A Child is a Child, Except Under Ohio Law: A Discretionary Review of Mandatory Bindovers

AuthorBriana Morris
PositionJ.D. Candidate, Capital University Law School, 2018
Pages149-188
A CHILD IS A CHILD, EXCEPT UNDER OHIO LAW: A
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF MANDATORY BINDOVERS
BRIANA MORRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is often believed that every good story has an equally good
beginning. Something that draws the reader in from the beginning and
holds their attention; something that leaves them wanting more. Now,
while this may be the case, what is not believed is the fact that every good
story has to have a happy or even worthy ending for the main character.
As readers, we want the main character to prevail, but that is not always
what the author intends.
Every case in the court system has a beginning and an ending. Every
plaintiff and defendant have a story to tell; their own version of the facts.
This is no different than the case that I will present to you in this Note.
This defendant, which will be my primary focus, has a story to tell, just
like many other juveniles in his position. But, like many others, his story
did not have a happy ending. This defendant was a first-time offender.
The court only looked at two factors in his case before determining that he
should be tried in adult court: his age and his crime.
1
He now faces up to
twenty years in adult prison for a crime he committed while he was
sixteen.
2
It raises a question of whether the juvenile justice system, as it
has evolved throughout the years, in Ohio and many other states are failing
today’s youth. Is the sentencing scheme the justice system offers
beneficial or harmful to these children? Are mandatory bindovers, as
statutorily prescribed, better than discretionary bindovers for the child and
society? Is this transfer from the juvenile system to adult court even
constitutional? Is prison time really better for a child than some form of a
rehabilitative program?
Copyright © 2019, Briana Morris.
* J.D. Candidate, Capital University Law School, 2018; B.A., Ashland University,
2016. I would like to thank my parents for their love, encouragement, and support not only
while writing this Note, but all through law school and life. A major thank you goes to my
mom for reading and editing numerous drafts of this f or me. Next, I would like to thank
Judge Elizabeth Gill and her staff attorney, Josh Werning, for piquing my interest in this
topic and for all of their invaluable guidance throughout this endeavor. Lastly, I would also
like to thank Professor Jack Guttenberg for being my faculty advisor.
1
State v. Aalim (Aalim I), 2016-Ohio-8278, ¶¶ 2–3, 83 N.E.3d 862, 864.
2
State v. Aalim ( Aalim II), 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 60, 83 N.E.3d 883, 901–02 (O’Connor,
C.J., dissenting).
640 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [47:639
To understand where we are now in the juvenile justice system, I
believe that it is important to recognize how the system has evolved
through the years. W ith this knowledge, it will be easier to understand
where the juvenile system is today with regard to punishments for
juveniles. It will also help to better comprehend where policy makers and
reformers are coming from when they speak about a need for change or
why some believe that the system is working perfectly for juveniles and
ultimately society as a whole.
II. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Progressive Juvenile Court
The progressive reformers of the nineteenth century that created the
juvenile court system did so with an understanding that there was an
ideological and legal differentiation between youths and adults.
3
These
reformers believed that “[b]ecause children lacked adult reason or legal
capacity, their parents and the state had to educate them and prepare them
for citizenship.”
4
The goal for the juvenile justice system at this time was
based on a modern and scientific conception of crime control.
5
This
“positivist criminology” idea sought to identify the causes of criminality
and treat it, rather than to punish the offenders.
6
Instead of punishing
juveniles, the court system took a diversionary and interventionist
rationale, which meant that the court wanted to provide a rehabilitative
alternative to criminal punishment and enforce a newer conception of
childhood.
7
This system took into account the changing times of the country, in
which there was a shift from agricultural, household-based economies to
an industrial society.
8
Progressives “believed that children were more
malleable than adults and[, therefore,] would internalize [the] norms and
expectations” of the changing society.
9
The Progressives’ fundamental
belief and trust in the power of the state to do good,
10
led the state to create
3
BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND T HE
CRIMINALIZIN G OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 19 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, eds.,
2017).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 21.
9
Id. at 23.
10
Id.
2019] A CHILD IS A CHILD, EXCEPT UNDER OHIO LAW 641
reformatories and separate institutions to help youths.
11
One goal, among
many, of the juvenile system was to “divert youths from the criminal
justice system and to substitute the state as parens patriae,
12
which means
super-parent.
13
Juvenile offenders were viewed as innocent, misguided
children, and many reformers attributed their delinquency to social
conditions and inadequate parenting.
14
The delinquent youths who
appeared before judges during this time were seen as children in need, so
the court would focus on that instead of what brought them before the
court.
15
This afforded the judge great discretion in determining the
sentence for the child.
16
Attorneys were seen as unnecessary, and often the
juvenile did not have a “right to know the charges brought against him, the
right to trial by jury, [or] the right to confront one’s accused.”
17
Therefore,
the nineteenth century juvenile court was seen more as a rehabilitative
institution for juveniles than it was viewed as a way in which juveniles
would be punished for their wrongdoing.
18
B. The Due Process Revolution
The rehabilitative approach to the juvenile justice system continued
into the late 1960s.
19
In 1967, one particular case called this method into
question.
20
In the case, In Re Gault, the Supreme Court of the United
States reviewed the states’ juvenile court procedures, and upon finding that
they were constitutionally deficient determined that they needed to be
improved.
21
Gerald Gault, who was fifteen years old, was taken into
custody without notification to his parents after making “lewd and
indecent” remarks on the telephone to his neighbor.
22
The judge held an
informal hearing where he stated that Gault needed care and custody
before sentencing him to the State Industrial School a week later.
23
Gault’s
sentence was to be “for the period of his minority [that is, until twenty-
11
Id. at 26–27.
12
Id. at 30.
13
Id. at 19.
14
Id. at 30.
15
Id. at 33.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 33–34.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 58–59.
20
Id. at 59.
21
Id.
22
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
23
Id. at 58.

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