China and Climate Change: From Copenhagen to Cancun

• Date: 01 September 2010

40 ELR 10858 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 9-2010

China and Climate Change:

From Copenhagen to Cancun

by Paul G. Harris

Paul G. Harris is Chair Professor of Global and Environmental Studies, Head of the Department of Social

Sciences, and Director of the Social and Policy Research Unit, Hong Kong Institute of Education.

There was a palpable sense of expectation around the

world that the December 20 09 Conference of the

Parties to the United Nations Framework Conven-

tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Copenha-

gen, Denmark, would result in a binding agreement among

governments to substantially reduce pollution-causing cli-

mate change. In contrast to t hat expectation, the outcome

of the conference was little more than voluntar y agreement

on principles—albeit important ones, in the form of t he

Copenhagen Accord—and general consensus that a binding

agreement might be achievable in time for the next C onfer-

ence of t he Parties in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010.

Many observers, and indeed some government ocials in

the West, blamed China for the failure of the Copenhagen

meeting, in particular for China’s opposition to a binding

agreement to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases

(GHGs) by 50% by mid-century.1 China was especially stri-

dent in opposing any binding cuts in GHGs for developing

countries, a lthough it pledged voluntary eorts to improve

its own energy eciency. Whether China is to blame for the

outcome at Copenhagen remains subject to debate, and of

course the Chinese strongly deny the accusation.2 What is

beyond question is that China is now the largest national

source of pollutants causing global warming, thus making its

policies and actions central to eorts by governments, indus-

try, and individuals to limit and cope with climate change.

China is taking steps domestically that will limit its aggre-

gate GHG emissions over business-as-usual scenarios. How-

ever, these limitations are far too little compared to the scale

of global cuts that will be needed to avert catastrophic climate

change. Developed countries have pushed China to be more

aggressive in limiting its emissions, and to submit to external

auditing of the implementation of those limits, ideally to be

followed by measurable reductions. However, these kinds of

demands run up against China’s profound sense of grievance

generally vis-à-vis the outside world, and more specically

are counter to its belief that the developed countries are to

1. Ed Miliband, e Road From Copenhagen. T G (Dec.20, 2009), avail-

able at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-

climate-change-accord.

2. Shi Jiangtao, , S C-

 M P (Mar. 11, 2010), at A6.

blame for climate change. China’s diplomatic position does

not reect its new status as t he world’s largest polluter, nor

does it account for the hundreds of millions of newly auent

consumers in China’s cities who are consuming and pollut-

ing at near-Western levels. China’s policies on climate change

are those of a relatively poor developing country that wishes

to focus intently on domestic economic growth and that sees

the developed world, particularly the West, as responsible for

addressing climate change. China expects wealthy countries

to take robust action to limit their own GHG emissions, to

reimburse China for the extra cost of more sustainable devel-

opment practices that it adopts beyond its own domestic

plans, and to compensate developing countries for the suf-

fering that will accrue from historical atmospheric pollution.

is A rticle briey examines China’s climate change

policies, particularly with regard to ongoing international

negotiations in the context of the UNFCCC. It describes

China’s GHG emissions, explains some fundamental objec-

tives underlying China’s climate change policies, introduces

some implications related to climate justice, and attempts to

predict Chinese policies for the next Conference of the Par-

ties in Cancun.

I. China’s Emissions

In 20 06, China overtook the United States to become the

largest national source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.3

It now accounts for one-quarter of carbon emissions globally,

and in 2008, two-thirds of the total global increase in emis-

sions came from China alone.4 Wh ile China’s average per

capita emissions remain far below those of the United States,

in that same year, its per capita emissions surpassed the global

average, placing emissions well above those of most develop-

ing countries.5 Per capita emissions are levelling o in the

developed world, but in China, they are increasing rapidly;

for example, China’s CO2 emissions are increasing four to six

3. Press Release, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, China Now

No. 1 in CO2 Emissions; USA in Second Position (2007).

4. Press Release, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, China Contrib-Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, China Contrib-

uting Two-irds to CO2 Emissions (2008).

5. T A. B  ., G, R, A N F-F

C E (2009).

Copyright © 2010 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.