China’s Policymaking in Transition

• DOI: 10.1177/1070496513496105
• Author: Heejin Han
• Published date: 01 September 2013
• Date: 01 September 2013
• Subject Matter: Articles

Journal of Environment & Development

22(3) 313 –336

© The Author(s) 2013

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DOI: 10.1177/1070496513496105

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Article

China’s Policymaking in

Transition: A Hydropower

Development Case

Heejin Han1

Abstract

The decision-making process underlying large dam construction in China used

to be dominated either by powerful leaders or by bureaucratic departments

pursuing parochial organizational interests. This article asks whether such state-

centric explanations can be applied to China’s more contemporary hydropower

development. Reconstructing the events surrounding the Nu River hydropower

development project from 2003 to 2009, this study demonstrates that a wide array of

nonstate actors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international

entities, emerged as new sources of policy input and influence. They advocated the

careful consideration of environmental and social impacts of large dams and public

participation in policymaking. To achieve these goals, nonstate actors formed networks

based on shared beliefs and preferences and engaged in rights-based activism. This

study concludes nonstate actors, their preferences, and their strategies should be

given more attention for a complete understanding of the evolving nature of Chinese

policymaking, particularly in the domain of hydropower development.

Keywords

hydropower development, China, policymaking, nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), environmental impact assessment (EIA)

China boasts the largest hydropower generation capacity in the world, with an esti-

mated total exploitable capacity of 380 GW (gigawatt; Brown, Magee, & Xu, 2008,

p. 619). The country’s long history of harnessing water resources led some to characterize

1National University of Singapore, Singapore

Corresponding Author:

Heejin Han, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, #4-42 11 Arts Link,

Singapore, 117573, Singapore.

Email: polhh@nus.edu.sg

496105JED22310.1177/1070496513496105Journal of Environment & Development X(X)Han

research-article2013

314 Journal of Environment & Development 22(3)

Chinese civilization as “hydraulic” in that the rise and fall of its various dynasties since

ancient times has been closely related to the mandate of heaven obtained through large-

scale irrigation and flood control projects (Wittfogel, 1957). Modern dam building in

China began in 1909 when Siemens installed the first turbines in Yunnan Province

(Bosshard, 2009/10, p. 44), and within a century the country has become home to more

than half the world’s 45,000 large dams (Oster, 2007). Despite being the most

“dammed,” in 2009, only about 6% of China’s total energy consumption came from

hydropower, whereas coal accounted for 70% (U.S. Energy Information Administration,

2012). As for electricity, almost 79% was generated from coal, while hydropower

accounted for only 16% in the same year according to the World Bank. These figures,

however, are likely to go up as China continues to build dams under the modern para-

digm of placing priority on developing and managing water resources for human eco-

nomic and social progress (McCormack, 2001).

Several factors have facilitated rapid hydropower development in China over the

past decade, particularly in the southwest regions. First, national-level development

and energy policies, such as the Develop the West Campaign and the West-East

Electricity Transfer project, have created an impetus for southwestern provinces to use

their abundant natural resources, including rivers, to accelerate economic develop-

ment (Chinese Society for Hydroelectric Engineering, 2009; Dore & Yu, 2004; He,

2007; Oakes, 2004).

Second, China’s state-owned power companies have begun to pursue aggressive

expansionist policies as they have undergone a series of corporatization reforms and

ongoing restructuring since the mid-1990s. Reform has forced companies to develop

corporate identities and pursue profit rather than political correctness for survival (Chen,

2010; Yeh & Lewis, 2004; Xu, 2002). In the increasingly competitive market environ-

ment, power companies have thus rushed to southwestern China to tap the region’s riv-

ers, which remain relatively underdeveloped compared with rivers in other regions.

Third, the Chinese government has found hydropower to be an attractive option

to help meet its soaring energy demands and to address mounting international pres-

sure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions generated from fossil fuel combustion. In

response to these challenges, the Chinese government enacted the Renewable Energy

Law in 2005 and many other policy measures, which have marked hydropower as

the centerpiece in China’s clean, renewable energy development blueprint. The

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 2007) set a target for

renewable energy to account for 10% of the total energy structure by 2010, and 15%

by 2020, as compared to 2006’s figure of 7%.1 China’s power companies that have

an installed capacity of over 5 GW will also have to ensure that 5% of their electric-

ity is generated from renewable sources by 2010 (China Daily, 2006). Moreover,

under a 25-year power purchase agreement, grid companies must purchase electric-

ity generated from renewable sources (Lema & Ruby, 2007, p. 3888). Successful

implementation of these mandates requires increasing the country’s hydropower

capacity to 300 GW by 2020, a dramatic three-fold expansion from 2005 (Lema &

Ruby, 2007). Combined, these factors have led power companies to accelerate the

development of hydropower as a quick and cost-effective option among the various