CHAPTER TWO RESPONSIBILITIES OF OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF AUTOMOBILES
| Jurisdiction | Maryland |
LAURA E. CHABALOWSKI is an associate with the Baltimore law firm of H. Barritt Peterson & Associates. She is a member of the Baltimore City, Maryland State and American Bar Associations. Her practice concentrates on insurance, automobile and premises liability litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will address the legal responsibilities imposed upon a person who is the owner of a vehicle at the time of an accident but who was not necessarily present in the vehicle at that time. It will deal with the relationship between the owner and the operator of the vehicle.
The chapter also deals with the liability of others who operate vehicles regardless of negligence and of the liability of passengers riding in a vehicle at the time of an accident.
In Maryland, where the owner of a vehicle is not driving the vehicle at the time of an accident there is a presumption of vicarious liability between the owner and operator, but this presumption is rebuttable. An owner of a vehicle who is not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident can nevertheless be held liable if (i) guilty of primary negligence such as by negligent entrustment or (ii) if liability is vicariously imputed to them.1
Maryland law recognizes a presumption of vicarious liability between the owner and operator of a motor vehicle based on the assumption that the owner has the right to control the operator of his vehicle.2 This presumption, however, is rebuttable. Some opinions have distinguished imputed negligence and negligence based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Imputed negligence has been distinguished on the basis that it is founded on the rebuttable presumption that the owner has the right to control the driver of the vehicle. Respondeat superior, on the other hand, has been held to rest on the relationship between the parties concerning the use of the vehicle.3
Simply granting permission to operate the vehicle, however, does not impose liability on the owner.4
II. OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITY WHEN NOT DRIVING
A. Real Owner vs. Registered Owner
While there is a presumption of ownership of a vehicle by virtue of placing title to a vehicle in the name of a person, this presumption of ownership is nevertheless rebuttable by showing that the title owner is not the de facto owner of the vehicle.5 The presumption can be rebutted when there is legally sufficient evidence produced to establish that the title owner does not have the right of possession and control of the vehicle.6
For example, where a son purchased an automobile but placed the title in his father's name because the son was underage, the father was not vicariously liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a garageman with whom it had been left for repairs.7
A presumption of permissive use is implied in the presumption of agency.8 However, proof of permissive use is not the equivalent of proof of agency. Therefore, like the presumption of agency, the presumption of permissive use may be rebutted by competent evidence.9
B. Dual Ownership
1. Generally
In 1989 the Court of Special Appeals held that a co-owner may be liable for negligent entrustment by participating in making another person a co-owner of the vehicle with knowledge of that co-owner's poor driving abilities and habits.10 However, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed that holding.11 In doing that, the Court of Appeals pointed out that in order for one co-owner to be liable for the negligent entrustment of a co-owned vehicle there had to exist the power to permit or prohibit the use of the vehicle. Such power did not exist since the co-owners had the same rights of ownership and neither had a superior right to control over the other. It is now the law in Maryland that mere co-ownership will not make a co-owner liable for negligent entrustment of that vehicle simply by permitting a co-owner with a poor driving ability or habit to become a co-owner.
2. Partnership Vehicles
The test of the liability of a partnership and of its members for the torts of any one partner is whether the negligent act was done for the benefit of the partnership and was within what may be reasonably found to be the scope of the business, purpose and agreement of the partnership. Under these circumstances, each partner is the principal of the others and, thus, can be held liable as individuals as well as co-partners.12
C. Family Purpose Doctrine
In general, a family member who maintains a vehicle for general family use is not necessarily liable for the negligence of another family member driving the vehicle with permission.13
Maryland has consistently rejected the "family purpose doctrine," which holds the head of a family liable for the negligent acts of a member of the family while using the vehicle.14
However, liability may be imposed upon the head of a family for negligently entrusting the family vehicle to another member of the family.15 Moreover, liability may be imposed the head of a family if it is established that the operator was acting for the benefit of the owner.
D. Master/Servant
1. Liability When Use Is Within Scope of Employment
a. In General
In order to hold the owner of a motor vehicle vicariously liable for the negligent operation of a vehicle by another under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it must be shown that a master/servant relationship existed between the owner and the operator at the time of the accident. The law imputes the negligence to the master and is based on the relationship between the parties and the nature of the expedition.16
The master/servant relationship usually arises in the context of employment. The employer is the master and the employee is the servant. In order to impute an employee's negligence to his or her employer, it must be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the accident.17
b. Deviation
Some deviation from job responsibilities is tolerated. If an employee deviates from an expected or normal route for the purpose of going for lunch, but is nevertheless carrying his employer's products and is returning to his employer's place of business, the question of whether the employee's trip was within the scope of employment has been held to be a question for the trier of fact.18
c. Employee Owner of Vehicle
An employer can be held vicariously liable for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee even where the motor vehicle is owned by the employee and not the employer.19
2. Nonliability of Master
a. In General
Under certain circumstances the owner of a vehicle who is the principal or master of the operator may escape liability for negligent conduct.
An employer's vicarious liability for an employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle depends on the employer's right to control the employee in the operation of the vehicle. In some cases the use of the vehicle could be of such vital importance in furthering the employer's business that his control over the vehicle might reasonably be inferred.20 One case held that an employee was not acting within the scope of his employment even though he was driving his personal vehicle in the furtherance of his employer's business by attending an employer-sponsored graduate course. The court rejected vicarious liability on the basis that the employer did not require the employee to drive his own vehicle and did not exercise any control over the use of the vehicle.
Similarly, in Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, Inc.,21 vicarious liability was rejected where an employee was involved in a vehicular accident after becoming intoxicated at a mandatory company party.
b. Abandonment of Master's Business
Liability cannot be imposed if the employee was not acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident.
While there is a presumption that the operator of a vehicle is the agent and/or servant of the owner, this presumption is rebuttable. An owner who is a master is not liable for the acts of his or her employee if, at the time of the negligent act, the employee has abandoned the business of the owner and is operating the vehicle for his or her own pleasure or business.22
The liability of the owner of a vehicle being operated by an agent relies on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Mere permission to operate a vehicle does not impose
liability.23
c. Driving to and from Work
An employee is not acting within the scope of employment for purposes of determining the applicability of respondeat superior while driving to and from work.24 This rule applies even if the employer requires the employee to have a personal vehicle available for use when travel is necessary, provided that the employee is not actually performing any designated job responsibilities at the time of the accident.25
d. Deviation
As stated in section II.D.1.b of this chapter, above, whether or not a deviation from job responsibilities is tolerated is left for the trier of fact.26
E. Owner's Presence in the Vehicle
Generally, negligence will be imputed to the owner of a vehicle who is present while someone else negligently operates that vehicle. However, the Maryland courts have noted that an owner may be absolved from imputed liability where the driver took the owner's keys while the owner was asleep and never obtained explicit authorization to drive, and the owner continued to sleep in the automobile until the time of the occurrence.27
The doctrine of imputed negligence rests on a rebuttable presumption that the non-driving vehicle owner had the right to control the vehicle.28 This is a rebuttable presumption.29 This doctrine may not be used to defeat the claim of an owner/passenger who sues his/her driver for injuries caused by the driver's negligence.30 Therefore, even if an agency relationship exists between the driver and the...
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