Children Sentenced to Die in Prison: Why a Lifetime Behind Bars is No Longer Justified for Juvenile Offenders.

• Author: Moore, Logan

Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).

1. INTRODUCTION

   Brett Jones turned fifteen years old the summer before he was set to start high school. (1) Twenty-three days later, he was arrested and charged as an adult. (2) Now, he will spend the rest of his life behind bars. (3) In the United States, a fifteen-year-old child cannot legally vote, (4) drink alcohol, (5) or--in most states--drive a car without adult supervision. (6) That same fifteen-year-old, however, who is not considered responsible enough to buy a ticket to an R-rated movie, may be sentenced to life in prison without the opportunity for parole ("LWOP"). (7) Not only is the United States the only nation which permits LWOP sentences for fifteen-year-olds, (8) but the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brett Jones's case makes it clear that a sentencing judge does not even need to find that juveniles like Jones are "irreparably corrupt" or incapable of reform before imposing the harshest sentence available. (9)

   Part II of this Note outlines the relevant facts and procedural background of Jones v. Mississippi. (10) Part III summarizes the Court's relevant Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV details the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Jones, which fundamentally disagreed about how to apply juvenile sentencing precedents. Part V first explores why both the majority and dissent ultimately failed to provide any clarification on the important question of which juveniles may receive an LWOP sentence and which juveniles may not. It then analyzes the consequences of this failure and discusses why a categorical ban is the best solution to the juvenile LWOP sentencing problem.

2. FACTS AND HOLDING

   Brett Jones was sentenced to die in prison for a crime he committed when he was fifteen years old. (11) Until that point, Jones had been the victim of neglect and abuse for most of his short life. (12) His mother abused alcohol, suffered from mental health issues, and frequently left Jones and his brother unattended throughout Jones's childhood. (13) His biological father physically abused his mother--he knocked out her teeth and broke her nose multiple times--until the two separated when Jones was young. (14) When Jones was around ten years old, he and his younger brother began to suffer verbal and physical abuse from their stepfather. (15) He would grab them by the neck and toss them around, leaving marks and bruises. (16) Jones was beaten with belts, switches, and paddles, and frequently referred to by "cruel epithets." (17) According to Jones's grandmother, Jones was the subject of much of the abuse because he was "simply 'easier to hurt and beat.'" (18)

   Jones began to contemplate harming himself at the age of eleven or twelve to escape "the panic and the hurt" he felt. (19) He experienced hallucinations and was prescribed antidepressant medications. (20) In the summer after Jones finished eighth grade, his stepfather grabbed him by the throat after he arrived home late one night. (21) When Jones fought back, the police were called to the house and Jones was arrested. (22) Jones was effectively kicked out of the house, and moved in with his grandparents in Mississippi. (23) After the move, his antidepressant medications were suddenly cut off. (24)

   When Jones moved, his girlfriend ran away from her home in Florida to be with him and live at his grandparents' house in secret. (25) On August 9, 2004, Jones's grandfather discovered that Jones's girlfriend was living at the house and forced her to leave. (26) Later that same day, Jones and his grandfather got into an argument in the kitchen. (27) His grandfather cornered him, "got in his face," and swung at him. (28) Jones testified that he had a knife in his hand from making a sandwich, and that he "threw the knife forward," stabbing his grandfather, because he "[did not] have anywhere to go between the corner and [his grandfather]." (29) His grandfather momentarily backed up but continued to come after Jones. (30) As they continued to fight, Jones ultimately stabbed his grandfather seven more times. (31) His grandfather staggered outside and died on the ground. (32)

   Jones attempted to save his grandfather with CPR. (33) When that failed, he tried to cover up his actions. (34) He pulled his grandfather's body into the laundry room, used a hose to clean the blood off of himself, threw his shirt in the garbage, and moved a car over the carport floor to cover up blood spots. (35) A neighbor saw him outside in a bloody shirt, and Jones claimed that the blood was a joke. (36) When he was arrested later that night, he agreed to be interviewed by a police officer without invoking his right to silence or counsel. (37)

   At Jones's trial, the jury rejected his self-defense argument and found him guilty of murder. (38) He received an LWOP sentence pursuant to a Mississippi statutory mandate. (39) He then moved for post-conviction relief in state court on the grounds that the mandatory sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. (40) After the state trial court and the Mississippi Court of Appeals denied the motion, Jones appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. (41) During that time, the Supreme Court of the United States held that mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences were unconstitutional. (42) The Court's holding required sentencers to "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." (43) It identified several factors that a judge should consider, including a juvenile defendant's chronological age and its hallmark features, family and home environment, incompetence associated with youth, and the circumstances surrounding the crime. (44) In the wake of that decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered a new sentencing hearing for Jones in which the judge was to take these factors into account before selecting an appropriate sentence. (45)

   The new sentencing hearing took place roughly ten years after Jones was originally convicted and sentenced to prison. (46) At the hearing, Jones provided evidence that he was capable of rehabilitation and had "matured significantly since his crime." (47) Jones, his mother, and his younger brother all testified about the verbal and physical abuse Jones endured from the ages of ten to fifteen. (48) An officer who knew Jones from Jones's time at a correctional facility testified that Jones got along with others, stayed out of trouble, obtained his GED, and became "'almost like [a] son'" during that time. (49) Jones's grandmother--the widow of the man he stabbed--testified that she continued to speak with Jones weekly to provide him encouragement and "remain[ed] steadfast in her belief that [Jones] is not and never was irreparably corrupt." (50) Nevertheless, the sentencing judge determined that LWOP remained the appropriate sentence. (51) The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to address disagreement and uncertainty about how to interpret its recent juvenile sentencing holdings. (52)

   Jones argued that the Court's recent decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana require more than just the discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP. (53) He raised three arguments to support his contention that a sentencer was further required to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing LWOP on a juvenile offender. (54) First, he claimed that the Constitution requires such a finding before a juvenile is eligible for LWOP, similar to some of the Court's death penalty cases, where the Court recognized that the factual finding of an intellectual disability or a lack of sanity renders a defendant ineligible for capital punishment. (55) Second, Jones argued that the Montgomery Court held that Miller was a substantive rule, and thus the Court must have envisioned more than just a discretionary sentencing hearing at which factors related to youth are considered. (56) Third, he reasoned that Miller and Montgomery sought to ensure that juvenile LWOP sentences were rare, and a specific fact-finding requirement was necessary to accomplish that objective. (57) Jones alternatively argued that if a sentencer is not required to make a separate permanent incorrigibility finding, he must at least provide an on-the-record explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility to ensure that a juvenile offender's age is considered. (58)

   The Court held that a sentencer is not required to either make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility or provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an "implicit finding" of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a sentence of LWOP on a juvenile homicide offender. (59)

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND

   The Supreme Court has consistently referred to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" to determine whether a particular criminal punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. (60) The Court has looked to relevant state legislative actions and patterns in jury determinations as evidence of these evolving standards. (61) Over the past few decades, the Court has established two strands of Eighth Amendment precedent: (62) (1) cases with substantive holdings--adopting categorical bans on particular sentences for certain classes of offenders or crimes, (63) and (2) cases with procedural holdings--prohibiting various mandatory sentencing statutes and requiring sentencing authorities to follow certain processes. (64)

   The Court recently confronted these two lines of precedent in a trio of cases related to juvenile LWOP sentencing. (65) In the first case--Miller--the Court analyzed both lines of precedent and held that mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences were unconstitutional. (66) In the second case--Montgomery--the Court was required to decide whether the Miller Court's...