China's Belt and Road Initiative is Reshaping Human Rights Norms.

• Date: 01 October 2020
• Author: Salamatin, Mikkaela

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1428 II. WELCOME TO THE BELT AND ROAD 1434 A. The Mechanics of the Belt and Road 1435 B. The (Negative) Effects of the Belt and Road Initiative 1439 1. Human Rights Abuses 1439 2. International Security Threats 1443 3. Potentially Obstructed Access to Justice 1445 4. Detrimental Environmental Impacts 1447 III. THE POWER OF WORDS AND THE REACTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1450 A. China's Actions at the Human Rights Council and Security Council 1450 1. United Nations Human Rights Council 1450 2. United Nations Security Council 1457 B. The Impacts of the Lack of a Strong, Unified International Response 1460 IV. WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD 1466 A. Increase Engagement and Investment in Developing Nations 1467 B. Encourage the Development of Guidance 1470 C. Continue to Vocally Oppose Objectionable Practices at the United Nations 1473 V. CONCLUSION 1475 I. INTRODUCTION

A small business owner, Alexis, wants to build a flower shop storefront on a small piece of land she inherited from her parents. Having run her shop out of her home for a couple of years, Alexis is now ready to take the next step. She wants to take her business to the next level, but she does not have enough money. So, what does Alexis do? She would likely apply for a loan from a bank, offering the clean deed of the land as collateral to secure the loan. This means that if Alexis does not repay the bank the money she has borrowed (plus interest) on schedule and thus defaults, then the bank can repossess the land. (1)

Collateralized loans are far from a novel concept. One of the oldest forms of secured money lending, via pawnbroker, dates back as far as ancient China. (2) The concept of a collateralized loan is easily scalable. Collateralized loans currently exist around the world, protecting many lenders' abilities to take on large amounts of risk. Countries can also acquire debt by taking loans from each other. (3) However, the piper must always receive his due.

A common path to modernization involving economic relief is one country taking a monetary loan from another, more stable and developed country. (4) Under the US Marshall Plan after World War II, the United States gave monetary grants, food, and infrastructural aid to western European countries in order to boost political stability and postwar economic recovery. (5) Perhaps the most noteworthy modern example of this pattern is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI (6) is the People's Republic of China's endeavor to create a modern-day version of the historic Silk Road by connecting countries across Eurasia and Africa to promote economic ties and development. (7) The stage was set by two of President Xi Jinping's speeches. In 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the concept of an economic version of the Silk Road "[t]o forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the Eurasian region." (8) Less than a month later, Xi Jinping laid the groundwork for a maritime Silk Road when addressing Indonesia's parliament regarding Chinese-Indonesian relations and the success of joint maritime projects like the Surabaya-Madura Bridge. (9)

Over the years, Xi Jinping's vision has come to life via China's national policy and events in foreign affairs, laying the groundwork for these new silk roads through a collection of projects. Countries typically use BRI loans to fund an array of infrastructure projects, ranging from railways to energy development. From 2013 to mid-2018, Oxford Economics reported that the total number of BRI projects in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations member countries alone were worth over $739.65 billion USD. (10) Since the BRI has been active in Africa, the number of loans from China to African countries tripled between 2012 and 2019. (11) As of May 2019, the BRI has made inroads into South America as China has signed BRI memoranda of understanding (MOUs) (12) with seven countries in the region, including Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. (13)

On its face, the BRI appears to be a very neighborly exercise of policy entrepreneurship. (14) However, not everything is what it seems. Within the last couple of years, China's systematic project has garnered negative attention for exercising "debt-trap diplomacy" through its BRI projects in Africa. (15) Simply summarized, debt-trap diplomacy is an exercise of power in which a more economically powerful country convinces a less powerful country to accept long-term detrimental investment deals (that seem great in the short-term) and then leverages the imbalance of power to "either acquire the project altogether or to acquire political leverage in that country." (16) That African countries would be willing to sign on to the BRI with a full understanding of the potential consequences was, and remains, unsurprising. In the case of Djibouti and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, French and US officials have chided Djibouti for its growing reliance on Chinese help, when the fact of the matter was simply that Djibouti was in need of money and China was willing to lend it. (17) When Djibouti defaulted on its Chinese loan, China happily collected on its ninety-nine-year lease to build a Chinese military support base on Djiboutian soil, seizing at this opportunity to join the world's other military powers in asserting control over a strategic region. (18) Djibouti is only one country on the list of African nations that many believe have fallen victim to the BRI's predatory lending narrative. (19)

The focus on this particular impact of the BRI, however, is too narrow. Despite growing general concern about the implications of China developing its soft power influence around the globe, (20) there is little academic scholarship examining the impacts of issues outside of the BRI investment agreements' effects on arbitration and economic relations. This Note seeks to grow this area of literature by evaluating some of the available avenues for the international community to address China's direct and indirect actions concerning the BRI.

Although no single action represents a significant threat to international peace and security, each action is a drop in a bucket that may not appear alarming until the bucket is almost full. China's actions taken through and in support of the BRI are small steps taken in the lengthy process of creating customary international human rights law by establishing consistent state practices and laying the foundations for a culture more accepting of China's view of economic influence. (21) In the future, if these actions are successful, China would have an even stronger anchoring tool in its toolbox to justify further and deeper extensions of its power around the globe.

Much like the narrower example of the Marshall Plan, an important caveat for these events is that this general practice--the use of economic development programs to expand a state's global influence--is not a new concept. Foreign affairs paradigms in trade policy and the pursuit of hegemonic stability have appeared several times throughout international history. (22) In the twentieth century, the United States promoted the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and thus in a broad sense, promoted geopolitical objectives. (23) Objectively, China's actions appear to seek the same greater goal. What is troubling about China's execution of this strategy, however, are the negative effects rippling out of China's chosen methods for pursuing its own vision of the world.

Part II of this Note discusses the official policies of the BRI based on policy documents and documents published from the Belt and Road Forums hosted by China. This Part will also address the BRI's effects on international human rights, international security, access to justice, and the environment. This Note will not address economic concerns outside of the functional usage of debt-trap diplomacy as an instrument of a country's soft power influence, and this Note construes security concerns broadly in reference to protection of nations and peoples. Part III proceeds by examining how China is leveraging its position as a member of the UN Human Rights Council and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to support actions under and surrounding the BRI's win-win cooperation framework and China's greater vision of increased global influence. This Part then highlights the reasons why the lack of a unified negative international response to China's actions is concerning. Finally, Part IV assesses ways in which other countries can respond to China's efforts to grow its hegemonic power and influence, as well as the challenges associated with each. Specifically, this Note looks at ways for countries to respond through their foreign affairs policies and as members of the UN.

2. WELCOME TO THE BELT AND ROAD

   The BRI evolved significantly over the past few years. The international community originally referred to the BRI as "One Belt, One Road," based on the English translation of the initiative's Chinese name "Yi Dai, Yi Lu." (24) In 2015, the Chinese government released guidance that standardized the initiative's name to its current name, "Belt and Road Initiative." (25) The 2015 action plan focused on the goal of increasing global connectivity. (26) The Chinese government averred that the slow recovery of the global economy from the 2008-09 recession evidenced the need for China to promote the original Silk Road's spirit of "peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, [and] mutual learning and mutual benefit." (27) This idea is consistent throughout many of the documents published by the government on the BRI. Though not all stakeholders in BRI projects will be Chinese, a basic assumption of the entire BRI policy is that public and private Chinese corporations will play a central role in the planning and implementation of these projects. (28) Such is a logical component of...