Chapter VIII Consecutive Sentencing: 730 Ilcs 5/5-8-4

• Library: Guide to Sentencing and Bond Hearings in Illinois (2018 Ed.)

Chapter VIII. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING: 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4

A. Consecutive Sentencing Issues

Although a defendant must be sentenced to concurrent terms in most cases where he or she is convicted of multiple offenses, there are instances where consecutive sentencing is mandated. Mandatory consecutive sentences apply whether the offenses are part of a single course of conduct or are the result of separate incidents.

1. Misdemeanor offenses. A defendant sentenced for multiple misdemeanor offenses must be sentenced concurrently.730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a); People v. Taylor, 171 Ill. App. 3d 278 (3d Dist. 1988). In a case where a defendant is sentenced for both a misdemeanor and for a felony, the misdemeanor sentence merges with the felony. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b)
2. Apprendi does not apply to consecutive sentencing. Oregon v. Ice, 129 S.Ct. 711 (2009); People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269 (2001).
3. Accountable Defendants. Mandatory consecutive sentencing under this section also applies to accountable defendants who do not inflict any injuries to the victim. (Unlike the death qualifying factor enumerated in 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) - Felony Murder, which requires the offender to have actually inflicted some injury to the victim before he is eligible for death). People v. Sangster, 91 Ill. 2d 260 (1982).
4. No double enhancement on consecutive sentencing. A consecutive sentence is not a sentencing enhancement subject to the general prohibition against double enhancements. People v. Phelps, 809 N.E. 2d 1214 (2004). See also People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 (2009).
5. Consecutive sentences when one of the sentences is Natural Life. Consecutive sentences are appropriate even when one of the sentences is Natural Life, as long as the sentences are being imposed under 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a-g) (Mandatory Consecutive sentencing). There is no consecutive sentencing when an offender receives multiple Natural Life sentences pursuant to the Habitual Criminal Statute (3rd Class X) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a)) unless the sentences are also required to be served consecutively pursuant to 5-8-4(a-g). People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148 (2006); People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490 (2010).
6. Separate Incidents. Mandatory consecutive sentencing pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) applies to offenders who are convicted of an offense in one jurisdiction and other offenses in a different jurisdiction. An offender who is convicted in Illinois of Murder, a Class X, or Class 1 offense in which the victim suffers severe bodily injury must be sentenced consecutively even if his other conviction is in a different jurisdiction. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) and (e); People v. Flaugher, 396 Ill. App. 3d 673 (4th Dist. 2009); see also People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393 (2001); People v. Curry, 687 N.E. 2d 877 (1997).
Be aware that until July 22, 1997 (i.e., the effective date of Public Act 90-128), mandatory consecutive sentencing pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-5-8-4(a) was limited to circumstances when an offender committed a Class X or Class 1 felony in which the victim suffered severe bodily injury during a single course of conduct. At that time, the legislature amended the consecutive sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-5-8-4(b)) to include mandatory consecutive sentences for offenses committed as part of multiple courses of conduct. (Note: Murder did not become a triggering offense until January 1, 2000).
Later, Public Act 93-0160 (eff. July 10, 2003) amended the consecutive sentencing statutes by combining parts of 5-8-4(a) and (b), and eliminating any reference to single or multiple courses of conduct. As a result of these changes, mandatory consecutive sentencing now applies whether or not the triggering offense and other offenses were part of a single course of conduct or multiple courses of conduct. Mandatory consecutive sentencing is also required even when offenders are sentenced at different times for separate incidents or if the offenses occurred in different jurisdictions. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) and (e); People v. Flaugher, 396 Ill. App. 3d 673 (4th Dist. 2009).
7. Separate Verdict Form for Felony Murder Count. When a defendant is being prosecuted for a violation of 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) and/or 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) ("Intentional Murder" and "Knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm") and 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) "Felony Murder," the trial court must provide a separate verdict form for the Felony Murder Count if the defendant requests it. People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (2009); see also People v. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690.

B. Mandatory Consecutive Sentencing: Triggering Offenses

Triggering offenses require sentences on other cases or counts within the same case to run consecutively to those given on the triggering offense(s).

Unless specifically limited by the relevant subsection within the Consecutive Sentencing Statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)), sentences on all triggering offenses must be consecutive to those on all other triggering and non-triggering offenses. People v. Curry, 687 N.E. 2d 877(1997); People ex rel. Senko v. Meersman, 2012 IL 114163.

Be aware, however, that a recent Appellate Court held that, though the mandatory consecutive sentencing provisions are constitutional, there can be circumstances where an aggregate sentence can be unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant. See People v. Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744 where the Court held that the aggregate minimum sentence required in Harris First Degree Murder and Attempt Murder convictions was unconstitutional as-applied to Harris because Harris had recently reached 18 years of age at the time of the incident, and that the 76-year mandatory minimum sentence...