Chapter VIII. Practical Considerations for Joint Ventures

Pages137-155
137
CHAPTER VIII
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR JOINT
VENTURES
This chapter examines practical factors for antitrust counselors to
consider when advising on the formation, governance, and management
of joint ventures. For example, as discussed further below, a frequent
concern in this context is the potential for coordination among joint ven-
turers as to competitive activities outside the scope of the venture. The
existence of clearly established and enforced guidelines, and information
firewalls can help prevent such coordination. Moreover, because it can
be difficult to prove a negative (i.e., the absence of coordination), such
guidelines can at least serve as some evidence that no coordination has
taken place, and that the parties are cognizant of the issue.
A. Composition of the Joint Venture
The relationship between the joint-venture parties, the structure of
the joint venture, and the membership model adopted by the venture can
have a significant impact on the nature and degree of antitrust risks the
venture presents. Therefore, parties should at an early stage of any ven-
ture consult antitrust counsel who can provide guidance as to these issues
as the venture takes shape. Important questions that counselors should
ask in the preliminary stages include why the parties want to form the
joint venture, whether and how the parties could achieve the same objec-
tives outside of the joint venture, and what their expectations are as to the
procompetitive benefits of the venture. Understanding the anticipated
customer reaction to a joint venture is also critical; as a practical matter,
this can have a significant impact on the antitrust risks the joint venture
will face. The procompetitive justifications for a venture should be re-
flected in the related business and strategic planning documents. The
formation stage is also a useful time to collect other documents and de-
velop evidence to support the procompetitive justifications for a joint
138 Joint Ventures
venture; this may be more difficult to do in the event of a post-formation
challenge. For example, in a teaming arrangement where two defense
contractors jointly bid on a project because neither has the capacity or
expertise to handle it individually, having a well-developed assessment
of their individual capabilities and expertise at the time of the joint bid
will be helpful in the event of a post-bid challenge.
1. The Parties Relationships
a. Identifying Areas of Overlap
A critical threshold issue in the analysis of any joint venture is the re-
lationships among the parties, i.e., the relationship between the joint ven-
ture itself and its members and the relationship between or among the
joint ventures parents. As a practical matter, antitrust risks vary depend-
ing on whether the parties are horizontal competitors, stand in a vertical
relationship, or operate in unrelated markets. A joint venture between
parties in unrelated markets is less likely to raise antitrust issues than a
joint venture involving parties in related markets.
For a number of reasons, it is important to understand all of the mar-
kets in which the parties operate and identify any overlaps. As discussed
previously, a common concern is the potential for coordination or infor-
mation exchanges that reduce competitive rivalry between the parties as
to markets outside that of the venture.
1
In addition, agreements not to
compete between a joint venture and its parents are common.
2
Therefore,
in order to evaluate the scope of any noncompete provisions, identify any
sensitive areas from an information-sharing standpoint, and analyze other
potential antitrust risks, counselors should understand at the outset the
full scope of the competitive relationship between the parties and the
1
. See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMN, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 2.2 (APR.
2000), availa ble at http://www.ftc.gov/os/200 0/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf
[hereinafter Competitor Colla boration Guidelines] (observing that joint
ventures “may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion through facilitating
practices such as the exchange or disclo sure of competitively sensitive in-
formation”).
2
. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem., 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964)
(“[I]f the parent co mpanies are in competition . . . it may be assumed that
neither will compete with the progeny in its line of commerce.”)

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