China and the Current Barbarians.

• Author: Sylvester, John
• Position: 'On China' - Book review

China and the Current Barabrians

Henry Kissinger, On China, The Penguin Press: N.Y., 2011, ISBN 13: 978-1594202711,

608 pp., $36.00 (hardback)

Americans have long been obsessed by China. This has ranged from the Canton clipper trade, to Pearl Buck and Chiang Kai-shek, to Mao Zedong and the Korean War, to Tiananmen and the new "China threat." Kissinger has labored On China, and is now identified with that country.

I was in the American Embassy in Saigon when he and his entourage came though on their way to Pakistan, and then secretly on to China. Right after seeing him in Saigon I went on leave to Hong Kong where I talked with a China specialist colleague. He noted the changes in Beijing's attitude towards the U.S., but doubted any dramatic change would soon come. Right after that the news broke of Kissinger in Beijing, to the surprise of the world. It was evidence of the truth of the maxim that nations have no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.

In his new book, Kissinger writes, as always, perceptively and well, if also to the protection of his own reputation.

The written characters for China in their language mean the central kingdom, central country. The Chinese regarded the outside peoples as barbarians, to be respected to the extent they adopted Chinese customs or paid tribute to the Emperor. Kissinger's first major theme is the durability of China's traditional practices towards the barbarians, Kissinger and Nixon being recent examples. The Chinese treated the foreigners with courtesy and gifts, but expected obeisance. They find it hard to deal with them as equals, but have learned how to exercise wily and stubborn tactics in their modern diplomacy.

The second main theme concerns Mao's turn away from hostility towards our country, policy since the Communist victory in 1949 as they allied with the Soviet Union. Mao, however, found Stalin suspicious of a Communist potential rival, and Mao resented Russian pretensions to dominance. The Korean War cemented bad relations with the U.S. for years. By the time of Brezhnev, Moscow had become publicly critical of Mao's destructive internal campaigns, and worried about Chinese moves against neighboring Siberia, areas the Czars had taken from China. They placed large army units close to the border. Soon clashes broke out on disputed river islands.

Kissinger notes, but does not dwell on, the human cost of Mao's Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, Mao causing casualties...