62) The court continued by noting that the court's obligation was to create a default rule, which the parties remained free to alter in future agreement negotiations.(fn63) The court applied the general rule, that in the absence of an agreement, the employer can determine workplace rules.(fn64) Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and granted summary judgment for Harris County.(fn65)

Judge James...