Chapter 8 - § 8.3 • SCOPE OF THE ACT

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 8.3 • SCOPE OF THE ACT

The CGIA may bar claims for damages at law for an entity's torts, including negligence, trespass, and nuisance, depending on the circumstances.¹⁹ Equitable claims for injunctive relief premised on the same facts are probably also barred by the CGIA.²⁰ Breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims, and claims under the Colorado Constitution, Colorado's eminent domain laws, and the U.S. Constitution and federal law are not subject to the CGIA.²¹

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Notes:

^[19] C.R.S. § 24-10-106(1) (declaring CGIA applies to claims "which lie in tort or could lie in tort . . . ."); Buckles v. Colo. Div. of Wildlife, 952 P.2d 855, 856 (Colo. App. 1998) (trespass claim barred by CGIA); Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064, 1066 (Colo. 2007) (finding CGIA does not bar liability for state employee's negligence because employee driving a private car); Langlois v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Cty. of El Paso, 78 P.3d 1154, 1156 (Colo. App. 2003) (nuisance claim barred by CGIA).

^[20] Colo. Dep't of Transp. v. Brown Retail Grp., 182 P.3d 687, 688 (Colo. 2008) ("Because . . . claims for contribution, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief all assert claims of liability against the [government entity] that either lie in tort or could lie in tort within the meaning of the Governmental Immunity Act, they are governed by it and must meet with its prerequisites."), distinguished by Upper Platte & Beaver Canal Co. v. Riverview Commons Gen. Improvement Dist., 250 P.3d 711, 717 (Colo. App. 2010) (CGIA did not bar claims for declaratory, injunctive, and limited restorative relief); Allen Homesite Grp. v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 19 P.3d 32, 35 (Colo. App. 2000) (finding equitable claims barred by CGIA because they could have been framed as tort claims and "the GIA bars claims that lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that is the form of action chosen by the claimant"; "our supreme court has distinguished equitable estoppel claims from promissory estoppel claims for purposes of the GIA . . . a claim for equitable estoppel is deemed to be a tort claim for purposes of the GIA." (citing Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 919 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1996); Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Summit Cty. v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714, 716 (Colo. 1996))).

^[21] Berg, 919 P.2d at 258-59 (determining CGIA does not apply to actions grounded in contracts; promissory estoppel claims are contractual in nature and not subject to CGIA); City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 184 n...