Chapter 9 Standards of Review on Appeal

• Library: Handling Appeals in Arkansas (2015 Ed.)

STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

Brandon J. Harrison

A. Introduction................................................................................................................. 9-2

1. De Novo Review.............................................................................................. 9-4

2. Clearly Erroneous.......................................................................................... 9-6

3. Substantial Evidence..................................................................................... 9-9

4. Abuse Of Discretion.................................................................................... 9-10

B. Standards Of Appellate Court Review.............................................................. 9-15

1. Administrative Agency Decisions.......................................................... 9-15

2. District Court Decisions............................................................................. 9-18

3. Circuit Court Decisions.............................................................................. 9-19

(a) Questions Of Law............................................................................ 9-19

(b) Findings Of Fact – Bench Trials................................................... 9-23

(c) Class Action Certification.............................................................. 9-24

(d) Default Judgments........................................................................... 9-25

(e) Dismissals.......................................................................................... 9-25

(f) Discovery........................................................................................... 9-28

(g) Summary Judgments...................................................................... 9-29

(h) Evidence............................................................................................. 9-30

(i) Jury Instructions............................................................................... 9-31

(j) Directed Verdict Or Dismissal..................................................... 9-33

(k) Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict................................... 9-35

(l) Motions For New Trial................................................................... 9-36

(m) Juror Misconduct............................................................................. 9-46

(n) Remittitur........................................................................................... 9-48

(o) Domestic Relations.......................................................................... 9-51

(p) Attorneys’ Fees................................................................................. 9-54

(q) Stays..................................................................................................... 9-57

(r) Extraordinary Writs ....................................................................... 9-60

4. Appellate Court Decisions........................................................................ 9-62

(a) Supreme Court Review of the Court of Appeals.................... 9-62

(b) Petitions for Rehearing................................................................... 9-62

____________

A. Introduction

By rule appellants and cross-appellants must succinctly state the standard of review “at the beginning of the discussion of the issue” on appeal. ASCR 4-2(a)(7). That’s the dry-as-dust rule upfront. But wait! On this appellate-law point you must “seek simplicity and distrust it.”

Standards of review determine the degree of deference (if any) the appellate court will give the circuit court’s or administrative agency’s decisions in the case being appealed. For trial attorneys, the standards should mold legal and fact-based arguments before a court or agency because the applicable standard of review “will one day be the lens through which [the] client’s day in court will be examined.” R. Christopher Lawson, Seeing the Appellate Horizon: Civil Trial Strategy and Standards of Review in the Eighth Circuit, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 561, 562 (2002). For appellate lawyers, the standard of review is “the blueprint for success on appeal, and the tool that shapes every winning argument.” Id.

So carefully consider the standards of review. Ignore them at your client’s potential peril. And be sure to state and apply the appropriate standard for each issue on appeal. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P. O. Market, Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 664, 66 S.W.3d 620, 628-29 (2002).

In some cases, lawyers offer competing standards on a particular issue. E.g., Advocat v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 42-43, 111 S.W.3d 346, 353 (2003). The appellate court itself may view the dispute differently than counsel and choose a standard the parties don’t press. Morgan v. Chandler, No. 06-310, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 505, at *8-9 (Oct. 12, 2006). The point is not to treat Rule 4-2(a)(7)’s requirement mechanically, or you’ll miss a chance to advocate well. And make sure the record on appeal includes all the information you will need to fully prosecute or defend the appeal, whatever standard could reasonably be applied.

Many metaphors exist concerning the standards of review. But whether a standard is termed a filter, lens, astrolabe, compass, or the next-generation GPS, the point is this: you must write your brief knowing how an appellate court will orient itself towards your case, and what mindset the court will use to guide it to decision. Familiarizing yourself with the applicable standard of review – by studying some opinions where the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have applied it – is all you need to serve your client well regarding this base part of the appeal process. A deliberation with the Oracle at Delphi is not required.

I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, “The more you explain it, the more I don’t understand it.”

Justice Robert H. Jackson

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947).

It’s helpful to think of a sliding scale of deference when discussing the four primary standards of review. On this continuum, the de novo standard defers least to the forum that decided the issue being appealed. At the other extreme is the abuse-of-discretion standard, the most deferential of the four. The remaining two standards, substantial evidence and clearly erroneous, fall between the extremes.

Some standards of review don’t offer the same degree of deference in every context, meaning there is a sliding scale within a specific standard. This is particularly so regarding abuse-of-discretion issues (discussed below). But variations also occur on questions of law. For example, statutory interpretation questions, like other law-based issues, are usually reviewed de novo. Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 461, 182 S.W.3d 112, 116 (2004). Yet, an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute that it’s charged to execute “is highly persuasive” and “will not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong.” Pine Bluff for Safe Disposal v. Ark. Pollution Control & Ecology Comm’n, 354 Ark. 563, 583, 127 S.W.3d 509, 523 (2003). An appellate court will, however, accept a circuit court’s construction of a statute unless the court “erred in its interpretation of the law.” Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 459, 995 S.W.2d 341, 345 (1999).

On rehearing, the Court of Appeals addressed the standard “for reviewing the judgment in a criminal case when evidence is entirely circumstantial.” King v. State, 100 Ark. App. 208, 213, 266 S.W.3d 205, 206 (2007) (r’hg denied). For introductory purposes, the supplemental opinion is pertinent for two observations. First, “[a] full statement of the standard of review must recognize both parts of the inquiry, the fact-finder’s role at trial and the appellate court’s role on appeal.” Id. at 214, 266 S.W.3d at 207. Second, an “oft-repeated standard” can become “clouded by slight modifications in the language of the opinions over time.” Id. So as an appellate advocate, take the opportunity to suggest to the reviewing court when a standard of review should be clarified. Similarly, stay current on our appellate courts’ expressions of the standard of review that applies to your case under review.

1. De Novo Review

You know – or soon will – that in state court an appeal from a district court to a circuit court gets you a “trial de novo” in the circuit court. Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 7(A). Black’s defines the term “trial de novo” as “[a] new trial on the entire case – that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law – conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed. 2004). This is Arkansas’s view. E.g., Harrell v. City of Conway, 296 Ark. 247, 248, 753 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1988) (a trial de novo proceeds “as though there had been no trial in the lower court”).

But a trial de novo is not the same as de novo review. The Court of Appeals has explained that “[w]hile our appellate review is de novo, it is conducted on a record already made . . . . It is not a trial de novo, such as appeals from [district court] to circuit court, where cases appealed are tried anew.” Paslay v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 75 Ark. App. 19, 21, 53 S.W.3d 67, 68 (2001).

When review is de novo, the appellate court decides independently the issue on appeal based on the record developed in the trial court. But it will not usually defer to the trial court’s ruling. Nationwide Ins. Enter. v. Ibanez, No. 06-765, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 27 at *4 (Jan. 11, 2007); Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 352 Ark. 315, 320-21, 101 S.W.3d 221, 225 (2003); Wyatt v. Giles, No. CA05-1094, 2006 Ark. App. LEXIS 322 at *3-*4 (May 10, 2006).

I’ve mentioned before that appellate courts review questions of law de novo, though they may occasionally defer to the circuit court’s interpretation of a statute or an administrative agency. Also, cases that would have been heard in the former chancery and probate courts before Amendment 80's passage are now reviewed de novo on questions...