Chapter §7.3 Other Rules of Construction

• Jurisdiction: Washington

§7.3 OTHER RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

In addition to the overarching rule to construe the PRA in favor of disclosure, the following additional rules of construction are relevant to PRA cases. First, the usual canons of statutory interpretation, which apply when any law's meaning is contested, are often used in a PRA context. Second, three statutory provisions, RCW 42.56.070(9), .210(3), and .904, contain more specific rules of construction dealing with particular kinds of records. Finally, Washington courts borrow from federal courts' reasoning in cases under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to the extent that the PRA mirrors FOIA.

In Associated Press v. Washington State Legislature,__Wn.2d__, 454 P.3d 93, (2019), the court looked to the definitions of the former Public Disclosure Act (former RCW 42.17.020 (2005), now codified as amended in RCW 42.17A.005) to determine that the offices of state legislators qualified as "agencies" that had to comply with the Public Records Act. Although the court generally has refused to "borrow" definitions from one statute to interpret that same term in an unrelated statute, here the court found that the legislative history of the PRA justified the court's decision to look to the old Public Disclosure Act definitions. Even though the decision only addressed the PRA's definition of "agency," it is possible the common definitions from the old Public Disclosure Act also could be used to interpret the PRA's definitions of "public record" and "writing."

(1) The usual canons of statutory construction apply to PRA cases

Although the PRA has its own construction instructions, the general rules for interpreting statutes also apply. Limstrom v. Ladenburg (Limstrom II), 136 Wn.2d 595, 606, 963 P.2d 869 (1998). When the meaning of statutory language is plain on its face, courts must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of what the legislature intended. Zink v. City of Mesa (Zink II), 162 Wn.App. 688, 709, 256 P.3d 384 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1010 (2012); Ockerman v. King Cnty. Dep't of Dev. & Envtl. Servs., 102 Wn.App. 212, 216, 6 P.3d 1214 (2000). In Wade's Eastside Gun Shop, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 185 Wn.2d 270, 278, 372 P.3d 97 (2016), the Supreme Court relied on the plain meaning of the definitions in RCW 42.56.010 in holding that a single page can be a "public record" subject to a separate penalty under RCW 42.56.550(4). See also Anderson v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., Div. of Child Support, 196 Wn.App. 674, 681-84, 384 P.3d 651 (2016) (citing the plain language rule in holding that RCW 26.23.120, which makes certain child support information "private and confidential," is an "other statute" exemption under RCW 42.56.070(1)).Courts will use dictionary definitions to give PRA terms their plain meaning. Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wn.2d 863, 881, 357 P.3d 45 (2015) (Courts "may use a dictionary to discern the plain meaning of an undefined statutory term.") (citations omitted); Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. #405,164 Wn.2d 199, 211, 189 P.3d 139 (2008) (definition of "personal"); Servais v. Port of Bellingham, 127 Wn.2d 820, 830-31, 904 P.2d 1124 (1995). Courts also will look to legislative history to construe ambiguous terms. Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims,152 Wn.2d 421, 434, 98 P.3d 463 (2004). Courts "do not rewrite unambiguous statutory language under the guise of interpretation." SEIU Healthcare 775 NW v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 193 Wn.App. 377, 399, 377 P.3d 214, review denied, 186 Wn.2d 1016 (2016). But when a statute is ambiguous, courts will look to legislative history to construe it. Yousoufian, 152 Wn.2d at 434. For example, in Doe L v. Pierce County, 7 Wn.App. 2d 157, 182, 433 P.3d 838, review denied, 193 Wn.2d 1015 (2019), the court looked to legislative history to interpret the personal...