CHAPTER ONE GENERAL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING AND DEFENDING LIABILITY
| Jurisdiction | Maryland |
NATHANIEL FICK received his undergraduate degree from the University of Maryland and law degree from the University of Baltimore. For 42 years of civil trial practice, his concentration was on Neurolaw (Brain Injury and Spinal Cord Injury), other Personal Injury and Wrongful Death, and Insurance and Business litigation. He became a Board Certified Civil Trial Specialist with the National Board of Trial Advocacy in 1995, and a member of the American College of Legal Medicine and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, a founding member of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, The Civil Justice Foundation, and The Public Justice Society, a Lifetime Fellow of the Roscoe Pound American Trial Lawyers Foundation, and of the John Marshall Honor Society. Mr. Fick served 10 years as a board member of the Brain Injury Association of Maryland and four years as President, and was a member of the International Brain Injury Association, Brain Injury Association [USA], National Spinal Cord Injury Association and American Trauma Society. Mr. Fick served as a Trustee on the Shock Trauma Research Fund for five years. He was a contributing editor to EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE UNITED STATES (Michie) and a contributing author to INNOVATIONS IN JURY TRIAL PROCEDURES (National Center for State Courts). Mr. Fick served for 10 years on the Board of Governors of the Maryland Trial Lawyers Association (now Maryland Association for Justice). He enjoys serving on the Dean's Development Circle for the University of Baltimore School of Law. As a general aviation pilot for 30 years, he now advises general aviation pilots, and since 2017 only mediates litigated cases.
C. WILLIAM MICHAELS was graduated from the University of Maryland School of Law in 1978. As a law student, he was on the staff of the Maryland Law Review and also was the Managing Editor of the Maryland Law Forum. (At that time, the only law student to receive recognition for both publications.)
Mr. Michaels has a B.A. in Politics and Philosophy from Brandeis University where he graduated magna cum laude with special honors. He was also on the staff of its weekly newspaper The Justice.
After law school, he clerked for a Circuit Court judge in Howard County. Following that, he was Editor-in-Chief and General Manager for a daily newspaper also in Howard County. His experience includes a position as Legal Editor at Bureau of National Affairs (now Bloomberg BNA). He has conducted a solo appellate practice based in Towson for more than 20 years, drafting briefs or as a lead counsel for appellate cases in Maryland and District of Columbia appellate courts and also in the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Federal Circuit. He is also a member of the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Mr. Michaels wrote the book No Greater Threat: America After September 11 and the Rise of a National Security State (Algora Publishing, 2002, 2d ed. 2005). He is a former member of The Daily Record Editorial Advisory Board. Mr. Michaels is a member of the Maryland State Bar Association, Baltimore City Bar Association, Baltimore County Bar Association, and the Maryland Association for Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a basic overview of general standards for imposing liability in motor vehicle accident cases. The defenses that are specific and unique to automobile accidents will be discussed.
Liability for damages sustained in motor vehicle accidents can be imposed because of negligence in the operation of the vehicle, willful or wanton misconduct, strict liability, or vicarious liability. This chapter will be primarily concerned with liability imposed because of negligent operation. The chapter will also briefly discuss willful or wanton misconduct and strict liability. Although vicarious liability will be mentioned, the reader is also referred to Chapter 16, Accidents Involving Multiple Parties for a more thorough discussion.
Related topics that are covered at length in other chapters of this deskbook include specific types of negligence. Although this chapter will mention several of the specific topics outlined above, the reader is referred to the specific chapter for a more in-depth analysis.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Most automobile cases involve claims of negligence or unintentional conduct. To successfully assert a negligence claim, four elements must be proven: (1) a breach of (2) a duty which is (3) the proximate cause of (4) plaintiff's injury. A duty may be imposed by statute or by common law decision. In Maryland, negligence is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the accident or incident occurred, not where participants of the incident or accident are residents.1
Although not arising out of an automobile case, an excellent global description of negligence is found in Prudential Secs., Inc. v. e-Net, Inc.2 In Maryland, in order to establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove: a duty owed to the plaintiff or to a class of which the plaintiff is a part; a breach of that duty; a causal relationship between the breach and the harm; and damages suffered. Absent a duty of care, there can be no liability in negligence, for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes another. As the duty owed varies with circumstances and with relation to each of the individuals concerned, so the alleged negligence varies. The act complained of never amounts to negligence in law or fact if there has been no breach of duty.
III. THE DUTY OF CARE
A. In General
Generally, negligence cannot be presumed from the mere occurrence of an accident. A duty and its breach must be proven to make one party responsible. In the absence of negligence, it cannot be inferred that one party rather than the other was at fault.3 Thus, the giving of a "mere happening of an accident" instruction may be reversible error if it conflicts with an instruction that a violation of the rules of the road is negligence.4
Although statutes impose many specific duties upon drivers and pedestrians, the common law requires every driver to exercise ordinary, reasonable care.5 This duty can be defined as follows:
Standard of Care—The driver of a motor vehicle must use ordinary and reasonable care. Reasonable care is that degree of caution and attention which a person of ordinary skill and judgment would use under similar circumstances.6
Drivers of large or heavy vehicles have been found to have a duty to take special consideration of the size and weight of the vehicle they are driving.7
Every driver has a right to assume that others will obey the law. However, this assumption does not impair, undermine, or supersede the driver's duty to exercise ordinary care by avoiding injuries to other persons or vehicles and by protecting his own safety.
The law does not attempt to define in detail what constitutes "reasonable care" under all possible circumstances. What constitutes reasonable care depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. Although the actions or precautions required by the standard may vary under different circumstances, the standard remains the same.8
B. Duty of Ordinary Care—Disabled
For the physically disabled, it is usually appropriate to give an instruction regarding diminished capacity if the disabled party involved is a pedestrian, passenger. or bicycle rider. Physically disabled persons are required to conform to the standard of reasonable care for persons with a similar disability.
Although no Maryland case addresses the issue, it is assumed that drivers who are physically disabled are required to conform to the standard of a reasonably careful person without a disability. A person who operates an automobile on the public streets will not be held to a lesser standard of care because of a disability and therefore may not be entitled to a diminished capacity instruction.
A driver who, without forewarning, suddenly becomes physically or mentally incapacitated, e.g. unconscious due to a heart attack, a blackout, fainting, or seizure, is not liable for injury resulting from the operation of the vehicle while so incapacitated.9 Any resulting injury is considered an unavoidable accident. This sudden incapacity defense is not a departure from the rule requiring the exercise of ordinary care; it merely shifts the inquiry to a stage earlier than that of the moment of occurrence.
If, however, it is found that a driver knew, or ought reasonably to have foreseen, that because of a physical or mental condition, the driver would be likely to become incapacitated in this fashion, there would be a finding of negligence. If, on the other hand, the loss of consciousness or other diminishment of capacity was not reasonably foreseeable, then there would not be a finding of negligence.
Similarly, there are occasions when a person might be entitled to a diminished capacity instruction. Although the defense of diminished capacity is usually associated with criminal proceedings, there are many situations where such an instruction might be appropriate in a civil proceeding. The critical issue in any civil action arising out of a vehicular crime is whether the offending driver had relevant deficits such as seizures, problems with attention, concentration, memory, inability to reason clearly and solve problems, slower thought processing, difficulty understanding others, trouble following directions, changes in control of temper, impulsivity, and similar potentially material conditions. These set of conditions may be related to a stroke, transient ischemic attack (TIA), or any neurological disorders or illnesses that are permanent or are occurring persistently.
IV. STATUTORY STANDARDS OF CARE
A. Negligence Per Se—Generally
Although...
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