Check Yes for Checkpoints: Suspicionless Stops and Ramifications for Missouri Motorists.

• Author: Harris, Conner
• Position: NOTE

State v. Biggerstaff, 496 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied (Mo. June 28, 2016)

1. INTRODUCTION

   One of the great advantages of living in a free society is the enjoyment of general privacy and freedom from unwarranted interference in one's personal affairs. This advantage benefits citizens in both their private and public interactions. For example, it is expected one could drive to the store across town, the mall in a neighboring city, or somewhere on the other side of the country uninterrupted and unhindered. The primary exception to this privacy expectation is that engaging in conduct that violates the law can warrant a stop and seizure by law enforcement. (1)

   The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution codifies this privacy expectation as a right to be enjoyed by all within its reach. (2) Specifically, the Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures." (3) Drawing the line between reasonable and unreasonable is a task with which courts often wrestle. This line has a direct impact on how police officers perform searches and seizures and how the subjects of those searches and seizures are treated in the criminal justice system.

   A general component of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. (4) However, police checkpoints--designated locations which require passing vehicles to stop and submit to a police officer's questioning--have been upheld as constitutional in both federal and state courts as a permissible method of instigating a seizure without individualized suspicion. (5) Checkpoint jurisprudence at the federal level has not yet resulted in concrete requirements for reasonableness, but there are general underlying principles. (6) Missouri courts have likewise abstained from providing any sort of checklist before a checkpoint may be considered reasonable (7) but instead seem to judge each checkpoint on a case-by-case basis, often yielding inconsistent results. (8) A recent decision by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, State v. Biggerstaff, indicates that checkpoints designed to enforce vehicle equipment laws, also known as enforcement checkpoints, may be set up at any location, at a moment's notice, and for an indefinite duration. (9)

   This Note explores and discusses the repercussions of this decision. Part II of this Note explores the facts of State v. Biggerstaff in detail. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of police checkpoints under federal law and in the state of Missouri. Part IV examines the reasoning and holding of the Southern District of Missouri in State v. Biggerstaff Finally, Part V comments on the Southern District of Missouri's rationale in reaching its holding, as well as how this decision will apply to motorists in the future.

2. FACTS AND HOLDING

   Stacy Biggerstaff was stopped on April 17, 2013, in the early afternoon at an equipment enforcement checkpoint in Taney County, Missouri. (10) The checkpoint's purpose "was to enforce traffic safety laws, with a focus on driver qualification and the condition of the motor vehicles' safety equipment." (11) Evidence obtained during the stop resulted in Biggerstaff being charged with possession of a controlled substance, driving while intoxicated, and driving with a suspended license. (12) Prior to trial, Biggerstaff motioned to suppress evidence resulting from the traffic stop on the grounds that the checkpoint violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. (13)

   Two relevant documents were admitted into evidence: General Order 64-02, which was promulgated by the Missouri Highway Patrol, and Special Order 24, which was issued by and applicable only to Troop D, the branch of the Missouri Highway Patrol with jurisdiction over Taney County. (14) Both orders laid out general guidelines for conducting checkpoints. (15) The special order included a list of approved locations for checkpoints during daylight hours. (16) The locations were "selected by zone supervisors for the purpose of reducing property damage, injuries, and deaths caused by unqualified drivers and defective equipment on motor vehicles." (17) Deciding checkpoint location was a matter of convenience, "the actual choice [of checkpoint location] would then be made based upon where the troopers to be used to man the checkpoint were working at that time." (18)

   The checkpoint itself consisted of two police cars, both with their emergency lights activated. (19) The officers on site stood in the roadway wearing police uniforms and reflective vests. (20) Additionally, "[e]very vehicle that approached the checkpoint was stopped." (21) The stops took as little as thirty seconds and consisted of a routine driver's license check plus an officer checking the functionality of one piece of vehicle safety equipment, such as a turn signal. (22) Biggerstaff did not have a driver's license when she was stopped at the checkpoint and was directed to pull over so the officer could further investigate. (23) It was during this investigation that the officer determined that Biggerstaff was intoxicated. (24) She was subsequently arrested and charged. (25) Biggerstaff motioned to suppress evidence obtained from this checkpoint on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. (26)

   Biggerstaff argued three primary issues at trial: (1) the location of the checkpoint was not determined using specific data; (2) the checkpoint was conducted without written procedures; and (3) there were no signs, signal flares, or otherwise sufficient forms of notice to warn approaching traffic of the checkpoint. (27 The court found that two of Biggerstaffs three main contentions--a lack of written instruction and sufficient notice--were directly refuted by the evidence in the case. (28) The court further noted that it was not a requirement for a checkpoint's location to be selected based on specific data indicating heightened probabilities of criminal violations. (29) Location was merely one factor to consider in a balancing test. (30) The trial court found that the checkpoint was not unreasonable and denied Biggerstaffs motion to suppress evidence. (31) Upon her subsequent conviction, Biggerstaff appealed this denial to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District. The Southern District of Missouri affirmed the trial court and held that the checkpoint was not unconstitutional because Biggerstaff failed to show that the checkpoint was unreasonable. (32)

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND

   1. Individualized Suspicion and Reasonableness

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." (33) The analogous section of the Missouri Constitution states, "[T]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable searches and seizures." (34) The prohibition against only "unreasonable" searches and seizures indicates that reasonable searches and seizures are acceptable. (35) The reasonableness of a law enforcement action "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." (36)

      The Fourth Amendment's demand for reasonableness relies heavily on an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. (37) Individualized suspicion is "the idea that the state should judge each citizen based upon his own unique actions, character, thoughts, and situation," and not "on stereotypes, assumptions, guilt-by-association, or other generalities." (38) Individualized suspicion is the "beating heart" that keeps people secure in their person and property and deters unreasonable government intrusion. (39) Its purpose is to limit the amount of discretion a law enforcement officer may use. (40) For example, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court held that roving traffic stops cannot occur without at least reasonable suspicion that the driver is violating the law or is subject to a lawful seizure. (41) This was in part because traveling in automobiles is an everyday occurrence for many Americans, and their expectation of privacy necessarily follows them to their automobile in order to preserve the integrity of the Fourth Amendment. (42)

      Police stops are considered seizures for constitutional purposes. (43) Generally speaking, searches and seizures conducted without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing are unreasonable. (44) However, under very limited conditions, suspicionless stops are considered reasonable. (45) Fixed police checkpoints have been upheld in both federal and state courts as a reasonable method of instigating a seizure without individualized suspicion. (46)

   2. Supreme Court Rulings on Checkpoints

      The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld checkpoints with specific primary purposes, such as intercepting illegal aliens at international borders (47) and locating intoxicated drivers and removing them from the road. (48) In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court upheld a checkpoint located near the United States's southern border because, despite fairly intrusive stops requiring passengers to present certain documents and answer personal questions, the United States government had an incredibly strong interest in securing its border. (49) In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court upheld a checkpoint designed to stop drunk driving because the intrusion was relatively small--the average delay was twenty-five seconds50--compared to the State's interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road.51

      However, even these reasonable checkpoints must meet minimum criteria to pass muster. (52) A constitutional checkpoint bars an officer from exercising "standardless and unconstrained discretion." (53) In general, the primary purpose of the checkpoint must be "closely...