Chase v. Walgreen Company: expanding employee protection against employer retaliation in workers' compensation law.

• Author: Ward, Joseph
• Position: Florida

Chase promotes justice and fully realizes the statute's intended protections for employees in workers' compensation law.

In Chase v. Walgreen Company, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2819 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 17, 1999), the Fifth District Court of Appeal interpreted F.S. [sections] 440.205 (1993)[1] as providing a cause of action for employees who have been coerced or intimidated by their employer in retaliation for seeking workers' compensation. Although the language of [sections] 440.205 spawned conflicting interpretations of its coverage from the parties in Chase,[2] the Fifth District's interpretation expands the statutory umbrella of protection beyond those cases where the employee was actually discharged for pursuing a workers' compensation claim. Chase extends employee protection under [sections] 440.205 from retaliatory discharge and threats of discharge to retaliatory coercion and intimidation.

[sections] 440.205 in the Courts

F.S. [sections] 440.205 (1999), entitled "Coercion of employees," provides that "[n]o employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." Section 440.205 was passed in 1979 Fla. Laws Ch. 40, but the Florida Supreme Court did not address the statute until Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983). Smith presented the question whether a private cause of action exists for wrongful discharge in retaliation for an employee's workers' compensation claim. The Supreme Court held that although Florida common law did not provide for retaliatory wrongful discharge in workers' compensation law, [sections] 440.205 creates a statutory cause of action for such a claim. The Smith court determined that "because the legislature enacted a statute that clearly imposes a duty and because the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge, the statute confers by implication every particular power necessary to ensure the performance of that duty."[3] The Supreme Court next addressed [sections] 440.205 in Scott v. Otis Elevator Company, 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990), in which it held that damages for emotional distress are available to an employee pursuing a [sections] 440.205 claim.[4]

In Montes De Oca v. Orkin Exterminating Company, 692 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), the Third District Court of Appeal considered a claim of wrongful termination when the employer gave the employee work exceeding his physical restrictions upon his return from an injury.[5] After the employee was unable to perform the work, the employer advised him that a job was available within his physical restrictions; however, when the employee reported to work, the employer once again assigned work beyond his physical limitations.[6]

The Third District rejected the employee's argument that, because the employer was "attempting to coerce him into settling his workers' compensation claim by not respecting his physical limitations,"[7] his claim fell within the parameters of [sections] 440.205. The court based its decision on the applicability of F.S. [sections] 440.15(6) (1993), providing that "[i]f an injured employee refuses employment suitable to the [employee's] capacity ... such employee shall not be entitled to any compensation ... unless at any time in the opinion of the judge of compensation claims such refusal is justifiable." The Montes De Oca court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Smith on the basis that in Smith "the employee had actually been discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim," whereas in the case before it, the employee had never actually been discharged.[8] However, the key to the Third District's decision that the employee's claim fell outside the coverage of [sections] 440.205 was [sections] 440.15(6):

This dispute is squarely within the grant of jurisdiction to the judge of compensation claims under section 440.15(6).... [A] dispute that falls within the scope of subsection 440.15(6) is outside the coverage of section 440.205.... [because] the legislative intent ... contemplates that this type of dispute will be resolved by the judge of compensation claims.[9]

Statutory Construction...