§81.7 Significant Authorities

• Jurisdiction: Washington

§81.7SIGNIFICANT AUTHORITIES

Washington courts are predisposed to applying the civil rules whenever possible and avoid denning the term "special proceeding" unless necessary. For example, the issue in Curtis Lumber Co. v. Sortor,83 Wn.2d 764, 522P.2d822 (1974), was whether a mechanic's lien asserted under RCW 60.04.100 (repealed 1991) expired when a complaint was timely filed, but service of the summons upon necessary parties was not made within eight months of filing the lien claim. The Washington Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, overruled City Sash & Door Co. v. Bunn,90 Wash. 669, 156 P. 854 (1916), overruled by Curtis Lumber Co. v. Sortor, 85 Wn.2d 764, 522P.2d822 (1974), and held that RCW 60.04.100 (repealed 1991) was a statute of limitations and that CR 3 controlled the procedure for commencement of an action. The majority did not expressly decide whether a mechanic's lien action was a "special proceeding," but emphasized the ability to construe the statute and rule in harmony with one another. Curtis Lumber Co., 85 Wn.2d at 767-68. The legislature thereafter amended the mechanic's lien statute. In subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals determined that the action was, in fact, a "special proceeding," and the procedural rules in the mechanics' lien statute, as amended, prevailed. Pac. Erectors,Inc. v. Gall Landau Young Constr. Co.,62 Wn.App. 158, 164-65, 813 P.2d 1243 (1991), review denied,118 Wn.2d 1015 (1992).

In Chief Seattle Properties, Inc. v. Kitsap County,86 Wn.2d 7, 541 P.2d 699 (1975), the appellant contended that the mandamus proceeding statutes did not allow the addition of parties or permit the institution of an action for declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Chapter 7.24 RCW. The court found no inconsistency between the civil rules and the mandamus proceeding statutes, noting that mandamus involves all of the usual elements of a civil proceeding. Id. at 28.

In Kelly v. Powell,...